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ABSTRACT
Senhua, Yu. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May, 2010. Exploration of sense of
self and humoral immunity for artificial immune systems: algorithms and
applications. Major Professor: Dipankar Dasgupta, Ph.D.
Many interesting immunological processes and mechanisms provide a potential
source of inspiration for researchers to build Artificial Immune System (AIS), among
which self versus nonself recognition is one of the distinctive mechanisms that are
explored for AIS with minimum logical and technique overlap for any existing techniques. This dissertation explores a revised sense of “self” suggested in Pattern
Recognition Receptors Model as a new immunity-based approach called Conserved
Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA). The CSPRA alleviates the intrinsic
limit of negative selection algorithms by combining the results of both self pattern
recognition and negative selection for anomaly detection rather than simply assuming
all foreign patterns are anomalies. To coordinate the detections from two signals in
the CSPRA, both Classical CSPRA and Selective CSPRA are proposed. Classical
CSPRA mirrors the immunological metaphor and does not trigger the costimulation
of APC detector (signal 2) until the T cell detector suspects the encountered anomalous sample (signal 1), whereas Selective CSPRA exploits domain knowledge and
randomized methods to resolve the conflicts between two signals in the system. This
dissertation demonstrates that the CSPRA has promising performance on breast cancer diagnosis and great potential in clinical diagnosis. Despite the articulation and
clarification of the concept of conserved self pattern, a network-based Intrusion Detection (ID) model based on the CSPRA named CSPRA-ID, which is augmented with a
novel scheme of near-deterministic detector generation, is presented. The CSPRA-ID
worked very successfully on the DARPA network intrusion data. Multilevel Immune
Learning Algorithm (MILA) is the abstraction of the immunological events in humoral immunity with the features of multilevel recognition and online learning. The

v

experiments have shown its success on anomaly detection. A MILA-based framework for automated and adaptive eye localization via face detection is proposed and
implemented in this work. It applies a multilevel detection strategy resembling the
top-down search to locate the eyes in face areas with the Viola-Jones object detection
approach, prior to that the high-quality solutions are identified through the process
of recognition and evolution. The experiments were performed with the PUT face
database to demonstrate the strength and uniqueness of the proposed framework.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In his classic “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” paper published in 1950 [240],
Alan Turing strongly believed that a well-designed computer would mimic the processes of the human brain and do anything the brain could do. To date, Turing’s visionary statements have been partially proven by enormous success in the modeling of
biological and natural intelligence. A great number of intelligent algorithms, including
artificial neural networks, evolutionary algorithms, swarm intelligence, fuzzy systems,
case-based reasoning and classifier systems, form part of the field of computational
intelligence. Artificial Immune System (AIS) is another computational intelligence
paradigm. The mechanisms of self/nonself discrimination, collaboration, adaptability, memory, and learning in the vertebrate immune system provide a potential source
of inspiration for computer scientists and engineers alike to develop computational
tools for solving particular science and engineering problems. Although it has less
than twenty-years histories since the immune system metaphor was applied to the
area of fault diagnosis in 1990 [122], AIS is emerging as one of the most exciting and
novel areas of research in computer science today involving models and applications
of greater diversity.
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The mechanisms of the biological immune system
The biological immune system has multi-layered architecture with defenses at all levels to protect the body from invading pathogens such as viruses and bacteria. It
can be envisioned as a two-tier line of defense, known as innate (nonspecific) immunity and adaptive (specific) immunity. The main components in innate immunity
include granulocytes and macrophages, which immediately“eat” the extracellular infectious microorganisms, without requiring previous exposure to them. The adaptive
immunity is mediated by lymphocytes, including T cell and B cell. The lymphocytes
become activated via the receptors in the surfaces of the lymphocytes highly specific
to a given antigenic determinant that recognizes the particular sites called epitope on
the surface of an antigenic stimulus, resulting in the development of memory cells by
the proliferation, selection and affinity maturation of the lymphocytes.
The adaptive immunity consists of humoral immunity and cellular immunity. The
antibodies are secreted by plasma cells (matured B cell) in the humoral immune
response. The antigen/antibody binding further activates the complement systems
to form a pore-forming molecule-membrane attacking complex (MAC) destroying the
foreign antigen. The cellular immunity is mediated by the cytokines generated by
T helper cells and plays an important role in the killing of virus-infected cells and
tumor cells.
Signaling takes a major role in sharing and passing information during the immune
response. Signals are generated among cells during the immune response and the
cells can move a signal from outside to inside. Cytokine is generally involved in
this cell signaling process. T cell phylogenesis is a good example to explain the
cell signaling process mediated by the cytokine. In the innate immune response,
some cytokines such as IL2, IL4, IL12, and IFNγ are produced by macrophages.
These cytokines can determine the generation of different types of T cells. T delayed
hypersensitivity (TDH ) lymphocyte produces IL2 (T cell growth factor), all other T
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lymphocytes must have a dose of IL2 before they will respond to antigen. Pre-T cell
is matured into Cytotoxic T lymphocyte (CTL) capable of killing vital infected cells
and tumor cells with the help of IL2. IL4 and IL12 stimulate the matured T cell to
be differentiated into T helper lymphocyte (TH ), which helps the activation of the
B cells. The production of TDH is affected by IL12 and IFNγ. The mediation of T
suppressor cells (Ts) remains unknown.
Self/nonself discrimination is considered one of the major immunological mechanisms. This mechanism includes negative selection of T cells and negative selection
of B cells. The negative selection of T cells can occur within the thymus or on the
periphery. The thymus is comprised of a myriad of class I and class II MHC-bearing
antigen presenting cells (APCs). These APCs primarily present self-peptide/MHC
complexes to the emerging T cell repertoire. The negative selection of T cells stems
from interactions of immature T cells with the self peptides presented by the selfMHC molecules on the surface of the APCs. Such interactions purge potentially auto
reactive T cells from the repertoire because the self reactive T cells will die in this
process. T cells with higher affinity to self peptides are more effectively purged from
the repertoire than those with lower affinities. Whether or not negative selection
occurs during B cell maturation was for a long time controversial. The debate comes
from the fact that there is no need to delete or inactive self reactive B cells because
the response of B cells to antigens is absolutely dependent on T helper cells. However, the biological findings also show that it would seem highly desirable to delete
or inactivate self reactive B cells: 1) B cells have the capacity to respond to antigens
without the help of T cells; 2) the microbial protein possesses a B cell epitope that
is similar to identical to the corresponding region of the homologous vertebrate self
protein. If self reactive B cells specific for this shared B cell epitope are present in the
body, then it directly interacts with the microbial proteins and thereby elicit T cell
help; and 3) it is very likely to create by accident receptors with increased affinity for
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self antigens during somatic hypemutation.

From biological to artificial immune system
Various immunological mechanisms or processes summarized above reveal that the
biological immune system is a valuable metaphor for developing novel computational
intelligence paradigms. Some of the interesting theoretical aspects that are explored
for the development of AIS are summarized as follows:
1. Negative selection: it is a powerful metaphor in the domain of anomaly detection. T cell receptors are initially generated through a pseudo-random genetic
rearrangement process and then undergo a censoring (maturation) process in
the thymus to eliminate self reactive immature T cells. This process is called
negative selection. Negative selection algorithm is one of the earliest AIS models inspired by the negative selection. It has been applied in various real world
applications. However, negative selection algorithm initially assumes that all
foreign patterns are anomalies, which inevitably results in a high false positive error rate. Over the years, many works dealt with improving the method
to tackle the limits, leading to a family of negative selection algorithm that
collects all of its variations.
2. Immune network theory: it is the inspiration of artificial immune network (AIN)
and its updated version AINE. The immune system maintains an idiotypic network of interconnected B cells that stimulate and suppress each other in certain
ways to keep the stability of the network. The immune system presents an
intrinsic dynamic behavior with the capability of recognizing and being recognized by other elements in the network. This idea can be exploited in helping
to create a dynamic model of some data being learnt to understand the data
being modeled.
3. Clonal selection principle: It establishes the idea that only those lymphocytes
4

capable of recognizing an antigenic stimulus will undergo proliferation, differentiation and selection. The algorithm (CLONALG) is based on this principle
and has been applied to pattern recognition and optimization problem.
4. Danger Theory: It suggests that immune system reacts to danger. The danger
is measured by the damage to cells. Alarm signal is emitted when a cell undergoes an unnatural death. Such signal establishes a danger zone around itself.
Only if antigen/antibody match occurs in the danger zone, lymphocytes will be
activated.
5. Dendritic cell function: Dendritic cell algorithm is inspired from the function of
dendritic cells of the human immune system. The algorithm processes the input
signals (PAMP, Danger Signal, and Safe Signal) with the pre-defined weights to
produce three output signals (costimulation signal, semi-mature signal, mature
signal). If the cumulative mature signal is greater than cumulative semi-mature
signal value, then the cell differentiates towards the mature state and is assigned
a “context value” of 1. The algorithm then calculates the proportion of mature
context presentation of that particular antigen, relative to the total antigens,
termed “MCAV” of that antigen. The antigens with a MCAC which exceeds
the predefined threshold are classified as anomalous and vice versa.
Through reading the literature, negative selection algorithms have dominated the
AIS field since it was developed in 1994 and become the most popular algorithm, notably in the field of anomaly detection. Both immune network theory and clonal selection principle are also widely used and accepted in the AIS field. Danger Theory and
dendritic cell algorithm are relatively new models in AIS and still immature. These
algorithms have been applied to a wide variety of applications including anomaly detection, pattern recognition, data mining, fault detection, and optimization, to name
a few. Recent advances in AIS have seen many other areas of immunology starting
5

to inspire new models and applications.

Contributions of this work
A comprehensive and critical literature review of the recent advances in the areas
of AIS is achieved. This work explores up-to-date advances in four major AIS algorithms: 1) Negative Selection Algorithm; 2) Artificial Immune Networks; 3) Clonal
Selection Algorithm; and 4) Danger Theory and Dendritic Cell Algorithms and surveys the major works in the application area of AIS in last few years. This work
would be a meaningful complement to the existing reviews, where either the different
aspects of the AIS field were surveyed or the recent advances in the AIS were missing.
In addition to serving as valuable reference resources for the researchers interested in
knowing the most recent advances in the AIS, this work can provide more insights
into the underlying immunological principles and possible inspirations, differences
and similarities between various AIS models, advantages, existing issues and possible
remedies, and potential applications.
It becomes widely acceptable within researchers in the area of NSA that NSA
produces a high false positive error rate due to its initial assumption - classifying all
foreign patterns as anomalies. The self in the NSA is defined early in the training
stage, based on incomplete self sample points. The non-self patterns, which come
later and are different from those early defined self, would not necessarily represent
anomalies and thus a high false positive error rate is viewed as the intrinsic limit of
the NSA [144]. Some early works to tackle this limit were confined to the modification
of NSA itself [144]. On the basis of further exploring the limit of the original NSA,
however, this dissertation went to different directions and attempted to take relatively new immune theory on self/nonself recognition mechanisms as inspiration to
build new approach for anomaly detection by alleviating some issues in the NSA. The
significant contribution of such efforts came as a new algorithm inspired from the Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs) model, called Conserved Self Pattern Recognition
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Algorithm (CSPRA). False positive error rate for anomaly detection is significantly
reduced with CSPRA, as the algorithm takes its inspiration from PRRs model, which
allows APCs to discriminate between “infectious nonself” and “noninfectious self”
and thus prevents from detecting altered or unknown self, which could be mistakenly
classified as anomalies in the original NSA and the variants of NSA. A series of works
on the CSPRA were carried out in this dissertation:
1. Tolerating self and attacking nonself are the basic idea of the self-nonself model.
However, this simple model has failed to explain a great number of findings such
as alerted self, pregnancy, aging and so forth. The PRRs model suggested that
the lymphocytes (T cell or B cell) would die if it recognized antigen (Signal
1) without the costimulation from Antigen Presenting Cells (APCs) (Signal
2), which can recognize evolving pathogens. As a computational imitation of
the PRRs model, the anomalies in the CSPRA is determined by combining
the results from APCs self pattern recognition and T cell negative selection. To
resolve the conflicts for anomaly detection between two types of the detectors in
the detection phase of the algorithm, two strategies known as Classical CSPRA
and Selective CSPRA were proposed.
• Classical CSPRA: the anomalies for the new sample are firstly and mainly
determined by T cell detectors. If the T cell detector could not confidently
detect the new sample, that is, the suspicious antigen is encountered, then
the anomaly for the suspicious antigen is determined by the APC detector.
• Selective CSPRA: the new sample is checked by both T cell detector and
APC detector. The matching distances for both detectors are kept in
record during the detection phase. The ambiguous boundaries for both
detectors are pre-defined. If the new sample is fallen into the ambiguous
region of both T cell detectors and APC detectors, then random method
7

is selected to determine the anomaly. Otherwise, the anomaly for the new
sample is determined by either T cell detector or APC detector based on
the domain knowledge.
2. An empirical study of the CSPRA was conducted by comparing to other oneclass classifiers (NSA, point-wise V-detector, boundary-aware V-detector, and
one-class SVM) and evaluating with various random number generators. The
following conclusions were derived in this study:
• The performance of both Classical CSPRA and Selective CSPRA are obviously better by comparison with other one-class classifiers
• The Selective CSPRA performs better than the Classical CSPRA for the
tested data sets. However, the Classical CSPRA becomes more efficient because it does not trigger APCs self pattern recognition unless the anomaly
called suspicious antigen could not be confidently detected by T cell negative selection.
• The different random number generators do influence the performance of
NSA, Classical CSPRA, and Selective CSPRA. However, such impacts are
obviously lessened in the CSPRA, which indicates that the CSPRA is more
stable and reliable.
3. The work on the theoretical aspect of the CSPRA revealed that the algorithm
has several important features: it is flexible to exploit the advantages of other
NSA variants; the complexity of the CSPRA is not increased in comparison
to the original NSA; the performance of the CSPRA is not degraded in any
applications by comparison with that of the NSA; The CSPRA achieves the
better performance by revising the sense of “self” other than simply assuming
“nonself is the anomaly”.
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4. In addition to the articulation and clarification of the concept of “conserved self
pattern” involved in the CSPRA, a novel scheme for near-deterministic detector
generation was proposed. Although the proposed near-deterministic detector
is integrated to the CSPRA for T-detector generation and detection in this
dissertation, it can be used as either a standalone algorithm or as a component
in the complicated system other than the CSPRA. The major advantages of the
proposed near-deterministic detector generation scheme can be highlighted as
follows:
• The detector is placed in a highly correlated manner to generate the detector set with an optimal distribution. Consequently, fewer detectors are
required to cover near full nonself space.
• The center of the next variable-sized detector is online determined by
reusing the samples generated for the coverage estimate during the detector generation. The detectors with an optimal distribution are generated
without any additional optimization step.
• The enforcement of the placement rule - the next detector is very foreign
to the existing detectors shall alleviate the overlapping of the detectors to
a certain degree.
• The control parameter self radius (r self ) is removed in this scheme after
examining the impacts of this parameter. This modification, in fact, allows
the algorithm to keep smaller detectors to better cover the holes in the
nonself space and make the algorithm more operable and reliable because
an optimal value for this parameter is usually difficult to be found.
5. Some important real-world application areas are explored with the CSPRA,
including clinical diagnosis and intrusion detection.
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• The Selective CSPRA is applied to analyze cytological characteristics of
the breast fine-needle aspirates (FNAs) for clinical breast cancer diagnosis.
By detecting the malignant cases with clinical breast cancer data collected
by Dr. Wolberg from the University of Wisconsin Hospitals, Madison, the
system could produce the detection rate of 99.54% with the false alarm
rate of 4.23% when training with 50% benign samples. The performance
is very promising compared to the results from the previous works (linear
programming, neural network, and ant colony based system).
• A new variant CSPRA-ID (CSPRA for Intrusion Detection) is proposed.
The CSPRA-ID cannot only identify known intrusions by utilizing the
knowledge of well-known attacks to build the conserved self pattern (APC
detector) but also detect novel intrusions because of the nature of one-class
classification of the T detectors. CSPRA-ID can detect 4,412,041 samples
within 34 minutes and yield high detection rate of 99.56% when the false
alarm rate is as low as 0.48%. One-class SVM has been selected to compare
with the CSPRA-ID science Stibor et al. reported that this technique has
very competitive performance on network intrusion detection problems in
comparison to real-valued NSA [222]. This dissertation demonstrated that
CSPRA-ID yields far lower false alarm rate with the comparable detection
rate in comparison to the SVM results obtained with the same parameter
settings as in [222].
Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm (MILA) takes the abstraction of T cell
dependent humoral immune response and utilizes more immune mechanisms, together with the feature of online learning, to detect the anomalies in a multilevel,
multi-resolution and more efficient fashion. Our early works showed that MILA can
successfully detect anomalies in time series. To further explore the potential of the
MILA, this technique was extended as a generic framework to build an automated
10

and adaptive system for detecting face and facial features. The proposed framework
consists of three layers: Initialization, Recognition and Evolution, and Response. It
applies the top-down search strategy to locate the eyes in face areas. The Haar Cascade Classifier is used to directly detect the objects of interesting (face and eyes) in
the system. The significant contribution of the proposed framework is that a multilevel detection strategy through a group of detectors (APC, Th, Ts, B) is adapted to
ensure the detection system more robust and efficient and the high-quality solutions
at each detecting level are automatically identified through the process of recognition and evolution. Some unique and practical features of the proposed framework
include:
1. The top-down strategy of information processing is adopted in the proposed
multilevel detection system. The incoming pattern is allowed access to the
next-level detection only when it successfully passes the preceded detection. To
distinguish with the previous works, a fast and high-level detection method is
proceeded as the first step to exclude the non-face images from the incoming
patterns. This strategy ensures the system more efficient and robust.
2. An evolutionary process automatically generates the optimal parameter settings
and selects the appropriate face detector. This selection process takes all possible detecting parameters as a whole to be considered rather than checking
each parameter in a piecemeal manner, for example, manual parameter tuning.
Therefore, this technique is more efficient and reliable.
3. The eye localization in the proposed framework is scanned in a more restricted
region. Thus, the additional detection, feature extraction or computation is
avoided and the detecting process is expedited due to a less computational
complexity.
4. The recognition and evolutionary is an offline process for finding high-quality
11

solutions to face and eye detection. The complexity of this process is not propagated to the detecting process which usually requires the fast or real-time
response.
5. The suppression mechanism proposed in our framework is a very useful feature
for cost reduction that is usually considered for an industry-level application.
The experiments were performed with real-world face images to show the strength
and uniqueness of the proposed framework. This work initiates a new application area
for immunity-based approaches. We expect that the researchers in the AIS community
will bring more attention to the exciting area of face recognition.

Dissertation layout
The rest part of this dissertation is organized as following. Chapter 2 surveys the
major works in AIS field, in particular, explores up-to-date advances in Applied AIS
during the last few years. This chapter also briefly summarizes the algorithm basics
and early works, which would be helpful to starters from the realm of computer
science. Chapter 3 establishes a new immunity-based approach called Conserved
Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA) based on reviewing its immunological
background such as the theories on the mechanisms of self versus nonself recognition,
in particular, the Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs) model. Chapter 4 further
enhances the CSPRA by proposing a novel detection strategy. The new strategy
exploits both domain knowledge and randomized methods to resolve conflicts on
anomaly detection between two types of detectors. This chapter also demonstrates
that the CSPRA has promising performance on breast cancer diagnosis and great
potential in the area of clinical diagnosis. Chapter 5 explores the performance and
properties of the CSPRA by numerous experiments. The CSPRA is compared to
other one-class classifiers such as NSA, point-wise V-detector, boundary-aware Vdetection, one-class SVM. Various random number generators are used to evaluate
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with the CSPRA to show the stability and reliability of the CSPRA. The properties of
the CSPRA are demonstrated and discussed. Chapter 6 presents an network-based
Intrusion Detection model based on the CSPRA (CSPRA-ID). A new scheme for
near-deterministic detector generation is described in this chapter. The performance
of the CSPRA-ID was compared to that of one-class SVM in this chapter in the
context of very large testing samples from DARPA network intrusion data. Chapter 7
introduces the Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm (MILA) and its application on
the field of anomaly detection. Chapter 8 views the MILA from different angles and
proposes a framework for adaptive eye localization via face detection and reports the
experimental results with the PUT face database. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes this
dissertation and provides suggestions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The immune system is a remarkable information processing and self learning system
that offers researchers many interesting processes and mechanisms for inspiration to
build Artificial Immune Systems (AIS). The filed of AIS has obtained some degree
of success as a branch of Computational Intelligence since it emerged in the 1990s.
Within AIS, there is a growing trend to divide this research area into three branches:
Applied AIS, Immune Modeling, and Theoretical AIS. This chapter surveys the major
works in AIS field, in particular, explores up-to-date advances in Applied AIS during
the last few years. This survey has revealed that recent researches are centered on
four major AIS algorithms: 1) Negative Selection Algorithm; 2) Artificial Immune
Networks; 3) Clonal Selection Algorithm; and 4) Danger Theory and Dendritic Cell
Algorithms, while many other areas of the vertebrae immune system are inspiring
computer scientists and engineers to develop new models and problem solving methods. From an extensive survey of AIS applications, we have no doubt there have
been a lot of successful applications of AIS. However, the success of these applications is still limited by the lack of some exemplars that really stand out as killer AIS
applications being accepted in industry.
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2.1

History of Artificial Immune Systems

Although the progress is slow and steady, there have been a lot of successful stories
in the area of artificial immune system (AIS) during the last decades. The AIS
community has produced a diverse set of immune inspired algorithms to solve various
computational problems or tackle real world applications. This section provides a
brief overview on the history of AIS development.

2.1.1

What is an AIS

AIS are the more recent diverse areas that bridge the disciplines of immunology,
computer science and engineering. To date, there have been three formal versions of
the definition of AIS over the years:
• “AIS are intelligence methodologies inspired by the immune system toward realworld problem solving.” [49]
• “an AIS is a computational system based upon metaphors of the natural immune
system.” [234]
• “AIS are adaptive system, inspired by theoretical immunology and observed
immune functions, principles and models, which are applied to problem solving.”
[27]
The difference between Dasgupta’s and Timmis’s definition is very trivial. Both
give a general view of the scope and inspiration source of the AIS. The third definition
describes a detailed view of what an AIS includes. Currently, it is widely acceptable
that the area of research in AIS can be divided into three branches: Applied AIS,
Immune Modeling, and Theoretical AIS. The researches in Applied AIS range from
building immune-inspired computer science system, developing immune-inspired algorithms, to apply AIS to the real world applications. In contrast, Immune Modeling
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includes the research work detailing models and simulations of natural and artificial
immune systems, while Theoretical AIS aims at describing the theoretical aspects
of AIS, including mathematical modeling of algorithms, convergence analysis, and
performance and complexity analysis of algorithms. This survey mainly covers the
recent developments on Applied AIS because it is not only the most vibrant and active branch in the area of AIS but also the research area my dissertation researches
belong to. The most recent and comprehensive survey on Theoretical AIS is possibly
from that of Timmis et al. [237]. However, an up-to-date relatively comprehensive
review on Immune Modeling has not been seen in the literature.

2.1.2

Successful Stories in AIS

The immune system has been recently drawn significant attention as a potential
source of inspiration for novel approaches to solve complex computational problems.
Its highly distributed, adaptive, and self-organizing nature, together with its features
of learning, memory, feature extraction, and pattern recognition, offer rich metaphors
for its artificial counterpart. Unlike other engineered systems, AIS requires both immunology and engineering to learn from each other through working in an interdisciplinary manner [236]. Through the collaborative effort of many interdisciplinary
research scientists, the field of AIS has produced a prolific amount of algorithms by
extracting or gleaning useful mechanisms from the immune system theories, processes,
and agents.
In 1994, Forrest et al. published an important paper titled “Self-Nonself Discrimination in a Computer” [77]. The concept of negative selection was the first to be
proposed in this paper. They described a method, generally called negative selection
algorithms (negative selection algorithm), for distinguishing self from other, which
is based on the generation of T cells in the immune system. This method was then
applied to the problem of computer virus detection. The monitoring targets such as
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legal user activities, legal application usage, and uncorrupted data were considered
as self. Negative selection algorithm was used to discriminate self from others such as
illegal user activities, illegal application usage, and virus infected data. The experimental results showed that negative selection algorithm obtained a 100% detection
rate when an infected file was encoded by 655 binary strings (32 bits for each string).
Since this paper was published, negative selection algorithm has attracted many researchers and practitioners and has been applied in various real world applications.
Over the years, negative selection algorithm is by far the most popular algorithm in
the field of AIS. Although many very different models have been developed consisting
of a family of negative selection algorithms, the main characteristics of a negative
selection algorithm described in this paper still remain unchanged.
Artificial immune network (AIN) is another successful story in the area of AIS.
Inspired by Farmer et al.’s immune network model [70], the first immune network algorithm was proposed by Ishida [122]. Timmis et al. re-defined and re-implemented
the artificial immune network [239]. These works were formally named AINE (Artificial Immune NEtwork) in [145]. The AIN/AINE consists of a set of B cells, links
between those B cells, and clonings and mutation operations. The set of B cells is
made of the initial population and the cloned population. Antigens are randomly selected from the training set (a subset of raw training data) and presented to the areas
of the B cell network (the remaining raw training data). If the blinding is successful,
then the B cell undergoes cloning and mutation. The concept of the link is proposed
in the updated version (AINE). A link between two B cells is created if the distance
between two artificial recognition balls is less than a network affinity threshold. This
work was then taken further by Timmis et al. in Bio-Inspired Architectures Lab at
The University of York and widely used in the areas of data mining and machine
learning.
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In 2000, de Castro et al. published Clonal Selection Algorithm (CSA) in their paper titled “The Clonal Selection Algorithm with Engineering Applications” [28]. CSA
is based on the clonal selection and affinity maturation principles and later renamed
as CLONALG [30]. One cell generation in this algorithm includes the initiation of
candidate solutions, selection, clone, mutation, reselection, and population replacement. These steps are similar to genetic algorithm (GA) but the sequence of the
steps is different. The comparison done in this paper showed that the Clonal Selection Algorithm can reach a diverse set of local optima solutions, while the GA tends
to polarize the whole candidate solutions to the best solution. Through its applications to binary character recognition, multi-modal optimization, and the Traveling
Salesman Problem, this paper also concluded that the algorithm has the capability
of performing learning and maintenance of high quality memory.
Although many other areas of immunology have been recently reported in the literature to inspire the development of algorithms and computational tools, for example,
Humoral Immune Response [57], Danger Theory [8], Dendritic Cell functions [99], and
Pattern Recognition Receptors Model [261], to name a few, these new areas are still
immature and under continuous investigation and development. Undeniably, there
have been a lot of successful applications of AIS. To today, however, there are still few
exemplars that really stand out as instances of AIS being used in earnest in industry.

2.1.3

Major Publications and Activities in AIS

The field of AIS is beginning to mature through the collaborative effort of many
researchers and practitioners. An extensive body of literature is produced in the field
of AIS, including AIS textbooks and a wide ranging collection of successful application
papers [54].
The first volume in AIS titled “Artificial Immune Systems and Their applications” was edited by Dasgupta in 1999 [49]. This volume provided an overview of the
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immune system from the computational viewpoint and took into account the major
works in this field until 1998, including the computational models of the immune
system and their applications. This first monograph in AIS titled “Artificial Immune
Systems: A New Computational Intelligence Approach” was written by de Castro and
Timmis in 2002 [27]. This book provided an accessible introduction on biology and
the field of AIS and gave the foundations of the AIS basic algorithms and analyses
how the immune system relates to other biological systems and processes. The book
is very suitable to serve as a textbook or a technique manual for the starters in AIS
with its definitiveness and completeness. In 2003, Tarakanov et al. presented their
book “Immunocomputing: Principles and Applications” [229]. The contents of this
book mainly include: 1) Introduction of immunocomputing; 2) The mathematical
basis of the immunocomputing; and 3) Various applications of Immunocomputing.
This book is the first attempt to introduce and summarize the earlier works in the
area of theoretical AIS. Ishida’s book [123] is the first book with the specificity of
the immune network models. This book explored the self-organizing network inspired
from Jerne’s idiotypic network and presented an application of sensor networks using
the self-organizing network. This book is a good lengthy documentation for the researchers interested in the immune network theory and its applications. Most recently,
Dasgupta et al. launched the new book on AIS titled “Immunological Computation:
Theory and Applications” [55] . In this latest monograph in AIS, they first provide a
detailed description of fundamental immunology concepts and some theoretical models of immune processes, which help the readers to establish a solid foundation for AIS
research. This book presents up-to-date immunology-based computational techniques
that are developed in their own research group and the other groups worldwide. For
instance, Real-Valued Negative Selection Algorithm, Danger Theory, Modeling the
Germinal Center, and Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm are the first to be sufficiently discussed in an AIS book with their first-hand achievements of the research
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in AIS. This shall be one of the most exciting parts for the readers interested in
knowing the most recent advances in the field of AIS. An extensive review on data
representations, affinity measures, (partial) matching rules, and general abstractions
of some immune elements and processes that are used in most immune-based models
are also included in this book. It has the review questions in each chapter and a
comprehensive index for all terminologies and important concepts that are used in
this book. These features make it very possible for this book to be selected by the
instructors as one of the most popular textbooks for undergraduate and graduate
students who would like to explore their individual “entry points” to the area of the
AIS.
International Conferences on Artificial Immune Systems (ICARIS), the flagship
conference dedicated entirely to the field of AIS and the major annual activity in the
AIS community, was first held in Canterbury, UK in 2002 and has been regularly held
every year since then. This conference provides a great opportunity for presenting
and disseminating the latest work in the field of AIS and has been collected more
than 200 papers so far, including a lot of important AIS algorithms and applications.
The publications in AIS are often appeared in the other international conferences
such as Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference (GECCO), IEEE World
Congress on Computational Intelligence (WCCI), and International Conference on
Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing (ICAISC), to name a few.

2.2

Recent Developments in AIS

The immune system is a valuable metaphor for developing novel computational intelligence paradigms. To today, while many other areas of the vertebrae immune system
are inspiring computer scientists and engineers to develop new algorithms, four major AIS algorithms have been constantly developed and are gaining popularity in the

20

area of AIS: 1) Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA); 2) Artificial Immune Networks
(AINE); 3) Clonal Selection Algorithm (CLONALG); and 4) Danger Theory and
Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA). There have been a lot of successful applications of
AIS, such as computer security, optimization, data mining, and anomaly detection,
to name a few. Several authors have surveyed and evaluated the filed of AIS from
different aspects. For example, Garrett tracked the development of AIS before 2005
followed by attempting to make an assessment of the usefulness of the AIS in terms
of “distinctiveness” and “effectiveness” [85]. [144] provided an introduction and analysis of the key developments in AIS within the filed of intrusion detection. Hart and
Jimmis discussed the application areas of the AIS and attempted to suggest a set
of problem features for the potential applications of AIS [113]. This section surveys
the up-to-date advances in the entire area of AIS during the recent years. It covers
various AIS models and different types of AIS applications, in particular, the recent
advances in this area since 2006. We believe that this work would be an important
complement to [85, 113, 144, 236, 237], where either the different aspects of the AIS
field were surveyed or the recent advances in the AIS field have not been covered.
We also briefly summarize the algorithm basics and early works before presenting an
extensive survey of recent works, which would be helpful to starters from the realm
of computer science.

2.2.1

AIS Models

Negative Selection Algorithms
Algorithm Basics and Early Works
In the biological immune system, T cell precursors move to the thymus from the Bone
Marrow and T cell development occurs in the thymus. T cell precursors do not express
any of T cell markers such as T Cell Receptor. The stages of T cell development are
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identified by the expression of specific TCR. Direct cell to cell interaction between
Pre-T cells and thymic cells induces Pre-T cells’ proliferation and also differentiation.
At this point, the alpha-chain of TCR undergoes generic rearrangement. These T
cells undergo the processes of Negative Selection to eliminate those T cells that are
strongly activated by self MHC plus self peptides in the thymus.
Negative Selection Algorithm (negative selection algorithm) is modeled off the
negative selection in the T -cell maturation process that happens in the thymus. A
negative selection algorithm includes two major stages:
• Detector generation: the candidate detectors are generated by some random
process and censored by trying to match the inputted self samples. Those
candidates that match any of the self samples are eliminated and unmatched
ones are added to the set of detectors.
• Abnormal detection: the detector set that are generated in the first stage are
used to check whether the new sample is self or nonself (abnormal). If the new
sample matches any detector, then it is classified as nonself or an anomaly.
Work in [135] provided the latest information about the progress of negative selection algorithm. Here, we summarize that work before continuing a survey of recent
developments on negative selection algorithm.
The various variations of negative selection algorithm are constantly being proposed. However, the main characteristics of this method described in [77] still remain,
including negative representation of information, distributed generation of the detector set, and one-class classification.
Data representation in various models of negative selection algorithm can be
grouped into two basic types: string representation and real-valued vector representation. Binary representation is a special case of string representation. String
representation is easy to analyze and good for textual or categorical information, but
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it is difficult to interpret in the original problem space and has the potential scalability
issue. Real-valued representation is often necessary in negative selection algorithm.
However, the self samples are seldom interpreted as the set of all the possible selves
in this case, whereas as the self patterns are assumed to be in the training data when
using string representation.
A matching rule and the distance measure are the cornerstones in negative selection algorithm. Matching threshold exposes the concept of partial matching for
approximation and generalization.
• Matching rules that are often used in string representation include rcb (rcontiguous bit) matching rule [197], Hamming distance [108], and r-chunk matching rule [16]. An important difference between rcb and r-chunk matching rule is
that full-length rcb matching rules produce the crossover holes and length-limit
holes but r-chunk matching rule has no problem with the length-limit holes.
Permutation mask plays an important role in rcb rule or r-chunk rule [16]. The
other matching rules discussed by Harmer et al. [111] include statistical correlation, binary distance, and landscape-affinity matching.
• Major marching rules used in real-valued representation include (whole, partial,
or normalized) Euclidean distance, and Minkowski distance. The other distance
measures summarized by Hamaker and Boggess [111] include the variation of
Euclidean distance, Manhattan distance, Overlap distance, Value Difference
Metric (VDM), Heterogeneous Euclidean-Overlap Metric (HEOM), Heterogeneous Value Difference Metric (HVDM), and Discredited Value Difference Metric (DVDM). The comparison of different distance measures is seldom reported
in the literature and possibly complicated. Taylor and Corne [230] compared
the Euclidean distance matching rule and r-bits matching rule using time series
but the results complicated the difference between two distance measures.
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Work in [135] also discussed various detector generation schema, which constitute
the majorities of the variations of negative selection algorithm. The first version of
NSA [77] presented an exhaustive algorithm that randomly generates candidates and
then eliminates those that match self samples. A self set-linear time algorithm for the
rcb matching rule was proposed in [61], which is more costly in space than the exhaustive algorithm. [61] also provided a greedy algorithm. This algorithm had higher time
complexity and the same space complexity as linear algorithm. The advantage of the
greedy algorithm is that it provides the maximum coverage for a given number of detectors and the number of unmatched nonself strings is known. Wierzchon developed
an algorithm to generate detectors with template that is more efficient in the sense
of the minimal number of detectors [250]. Singh extended the greedy algorithm to
higher alphabet [214]. This extension is necessary in cases where the semantics of the
information will be lost in binary representation. The article [110] published a new
idea in detector generation by converting the data space into schemata space. Detectors are constructed in the complementary space of the schemata using the traditional
“generate-and-test” strategy. The candidate detector (detection rule) is rejected if
it contains any common schemata. Dasgupta et al. [52] applied a genetic algorithm
to generate detectors, which takes the form of “detector rules”. The fitness function
is based on the number of self samples covered, the volume of the rules (detectors),
and the overlap with other rules. A niching algorithm is used to get the different
rules. A randomized real-valued negative selection algorithm was proposed in [95].
In this algorithm, Monte Carlo integration is used to estimate the volume of the self
and nonself space and the method is simulated annealing to optimize the distribution
of the detectors in the nonself space. In [94], the mechanism used in the detector
generation stage is not based on the same matching rule as in the detection stage. In
the generation stage, the median distance is calculated between the randomly generated detector and K nearest neighbors. Another detector generation algorithm in [53]
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proposed that an initial population of candidate detectors in hyperspherical shape is
generated with random centers. Those candidates are moved away from the training
data and existing detectors. Then the detectors are evaluated by their size excluding
the overlap. The larger detectors are considered better fit and selected to go to next
generation. The small detectors are replaced with clones of those better-fit detectors.
The analysis on the complexity of detector generation is mainly with stringrepresentation negative selection algorithm. D’haeselleer first analyzed the time and
space complexity of exhaustive detector generating algorithm and then further proposed linear and greedy algorithm and compared their complexities with the original exhaustive algorithm [60]. Wierzchon proposed and discussed the complexity
of a deterministic algorithm to generate detectors with template [251]. Ayara et
al. examined the time and space complexities for five negative selection algorithms:
Exhaustive, Linear, Greedy, Binary template, and NSMutation [15]. The time complexities of the exhaustive algorithm and NSMutation are exponential with respect to
the size of self. All the others have linear time complexity. NSMutation has a higher
space complexity than that of the exhaustive algorithm. The linear, greedy, and binary template algorithms all have higher space complexity. The binary template has
the lowest space complexity. Stibor et al. developed a deterministic algorithm to
generate all possible detectors called perfect detector set using the r-chunk matching
rule and discussed the space and time complexity of the algorithm [218].
Detector coverage in negative selection algorithm was initially discussed when
negative selection algorithm was first published in 1994. The sophisticated work on
the analysis of the detector coverage was done by D’haeseleer et al. [60,61]. The greedy
algorithm of detector generation described in [61] guarantees the maximum possible
coverage. If a continuous data stream is being processed, preprocessing by splitting
the stream into a subset will lose some of the original information. D’haeseleer used
the conditional entropy as a quantitative measurement of the loss of information.
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They also formulated the second source of information loss-negligence of the number
of the duplicates and gave an analysis of the number of detectors for a given failure
probability. Esponda et al. developed a formal framework for analyzing positive and
negative detection under various matching criteria and discussed in depth the idea of
crossover closure [67, 68].
The uniqueness and applicability of negative selection algorithm have been discussed in several papers. Freitias and Timmis argued that negative selection algorithm is not appropriate for classification and the affinity measure should fit the data
type [79]. However, Lee and Sim applied negative selection algorithm to the classification problem [151]. Garrett concluded that negative selection algorithm is not unique
in symbol and expression compared with genetic and evolutionary computation and
artificial neural networks, but its process is unique [85]. Esponda et al. developed
negative database, which has the advantage of hiding the descriptive information of
self while providing a way to identify nonself data [66]. Ebner et al. pointed out that
the negative selection algorithm is not suitable in two cases: 1) space is finite but self
comprises only a small fraction of the available space; 2) space is infinite [64].
A Survey of Recent Developments on NSA
Gao et al. introduced Genetic Algorithm based negative selection algorithm detector
optimization scheme [81]. In this paper, they only focused on optimizing the nonoverlapping detectors to obtain the maximal nonself space coverage. To guarantees
that for oj , detector j has the maximal possible radius rj without any overlapping
with all the N self samples, we only need to search for the optimal oj to cover the
maximal nonself space. Genetic algorithm is used for the optimization of oj . The
fitness of each detector is calculated by its radius rj . Those detectors with larger
valid radiuses have higher fitness for evolution in the genetic algorithm. A parallel
work in [82] presented clonal optimization NSA in which the detectors are optimized
by clonal optimization method for anomaly detection. The clonal optimization NSA
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was tested with simulated bearings fault detection problem.
Shapiro et al. introduced hyper-ellipsoids detectors as an improvement to hyperspheres detectors in a negative selection algorithm [212]. An n-d ellipsoid is defined
by equation 2.1:

(x − ω)T A(x − ω) = 1

(2.1)

where A is a real symmetric positive-definite n x n matrix; ω, an n x 1 matrix, is the
center of the ellipsoid. Any vector x that satisfies the equation 2.1 is on the surface of
the ellipse. Shapiro et al. then used an evolutionary algorithm (EA) to optimize the
sets of ellipsoids. The individual representation, crossover, mutation, and objective
function in the evolutionary algorithm were addressed in this paper. Hyper-ellipsoids
retain the benefits of hyper-spheres but are much more flexible, mostly in that they
can be stretched and reoriented. The experimentation validates that fewer hyperellipsoids can cover similar nonself space compared to the traditional hyper-spheres
model in a negative selection problem. Another work in [191, 192] introduced hyperrectangular detectors covering nonself space that are created using niching genetic
algorithm and enhanced by coevolutionary algorithm.
Luo et al. proposed a novel negative selection algorithm called r[]-NSA with binary
representation [161]. In r[]-NSA, each detector, called r[]-detector, has the corresponding array keeping multiple partial matching length (thresholds). The following is an
example of r[]-detector.
l=5
self set: 00111, 00110
r[]-detector: 11100 r[5] = 1,1,2,1,0
r[]-detector: 01110 r[5] = 2,1,0,0,0
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The string length l is 5, for r[]-detector “11100”, r[5] = is the detector array in
which r[1]=1, r[2]=1, r[3]=2, r[4]=1, r[5]=0. r[1]=1 means that if the first bit is
matched between the testing string and the detector “11100”, then the testing string
is classified as anomaly. r[2]=1 and r[4]=1 can be explained by the same way as
r[1]=1. However, r[3]=2 means that if both the third bit and the fourth bit are
matched between the testing string and the detector “11100”, then the testing string
is anomalous, whereas r[5]=0 means that the valid matching is not required starting
from the fifth bit. It is noteworthy that the testing string is considered as anomaly if
and only if any of the conditions is fulfilled among r[1]=1, r[2]=1, r[3]=2, r[4]=1.
In [163], Luo et al. proposed a heuristic detector generation method for negative selection algorithm. In this method, a template consisting of is regarded as a
candidate detector, where “*” can match with “0” and “1”. A template of order
i represents a template of length l with (l-i) “blank” symbols (*). For example, a
candidate detector “11*1*” is a template of order 3 with two “blanks”. As discussed
in this paper, the advantage of heuristic detector generation algorithm is that the
matching times of heuristic detector generation are much less than that of exhaustive
detector generation and thus decrease the time cost.
Additional research in [162] developed a fast negative selection algorithm by exploiting the ability of multi-pattern matching algorithm [7] to locate all occurrences
of multi-pattern in an input string by just one scan operation. This method converts
the self set to a state graph called self graph and efficiently generates the detectors
based on the self graph through negative selection. Correspondingly, the detector
set is also converted to the detector graph. To determine the anomaly, the partial
matching operation is performed between the detector graph and the string to be
detected. When processing an input string of length l, the time complexity of this
method is O(l) compared to O(NR*l) of the exhaustive detector generation.
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Two Evolutionary Negative Selection Algorithms (ENSA) with binary representation were proposed in [160], which were named as simple ENSA and basic ENSA.
In simple ENSA, the initial detector set is generated randomly. Then, the initial
detector set is checked with the current data being protected with r-contiguous bots
matching. If the detector matches the data, an abnormal change is identified. Otherwise, the initial detector set is evolved to the next generation through mutation,
selection and negative selection. The next generation detector set is again used to
match the current data being protected. Such evolutionary generation loop continues until the abnormal change is detected. The steps in basic ENSA are similar
to simple ENSA, however, the next generation detector set consists of not only the
detect set analogous to the next generation detector set in simple ENSA but also
the detector set that is initially randomly generated and then matured with negative
selection. Simply speaking, an additional randomly-generated detector set is added
to the next generation detector set in basic ENSA. They claimed that the advantage
of this change in basic ENSA is that it can search in global space and prevent from
converging to local optimizations. The further work in ENSA made an attempt to
investigate the ability of the ENSA to detect abnormal change in nonself space [159].
Two different mutation operators are used in analyzing the convergence of the ENSA.
The first mutation operator (Mutation I) is that only one bit of a detector is selected
and flipped with a high probability. The second mutation operator (Mutation II) is
that every bit of a detector is possible to be flipped but the probability is relatively
low. The detector set of the ENSAs is considered as a Markov chain on the state space
of R. R represents the space covered by the complete detector set. The theoretical
analysis shows that the ENSA with Mutation I is an ergodic markov chain and its
convergence strongly depends on the initial detector set, so the ENSA with Mutation
I is not a good method if the complete detector set is divided into more than one
equivalent class by the initial detector set. The ENSA with mutation II converges
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if it maintains the best detector that could be found before or after selection, which
ensures that any anomaly string out of the holes will be found when the evolutionary
generations are large enough. The work in [257] discussed the average time complexity of ENSAs for two different cases: 1) No gap between the initial detector set (I)
and the anomaly string samples to be detected (C); and 2) Gap exists between I and
C. The time complexity in the first case is O(l ln(l )) with a string of length l, whereas
the time complexity in the second case is O(lg+1 ), g is the width of the gap. This paper also gave a detailed analysis of the lower bound of the second case and discussed
the characteristics of such lower bound. The simulation experiments were done in
this work to verify the theoretical results. [265] applied ENSA to hardware/software
partitioning problem in the embedded systems. The hardware/software partitioning
problem is the antigen itself whereas the antibody is the possible solution of the problem. Antibody is encoded as a binary string 1 and 0 representing hardware code and
software code, respectively. This paper proposed a different concept of “self”. The
self set is initially empty and the worst candidate solutions in every generation are
added into the self set. The size of the self set is predefined and the oldest individuals
are removed from the self set when the self set reaches the maximum.
Ji and Dasgupta examine various applicability issues of the negative selection algorithms (NSA) [134]. High-dimensional data is a general difficulty for classification
and other machine learning techniques. When the dimensionality is high, the relatively smaller number of samples could not really catch the characteristics of the
target concept. Negative selection algorithms have not provided a direct remedy to
this problem. Blindly using data representation (binary or real-valued) will break
the data proximity in the problem space and cannot provide meaningful generation.
Real-valued representation only works for the continuous problem and the proper real
numbers are required to represent some continuous properties in the problem. It is
better to construct customized distance measure/matching rule for a given hybrid
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data representation. In spite of the limitation of specific matching rules, the feature
of one-class classification in negative selection algorithm results in that the probability distribution of the abnormal (or nonself) data is unknown. Since the probability
distribution of the data influences the performance of a classification algorithm or a
learning method, including negative selection algorithm, the limitation does exist in
negative selection algorithm. The confusing concepts such as the detection rate and
detector coverage were also discussed in this work.
Ma et al. proposed an antigen feedback mechanism to efficiently generate effective
detectors [165]. In addition to the randomly generated detectors, the unmatched
antigen is copied into the detector space called feedback detector. This feedback
detector goes through the same maturing process as a randomly generated detector
to be eliminated if it matches any of the self strings. The matured feedback detector is
then used to match further incoming antigens. If it can be activated by the incoming
antigens, then it becomes a legitimate detector. This simple mechanism achieves
95.21% detection rate for attack strings and 99.21% detection rate for normal strings
on the KDD CUP 1999 dataset.
Ji et al. published a new variation of negative selection algorithm - V-detector
in [132], which provides better detector coverage with the smaller number of detectors.
In the real-valued negative selection algorithm, the detector can be considered as a
hyper-sphere in a multi-dimensional real-valued shape space. The threshold used
by Euclidean distance matching rule defines the radius of the detector. V-detector
algorithm also generates candidate detectors randomly but it records the Euclidean
distance during the detector generation and assigns a variable radius based on the
minimum distance to each matured detector. In V-detector, each detector has its
own radius, which is basically decided by the closest self sample and used in the
detection phase. The control parameters of in V-detector are mainly self radius and
estimated coverage. Self radius specifies the variability in the self data (training
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data). Estimated coverage is at least 1-1/m if the algorithm randomly tries m times
without finding an uncovered point. In their later work [133], a more formal statistical
mechanism was proposed to analyze the detector coverage in V-detector, which has
the advantage of statistical confidence in the estimation of the actual coverage. The
algorithm stops when the estimated coverage or the limit of the detector number
is reached. V-detector was extended in [129] through introducing the concept of
boundary-aware. The only difference between boundary-aware V-detector and the
earlier version of V-detector is that the assignment for the radius of each detector that
is going to be retained is changed. For the boundary-aware V-detector, the detector’s
radius to be decided is exactly the distance from the center of the detector candidate
to the nearest self point. However, the earlier V-detector uses the distance that is
obtained by subtracting the self radius from the distance described in boundary-aware
V-detector. In other words, the boundary-aware V-detector uses a radius larger by
the value of the self radius so that the detectors can be close enough to “touch” the
self point. The experimental results validated that this trivial change in boundaryaware V-detector produced a better performance. Chmielewski introduced tree-based
structures to represent KDD Cup 1999 data to speed up the performance of V-detector
[38]. They used k-d tree structure to store self samples to reduce the complexity of
searching the nearest self samples. However, they addressed that tree-based structures
are not useful for detector generation. [42] used V-detector to detect novelties in
Mackey-Glass time series and suggested that the methods for estimation of optimal
state-space reconstruction parameters may be used for the estimation of immunebased detection system’s parameters.
Discrete-valued detectors were proposed for a network intrusion detection system
by Powers and He [200]. The detectors are generated using Genetic Algorithm in this
work. The system groups ports into functional categories, so the port number field
of a detector can only store a value between 1 and 9. The actual upper limit of port
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number is as high as 65,535. This change greatly reduces the size of the search space.
Stibor et al. proposed a Self Detector Classification method in [219]. In this
method, self-elements are considered as self detectors with an a-priori given selfradius rs. If an element lies within a self-detector, it is classified as self, otherwise as
non-self. The self radius is determined in the training phase by means of the ROC
analysis, which is initialized with a small start value (e.g. 0.01) and increased after
one training classification run by rs = rs + ∆i until rs ≥ max (e.g. max =1.0). The
resulting false alarm rate and detection rate are calculated for every ∆i step and used
for plotting ROC curves. The self radius rs with the minimum error is selected for
the self-detector. The minimum error is derived from equation 2.2:

minimumerror = min(1 − (di − fi )), ∀i

(2.2)

The Self Detector Classification method was in comparison to both V-detector
and one class Support Vector Machine (SVM) with the same data sets in [132]. Their
experimental results concluded that Self Detector Classification performed better in
general. They also questioned whether real-valued negative selection is an appropriate
approach for anomaly detection because it requires positive and negative examples
to achieve high classification accuracy. In [222], Stibor et al. further pointed out
that V-detector is not competitive to statistical anomaly detection techniques (e.g.
one class SVM) on the KDD data set and the termination guarantee of V-detector
is very sensitive to several parameters. Ji et al. [134] argued that in the experiments
reported by Stibor et al. [222], 9 discrete fields in the KDD Cup 1999 data are converted to a natural number arbitrarily and then normalized between minimum and
maximum. Such conversion has two flaws: 1) the converted points will be distributed
on separated (parallel) planes instead of a single plane in the real space; and 2) different nature numbers are totally arbitrarily assigned to the original discrete fields.
Ji et al. further claimed that positive selection method like Self Detector [219] is
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not a realistic solution when the number of self samples is larger than the number
of detectors by more than one order of magnitude. Stibor et al. believed that such
argument in [134] with regard to real-valued positive selection (Self Detector) and
one-class SVM and the superiority of real-valued negative selection are neither justifiable nor supportable. Instead, they showed that real-valued negative selection
failed on the high-dimensional digit recognition experiment [220]. In [225], Stibor et
al. claimed that the use of hyperspheres as antibody recognition regions can lead to
the poor classification results of the real-valued negative selection algorithm reported
in [222], especially for high-dimensional classification problems because these hyperspheres have undesirable properties in high dimensions: 1) the volume of overlapping
hyperspheres tends to zero; and 2) nearly all uniformly randomly distributed points
are close to the hypersphere surface. A large portion of the volume of the unitary
hypercude does not lie within the hyperspheres.
In additional work, Stibor et al. argued that holes in anomaly detection with
binary negative selection algorithm are necessary to generalize beyond the training
data set. Holes must represent unseen self elements (or generation regions) to ensure that seen and unseen self elements are not recognized by any detector [223, 224].
In [223], they explored the generation capability of the Hamming negative selection
when using the r-chunk length r. They found that an r-chunk length which does not
properly capture the semantic representation of the input data will result in an incorrect generalization and further concluded that a suitable r-chunk length does not
exist for input data with element of different length. In [224], they conducted some
experiments to investigating how randomly determined permutation masks will influence the occurrence of holes. They observed that holes when applying a randomly
determined permutation mask are randomly distributed across the space instead of
being concentrated inside or close to self regions because a randomly determined permutation mask shatters the semantical representation of the underlying data. They
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further pointed out that finding a permutation mask which does not significantly
distort the semantical representation of the data may be computational intractable
and therefore, the use of permutation masks casts doubt on the appropriateness of
abstracting diversity in Hamming negative selection. In [216], Stibor investigated the
r-contiguous matching probability in a random search approach by using the equivalent k-CNF problem formulation. This work turned out that finding detectors is
hardest in the phase transition region, depending on the number of self bit strings,
the bit string length and matching length. Most recently, Stibor proposed measure
distance in binary negative selection by means of probabilities, which is modeled with
a kernel estimator and advocated that a statically founded method is worthy of being
introduced in the area of AIS [217].
Caldas et al. presented a new selection algorithm [21] based on negative selection
algorithm and decision theory. A repository database (DB) is used to store quantitative indicators of self performance for an enterprise in the proposed system. Those
indicators of self performance are derived from transactional systems and external
information. The decision cells are responsible for selecting the appropriate executive
decisions from DB and providing the feedback from executive decision making to DB.
Each decision cell represents a decision problem and is composed of n decision receptors. The proposed algorithm includes two stages: learning and operation. In the
learning stage, the decision maker generates the first decision cells based on strategic
information stored in DB. These cells make the initial repository of self cells, that is,
decision memory, to be stored in DB for future generalizations. In the operation stage,
the decision maker requests a decision cell of a specific type from the system. After
the most appropriate decision cells have been generated and thereafter presented to
a given decision problem, the decision maker may be requested (not always) to decide whether it is self or non-self. Several experiments were carried out to test the
proposed algorithm.
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Graaff et al. recently presented a genetic artificial immune system (GAIS) in
which a life counter function was used to dynamically determine the number of detectors [96]. In GAIS, an artificial lymphocyte (ALC) could be at one of four states
with different priority: Immature (no priority), Annihilated (low priority), Mature
(medium priority), Memory (high priority). The priority is measured by a life counter
(LC) value between 0 and 1. The bit-string receptor of an ALC is randomly initialized
then it is trained using either positive selection or negative selection. Each ALC is
assigned an affinity-distance threshold, which is the hamming distance of the nearest
self pattern to the ALC in negative selection training or the hamming distance of the
farthest self pattern to the ALC. When matching a non-self pattern, the number of
non-self matches by an ALC will be kept in a record using a HitCounter function to
determine the ALC’s matching ratio. After a specified number of patterns has been
classified, the HitRatio of an ALC is calculated by using the total HitCounter divided
by the number of iterations. The life counter function is introduced in GAIS to determine in which state an ALC is at any given time. The value of the life counter
depends on the ALC’s HitRatio. Another feature of GAIS is the use of a genetic
algorithm (GA) to evolve a dynamic set of ALCs. Each ALC is considered as a chromosome and a set of randomly generated ALCs constitutes the initial population of
the GA. The fitness of an ALC is evaluated differently for different training methods,
depending on the average distance between the ALC and the existing set of ALCs,
and the ALC’s affinity distance threshold. Parent chromosomes that are randomly
selected from an elitist set of chromosomes produce a set of offspring through uniform
crossover. Mutation is applied to randomly selected offspring. The new population
selected for the next generation includes all individuals in the elitist set and the fittest
offspring. The GA terminates when the maximum number of generations is reached
or the fitness of the ALC population has converged. This work applied the GAIS
model to classification problems with 5 different data sets from the UCI machine
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learning repository and compared the proposed model to C4.5.
In [12] a genetic algorithm was used to generate the detector set in a real-valued
negative selection algorithm. Each chromosome represents a possible detector set
where each gene corresponds to a pointer (index) to a certain n-dimension point
(detector center) in a sequence of samples with a probability distribution. The chromosome size is equal to the maximum number of detectors desired. The detector
centers were placed by using highly uniform quasi-random sequences. A decoding
function is used to compute the largest possible radius for each detector center. The
retained detector set should tolerate self set and have minimum overlaps between
the detectors. The amount of overlaps is controlled by parameter α, particularly, the
higher the value of the parameter α the less the amount of overlap. The volume of the
detector set is used to evaluate the fitness of the solution coded in the chromosome.
The volume of the detector set and the volume of the self set are calculated by Monte
Carlo Integration [155, 181]. The proposed detector generation scheme is suitable for
high dimension problems because the error in a Quasi-Monte Carlo integration, which
computes the non-self coverage, is related to the number of points used rather than
to the problem dimension.

Artificial Immune Network
Immune Network Theory and Early Works
In 1974, Nobel Laureate Niels K. Jerne proposed an immune network theory suggesting that immune system is capable of achieving immunological memory by the
existence of a mutually reinforcing network of B cells [127]. The B cells not only stimulate each other but also suppress connected cells to regulate the over stimulation of
B cells in order to maintain a stable memory. The paratopes of a B cell have the ability to match against idiotopes on other B cells. The binding between idiotopes and
partopes has the effect of stimulating the B cells, which forms the immune network
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called idiotypic networks.
Based on Farmer et al.’s immune network model [70], the artificial immune network
algorithm proposed by Ishida [122] can be considered as the earliest work in the
field of AIS. These earlier works were further improved by Hunt et al. [120]. Their
proposed system was composed of a bone marrow object, a network of B cell objects
and an antigen population. The B cell object population is randomly initialized
by the bone marrow object. When the antigen population is loaded to the system,
they are randomly picked up and inserted to a randomly chosen point in the B cell
network. If the B cell can bind to the antigen population, many new B cell objects
will be cloned and the clones with higher affinity to the cells already in the network
will be added to the existing network of the B cells. The work in [119] refined the
initial model. The new implementation in Java with a relational database is called
Jisys. In Jisys, a B cell population is divided into two sub-populations: the initial
population and the clones population. The initial B cell population is generated from
a subset of raw training data. The antigens are selected randomly from the remaining
training data and presented to the area of the B-cell network. Jisys also adopted the
techniques developed by CBR (case based reasoning) community and used various
methods borrowed from Genetic Algorithm and other techniques to clone the B cells
(network nodes).
Such artificial immune network was later re-defined and re-implemented by Timmis et al. [239] and further enhanced in [238]. These works were formally named
AINE (Artificial Immune NEtwork) in [145]. AINE is initialized by a cross section
of the data set to be learnt as a network of ARB (Artificial Recognition Balls) objects, which represent a number of similar B cells instead of a single B cell. A link
between two ARBs is created if the affinity (Euclidean distance) between two ARBs
is below the Network Affinity Threshold (NAT). Like the earlier work, antigens are
actually part of the training data in AINE. Each member of the antigen training set is

38

matched against each ARB in the network. ARBs are stimulated by the antigen/ARB
matching and by neighboring ARBs in the network, which also includes a suppression
process to maintain the stability of the network. The stimulation level of an ARB
determines the survival and cloning of the B cell. AINE uses a stochastic process of
mutation during the cloning to create a diverse network. The replacement mechanism
in AINE forces ARBs to compete for survival based on a finite number of resources
that AINE contains. The ARB with the higher stimulation level can claim more resources and thus reduce the chance to be removed from the AINE. AINE doesn’t set a
predetermined number for removal of the ARB. Instead, it depends on the algorithm
performance. The results show that the performance of AINE is very encouraging for
date clustering. It also can be used as a compression facility to reduce the complexity
of the networks. The other earlier works related to AINE include various enhanced
AINE, re-implementation of AINE, Fuzzy AINE, dynamically weighted AINE and so
on [112, 146, 183–186, 246, 248, 251].
As noted, AINE incorporated some basic ideas from the clonal selection theory.
The B cells in AINE undergo cloning, mutation and selection when they are simulated
in the network. aiNet is a learning algorithm and performs the clustering of input data
so that MSE (mean square error) is iteratively reduced [29]. Although it is generally
considered as one of the AINE lineage and is still put in this category in this review,
aiNet takes the inspiration from clonal selection theory, for example, an activated
(recognized) input pattern (antigen) in aiNet goes through proliferation, mutation
and selection. Opt-aiNet was developed for solving multi-modal function optimization problems [26]. It introduced several interesting features: 1) it can dynamically
search an optimum population size based on the network suppression threshold and
a well-defined stopping criterion; 2) it has the capability of combining exploitation
with exploration of the fitness landscape; 3) it employs both local and global search
methods for new and better solution; 4) it locates and maintains stable local optima
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solutions.
A Survey of Recent Development on AINE
Pacheco et al. presented an Abstract Immune System Algorithm [193] based on
Farmer et al.’s model [70]. Four facts are considered for the dynamics of this model:
1) the stimulation between the paratope of an antibody and the epitope of another
antibody; 2) the suppression of the antibody when its epitope is recognized by the
paratope of another antibody; 3) the stimulation between the antigen and antibody;
and 4) tendency of cells to die in the absence of any interaction. When the reaction
loops start, the concentrations of the various antibody types are updated using the
finite different method. A given antibody type is stimulated or eliminated by referring
to recruitment threshold or death threshold, respectively. This paper provided two
examples used to test the algorithm: a classical maximization problem for the power
function f(x) = (x/c)n and the problem of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This work
also implemented a workbench of classes/interfaces in Java available in http://ctp.di.
fct.unl.pt/∼jddp/immune/.
The Work by Schmidtchen and Behn [205] investigated a minimalistic model of
idiotypic network of B-lymphocytes where idiotypes are represented by bitstrings encoding the nodes of a network. A given B-cell has exactly one specific type (the
idiotype) of antibody. The entirety of the B-lymphocytes system forms a functional
network consisting of all idiotypes an organism is able to generate and the links connecting complementary idiotypes allowing a few mismatches. The idiotypic network
is modeled by an undirected base graph G=(ν, ). Each idiotype ν ∈ υ in the network
is characterized by a bitstring of length d: bd bd−1 ... b [17]. This work performed
(2)

simulations on the base graph G12 for (tl , tu ) = (1, 10) for different values of influx
I starting with an empty base graph. The base graph contains 4096 nodes each of
which has 79 links to other nodes. The simulations showed that after a transient
period a steady state is achieved. The random evolution leads to a network with
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highly organized architecture. The nodes can be classified into different groups with
clearly distinct statistical properties. The major contribution of this work is explaining these very complex network structures emerging during the random evolution
through a detailed analytical understanding of the building principles. The building
principles allow us to calculate instance size and connectivity of the idiotype groups
in perfect agreement with the empirical findings reported in [17].
omni-aiNet was developed in [44] to solve single and multi-objective optimization problems, either with single and multi-global solutions. omni-aiNet united the
concepts of omni-optimization with distinctive procedures associated with immuneinspired concepts and thus showed several advantages: 1) automatically adapting the
exploration of the search space according to the intrinsic demand of the optimization
problem; 2) adjusting its size during the execution of the algorithm, according to a
predefined suppression threshold; and 3) controlling the spread of solutions in the
objective space with a new grid mechanism.
By exploiting the multipopulation property of aiNet, a Multi-Objective Multipopulation Artificial Immune Network (MOM-aiNet) was proposed for biclustering [43].
To differ from most multi-objective optimization algorithms that usually return a single set of non-dominated solutions, MOM-aiNet returns several sets of non-dominated
solutions. The concept of dominance is generally employed to compare the quality of
two solutions for a given problem and thus it is used to measure the solution set returned by MOM-aiNet. Biclustering can produce arbitrarily positioned and possibly
overlapping biclusters, which is the case of MOM-aiNet. Each set of non-dominated
solution in MOM-aiNet potentially corresponds to biclusters extracting distinct correlations of rows and columns of the data matrix. By randomly choosing one row
and one column of the dataset, MOM-aiNet first generates n subpopulations of one
bicluster. The algorithm then executes a main loop, for each subpopulation, n-clones
are generated subject to a mutation process. The mutation consists of one of three
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possible actions chosen randomly with the same probability: insert a row, insert a column, and remove a row or column. If the number of non-dominated elements exceeds
n-clones, a crowding distance-based suppression is performed in order to maintain a
small and locally diverse subpopulation. The MOM-aiNet algorithm was applied to
both Yeast problem and the Movielens dataset and was compared with FLOC, CC
and BIC-aiNet algorithms in this work. In spite of its better performance compare
to the other algorithms, the results showed that MOM-aiNet can better control over
the bicluster quality and return a broader set of non-dominated solutions.
The new variant of opt-aiNet called opt-aiNet-AA-Clust was proposed and implemented in [206]. A new representation for proteins was proposed in this work, in
order to maximize the predictive accuracy of a hierarchical classification algorithm
applied to protein function prediction. The earlier work [40, 45] divided the amino
acids into three functional clusters: hydrophobic (amino acids C,V,L,I,M,F,W), neutral (amino acids G,A,S,T,P,H,Y), and polar (amino acids R,K,E,D,Q,N). This work
borrowed such an idea to substitute the amino acids in the sequence for the cluster
in which that amino acid belongs. A good example in this paper is that assuming
H=hydrophobic, N=neutral and P=polar, the protein sequence CVGRK would be
converted to HHNRR. This work defined three local descriptors: composition (C),
transition (T), and distribution (D). C is the proportion of amino acids with a particular property. T is the frequency with which amino acids with one property are
followed by amino acids with a different property. D measures the chain length with
which the first, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% occurrences of the particular property
are located. A detailed example was provided in this paper to demonstrate how to
calculate these three local descriptors. This work then proposed an Artificial Immune
System (AIS) for amino acid clustering. The proposed AIS was modified from optaiNet [26,30] to fit with the application of amino acid clustering. These modifications
are summarized as follows:
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• Real-valued individual representation is used in opt-aiNet, whereas opt-aiNetAA-Clust uses a string of symbols to represent clusters
• The mutation scheme used in opt-aiNet-AA-Clust is somewhat different from
the original opt-aiNet. In opt-aiNet, the single value encoded by each immune
cell will be incremented or decremented with a magnitude based on its fitness. In
opt-aiNet-AA-Clust, the mutation is simplified as one or more positions change
in the immune cell’s representation.
• The original opt-aiNet used a single mathematical fitness function as a measure
of quality. In opt-aiNet-AA-Clust, a much more complex system for creating
and evaluating the attributes produced by the clustering results was proposed.
A set of predictor attributes must be created by the clusters that are translated
from the immune cell representation. This produces a dataset consisting of
these predictor attributes, which is split into two subsets - sub-training and
validation. The proposed AIS is trained in sub-training dataset and evaluated
using validation dataset.
• In the original opt-aiNet, the algorithm will terminate when there has been no
improvement above a threshold in the population between successive iterations.
The proposed terminates after a given number of iterations.
Although this work only dealt with structures where each class has exactly 1 parent, the experimental result showed that a significant increase in predictive accuracy
was at the third level of the class hierarchy. Further work may need to investigate
this contradict result. Another variation of opt-aiNet [227] was developed for the
capacitor placement problem for radial distribution networks. This variation uses an
integer value vector to represent the network cell for the possible solution. It has no
control over the initialization process and applies a fixed mutation rate.
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In [221], Stibor et al. investigated the compression quality of aiNet. Based on
the Parzen window estimation and Kullback-Leibler divergence, they presented a
similarity measure between the input data set and the aiNet output data set. A
Parzen window estimator is used to estimate the probability densities over the input
data set and output data set. This paper provided source code written by open source
program R that is used to generate data sets from different probability distributions.
The experiments with four generated data sets revealed that aiNet performs better
on uniformly distributed data set, whereas it produces poor results on non-uniformly
distributed data set.

Clonal Selection Algorithm
Clonal Selection Theory and Early Works
Clonal Selection Theory states that a clonal expansion of the original lymphocyte
occurs when the original lymphocyte is activated by binding to the antigen; however,
any clone of the activated lymphocyte with antigen receptors specific to molecules of
the organism’s own body (self-reactive receptors) is eliminated during the development of the lymphocyte. During the clonal expansion of B cells, the average affinity
increases for the antigen that triggered the clonal expansion through a process of
affinity maturation. Therefore, the memory B cells are developed to make a more
effective immune response to antigens that had been encountered. Affinity maturation is caused by a somatic hypermutation and a selection mechanism. Somatic
hypermutation results in the diversity of antibodies by introducing random changes
to the genes that encode for them. The selection mechanism guarantees that only
those clones (antibodies) with higher affinity for the encountered antigen will survive.
Clonal selection algorithm was initially introduced in [28] and formally described
in [30]. The general algorithm was named CLONALG. As a summary, the major
steps in the CLONALG algorithm include [30]:
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1. Randomly choose an antigen and present it to all antibodies in the repertoire;
2. Determine the vector that contains its affinity to all the N antibodies;
3. Select the n highest affinity antibodies to compose a new set;
4. The n selected antibodies will be cloned (reproduced) independently and generate a repertoire of clones: the higher the antigenic affinity, the higher the
number of clones generated for each of the n selected antibodies;
5. The repertoire of clones is submitted to an affinity maturation process inversely
proportional to the antigenic affinity, generating a population of matured clones:
the higher the affinity, the smaller the mutation rate;
6. Determine the affinity of the matured clones with relation to antigen;
7. From this set of mature clones, re-select the highest affinity one with relation
to the antigen to be a candidate to enter the set of memory antibodies. If the
antigenic affinity of this antibody candidate is larger than its respective memory
antibody, then will replace this memory antibody;
8. Replace the d lowest affinity antibodies from the remaining antibody repertoire,
with relation to the antigen, by new individuals.
A Survey of Recent Development on CLONALG
Work by Ciccazzo et al. [41] introduced a new clonal selection algorithm called the elitist Immune Programming (EIP). EIP was an extension of Immune Programming (IP)
and the pseudo-code of EIP was provided in this paper. Firstly, the concept of elitism
borrowed from another immune inspired algorithm is introduced to EIP; that is, at
each generation g, the best solution found so far cannot be erased from the population.
In addition, EIP uses a new class of hypermutation operators and a network-based
coding. A hypermutation operator acts on one component, link or node at a time.
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All the operators take or return only consistent circuits. This work introduced ten
ad-hoc network-based hypermutation operators, including add-series, add-parallel,
add-random-component, expand-node, delete-component, mutate-component-value,
copy-component-value, mutate-component-kind, link-modify, and shrink. This work
applied the EIP algorithm to the synthesis of topology and sizing of analog electrical
circuits. The quality of the circuit was assessed by the distance between the curve
described by a circuit and the one described by a hypothetical ideal circuit. The
experiments showed that the circuits obtained by EIP were better than the one found
by Genetic Programming.
Halavati et al. added the idea of symbiosis to CLONALG [107]. As a variation of
CLONALG, this algorithm uses partially specified antibodies that may not have all
required data to be evaluated as a solution. This algorithm is initialized with a set of
partially specified antibodies, each having just one specified property. Then, the algorithm randomly picks an antibody to add to an assembly. By repeatedly doing so, the
algorithm shall build an assembly with all required properties. If the algorithm fails
to complete such an assembly with existing antibodies, it will create some antibodies
with random values for all missing positions of the created assembly and add them
to the population. The process of cloning, mutation and selection in this algorithm is
extremely similar to those in CLONALG. As stated in this paper, the inspiration of
using partially specified antibodies comes from the assumption t that a problem can
be broken into several sub-problems and thus good solutions of these sub-problems
may compose a general good solution for the main problem. If such assumption becomes true, this algorithm may find a solution faster than CLONALG. By applying
them to multimodal function optimization and combinatorial optimization, this work
showed that the proposed algorithm can solve problems that CLONALG failed to
solve.
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The work in [176] presented a variation of CLONALG for software mutation testing. The variation allows many memory individuals to contribute to an antigen’s
recognition rather than following the concept of a memory individual per antigen in
CLONALG. Each antibody represents a single test in this application. The population of antibodies is initialized with s tests, either by randomly generating tests or
by specifying each one. The algorithm iteratively searches for those antibodies which
kill at least one mutant program not already killed by an existing memory test. The
mutation score (MS) is used to evaluate the affinity (or fitness) of an antibody. Those
antibodies with high affinity are added to the memory set to be returned to the tester
at the end of the process. The process of antibody evolution (clone selection) in this
variation is same as that in CLONALG. The effectiveness of this variation of CLONALG was compared against an elitist Genetic algorithm and the results showed that
the Immune Inspired Approach generates the higher mutation scoring test sets in less
computational expense.
Inspired by the clonal selection principle, work in [47] developed an immune algorithm for the protein structure prediction problem on lattice models. Antigen (Ag)
and B cells in the proposed immune algorithm represent a sequence of hydrophobicpattern of the given protein and a sequence of directions, respectively. H, P denotes
two types of beads in the standard Dill’s lattice model: bead-Hydrophobic/non-polar
or bead-hydrophilic/Polar, respectively. F, L, R denotes Forward, Left, and Right, respectively. Different from the original Clonal Selection Algorithm, this work proposed
two special mutation operators (inversely proportional hypermutation and hypermacromutation) and one aging mechanism. Inversely proportional hypermutation is
similar to the mutation operator in the conventional Clonal Selection Algorithm. It
makes mutations inversely proportional to the fitness value. The hypermacromutation
operator randomly determines the number of mutations, which doesn’t use functions
depending on constant parameters. The aging operator is designed to avoid getting

47

trapped in local minimum by eliminating old B cells from the population based on
the maximum number of generations allowed for generated B cells to remain in the
population. This work also discussed the characteristic dynamics of the proposed
immune algorithm and demonstrated the competitive performance of the algorithm
by testing with well-known protein structure prediction lattice models, the HP model
in two-dimensional and three-dimensional square lattices, and the functional model
protein.
Wilson et al. proposed Trend Evaluation Algorithm (TEA) to evaluate price time
series data [254]. TEA is very similar to CLONALG with some differences that are
summarized in this paper. TEA not only finds the best fitting candidates (long term
memory pool) but also maintains a short term memory pool by proliferating all bound
trackers. Apoptosis and mutation in the TEA occur across all population members.
A simple antigen A containing 20 fictitious price movements and 8 trends (T1 to T8 )
is constructed to test the ability of the TEA to identify price trends. Antigen A is
further splitted into two subsets A1 an A2. A1 contains three simple trends T1, T2,
and T3 and the other more complex trends are involved in A2. 4 experiments were
defined in this work to examine the algorithm’s ability to identify the price trends
and to investigate the influence of the long term memory pool.

Danger Theory
Introduction to Danger Theory
The danger theory has become popular amongst immunologists for the last decade.
Its chief advocator Polly Matzinger published this theory in 2002 in the journal of
Science [175]. She points out that the “foreignness” of a pathogen is not the important
feature that triggers a response, and “selfness” is no guarantee of tolerance. The
central idea in the Danger Theory is that antigen presenting cells (APCs) are activated
by danger/alarm signals from injured cells, such as those exposed to pathogens, toxins,
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mechanical damage, and so forth. However, danger/alarm signals should not be sent
by healthy cells or by cells undergoing normal physiological deaths. Alarm signals can
be constitutive or inducible, intracellular or secreted, or even a part of the extracellular
matrix. Cells that die necrotically release their contents. Any intracellular product
could potentially be a danger signal when released. Inducible alarm signals could
include any substance made, or modified, by distressed or injured cells.
According to the Danger Theory, a cell that dies unnaturally sends outs the danger/alarm signal. The danger signal establishes a danger zone around itself. On the
other hand, the antigens near the cell that emits the danger signal are captured by
APCs such as macrophages, and then travel to the local lymph node and present the
antigens to lymphocytes. The antibodies secreted by B cells match the antigens, but
only those that match the antigens in the danger zone will be activated or stimulated
and undergo the clonal expansion process. Those that do not match or are not in the
danger zone do not get stimulated.
Bretscher and Cohn extended the Two-Signal model that takes into account the
danger model in another way [18]. The lymphocytes need two signals to get activated:
antigen recognition (signal one) and co-stimulation (signal two). Co-stimulation is
a signal that means “this antigen really is dangerous” in the Danger Theory. Polly
Matzinger further applied the laws of lymphotics to the danger theory [174]:
• Law 1: Two signals are needed to activate the lymphocyte. The lymphocyte
will die if it receives signal one without the costimulation of signal two. In the
absence of signal one, signal two will be ignored.
• Law 2: Signal one can come from any cells. However, signal two is from APCs
only except that the signal two for B cell activation is from T helper cells.
• Law 3: Activated (effector) cells do not need signal two, which revert to resting
state after a short time. Immature cells are unable to accept signal two from
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any source.
Although a number of advantages are claimed for this theory, the limitations in
the Danger Theory do exist. Matzinger admits that the exact nature of the danger
signal is unclear. The danger theory is yet to clearly answer this question: how to
distinguish danger from non-danger? Also, some dangers such as cuts and transplants
should not be responded to. The autoimmune diseases have not been fully reconciled
with the Danger Theory.
A Survey of Applications of the Danger Theory on AIS
The first paper that discussed the Danger Theory was published in 2002 by Aickelin
et al. [8]. This paper pointed out some analogies to artificial immune systems in the
Danger Theory, among which the following aspects are more interesting:
• Antigen presenting cell is required to present an appropriate danger signal.
• The “Danger” signal may have nothing to do with danger.
• The appropriate danger signal can be positive (presence of signal) or negative
(absence).
• The measure of proximity may be used to mimic the danger zone.
• An immune response should not lead to further danger signals.
This paper then proposed some conceptual ideas on how the Danger Theory might
help overcome some problems when the current artificial systems apply to the application area of anomaly detection. According to the Danger Theory, it will be danger
signals that trigger an immune response. The suitable signals could include lower
or higher memory usage, inappropriate disk activity, unexpected frequency of file
changes and so forth. Once the danger signal has been emitted, the immune system
can then react to those antigens with the danger zone. The danger zone can be substituted with more appropriate causality measures such as similar execution start times,
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concurrent runtimes or access of the same resources. The antibodies or detectors that
match those antigens (first signal) within a radius defined by a measure (signal two)
will undergo proliferation to develop memory cells. Once the dangerous components
are identified, they are sent to a special part of the system for further confirmation.
Similar application of the Danger Theory to intrusion detection can be also found
in [101].
The work in [8] also outlined another illustrative scenario that applies the Danger
Theory to data mining problems: a user is browsing through a set of documents. Each
document has a set of features (keywords, title, author etc). An artificial immune
system is implemented and the antibodies in the system are specific for recognizing
those features in the documents. Every document browsed by the user will be presented to the antibodies (Signal one). When a user either explicitly or implicitly
indicates interest in the current document (danger zone), a “danger” signal is raised
(signal two), then those antibodies matching any antigen, i.e., the feature in current
“Interesting” document), are stimulated and become effectors. Uninteresting document features will tolerate the autoreactive antibodies in the absence of signal two.
The artificial immune system finally learns to become a good filter when searching
for other interesting documents.
Prieto et al. made an attempt to apply the danger theory to a goalkeeper strategy
in robot soccer [201]. An algorithm called DTAL that takes into account danger
signals, lymphocytes and danger zone was developed in this work, including a dynamic
danger zone version and a fixed danger zone version. The developed algorithm was
used to implement a goalkeeper strategy using middle league SIMUROSOT from
FIRA: when the ball is on the home side (tissue), the alarm signal (signal one)
is triggered; when an opponent takes the ball (antigen) near to the penalty area
(danger zone), signal two are triggered; when both danger signals are received, a
lymphocyte is activated to clear the ball. The developed strategy performed well
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with the effectiveness above 90%.
Iqbal introduced a novel intelligent data processing approach inspired from Danger Theory [121]. The system call data was used in this work. System call data,
available for download from the University of New Mexico website (http://www.cs.
unm.edu/∼immsec/data-sets.htm), has enormous significance in intrusion detection
applications. By correlating system call sequences of normal and exploited processes,
this work identified the presence of DASTONs in system call data. DASTONs represent the data chunks or points present in data heap that actively participate in data
processing to retrieve specific information from the data. The result is useful because
talking care of DASTONs only will make the system efficient by reducing the amount
of data to be processed.
Work in [207] highlighted some initial thoughts on how the Danger theory can be
used to further improve the performance of an email classifier system. For example, in
a web mining system different types of media may cause different types of signal to be
released, whereas in an email system an interesting email may release an “interesting”
signal of one class. The strong relevance to these features can be found in danger
theory. However, Secker et al. have to admit that a number of interesting research
questions still remain unanswered [207].

Dendritic Cell Algorithm
Introduction to Dendritic Cells
The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) is inspired by innate immunity, more precisely,
the function of dendritic cells. Dendritic cells whose primary role is as an antigen
presenting cell are originally identified by Steinman and his colleagues [215]. Dendritic cells comprise a system of leukocytes widely distributed in all tissues. They
possess a heterogeneous hemopoietic lineage and thus perform a differential morphology, phenotype and function in different tissues. Dendritic cells are derived from bone
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marrow progenitors and circulate in the blood as immature precursors prior to migration into peripheral tissues. Within different tissues, Dendritic cells differentiate
and undergo further maturation upon appropriate stimulation and then migrate to
secondary lymphoid tissues where they present Ag to T cells and induce an immune
response.
The immature dendritic cells (proliferating progenitor cells and non proliferating
precursors) reside at body surfaces and interstitial spaces. In most tissues, dendritic
cells are present in a so-called immature state and are unable to stimulate T cells.
They have abundant major histocompatibility (MHC) II products within intracellular compartments and respond rapidly to inflammatory cytokines and microbial
pathogens to produce mature T cell stimulatory. Once the immature dendritic cells
have acquired and processed the foreign pathogens, they migrate to thymus and the
spleen, undergo maturation and stimulate an immune response.
Upon their state of maturation, dendritic cells can perform a number of different
functions. As described in [124,140], Modulation between these states is facilitated by
the detection of signals within the tissue - namely danger signals, PAMPs (pathogenic
associated molecular patterns), apoptotic signals (safe signals) and inflammatory cytokines. The characteristics of these four types of signal are summarized as follows:
• PAMPs are pre-defined bacterial signatures, causing the maturation of immature dendritic cells to mature dendritic cells through expression of “mature
cytokines”.
• Danger signals are released as a result of damage to tissue cells, also increasing
mature dendritic cell cytokines, and have a lower potency than PAMPs.
• Safe signals are released as a result of regulated cell death and cause an increase
in semi-mature dendritic cells cytokines, and reduce the output of mature dendritic cell cytokines.
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• Inflammatory cytokines are derived from general tissue distress and amplify the
effects of the other three signals but are not sufficient to cause any effect on
immature dendritic cells when used in isolation.
The maturation state of a dendritic cell influences the T cell response and is
determined by the relative concentrations of these four types of signal. Based on
the combinations of signals received, two terminal differentiation states, mature or
semi-mature, are generated during the maturation of dendritic cells. The mature
dendritic cells exhibit the following behavior: collection of antigen ceases; expression
of co-stimulatory molecules and chemical messengers (cytokines); migration from the
tissue to a lymphatic organ; and presenting antigen to T lymphocytes [259]. Mature dendritic cells have an activating effect while semi-mature dendritic cells have a
suppressive effect.
A Survey of Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)
The first dendritic cell algorithm was conceptualized and developed by Greensmith
et al. [99]. It is characterized by combining multiple signals to assess current context
of the environment and asynchronously sampling another data stream (antigen). The
input signals have to be pre-classified, including PAMP (abnormal), Safe signals (normal), Danger signals (possible changes), amd Inflammatory cytokines (signals that
amplify the effects of the other signals). Inflammatory cytokines are not used in this
paper. A fuzzy threshold, derived in proportion to the concentration of costimulatory
molecules, is used for a dendritic cell to stop collecting antigen and migrate from the
sampling pool to a virtual lymph node. The Dendritic Cell Algorithm processes the
input signals with the pre-defined weights to produce three output signals (costimulation signal, semi-mature signal, mature signal). If the cumulative mature signal is
greater than cumulative semi-mature signal value, then the cell differentiates towards
mature state and is assigned a “context value” of 1, and vice vesa. The algorithm
then calculates the proportion of mature context presentation of that particular anti54

gen, relative to the total antigens, termed “MCAV (mature context antigen value)”
of that antigen. The antigens with a MCAC which exceeds the predefined threshold
are classified as anomalous and vice versa.
A formal description of the Dendritic Cell Algorithm is given in [102]. The Dendritic Cell Algorithm is implemented as a libtissue tissue server and has three stages:
initialization, update and aggregation. Initialization involves setting various parameters. The update stage can be decomposed into tissue update and cell cycle. Both the
tissue update and cell cycle form the libtissue tissue server. Signal data is fed from the
data-source to the tissue server through the tissue client. The tissue update occurs
on an event-driven basis. When the new data appears in the system, it updates the
values for signals and antigen to provide the input signals for the population of dendritic cells. The cell cycle is a discrete process occurring at a user defined rate. The
cell cycle and tissue update continues until a stopping criterion is reached, usually
until all antigen data is processed. The last stage is aggregation, where all collected
antigens are subsequently analyzed and the MCAV per antigen derived. The graph
and pseudocode are provided to explain the data structure and three stages in the
Dendritic Cell Algorithm, respectively. The semantics of the different category of
input signals are summarized as follows:
• PAMP: 1) a signature of abnormal behavior; 2) a high degree of confidence of
abnormality associated with an increase in this signal strength.
• Danger signal: 1) measure of an attribute which significantly increases in response to abnormal behavior; 2) a moderate degree of confidence abnormality
with increased level of this signal, though at a low signal strength can represent
the normal behavior.
• Safe signal: 1) a confident indicator of normal behavior in a predictable manner
or a measure of steady-behavior; 2) measure of an attribute which increases
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signal concentration due to the lack of change in strength.
• Inflammatory signal: 1) a signal which cannot cause maturation of a dendritic
cell without the other signals present; 2) a general signal of system distress.
Gu et al. applied the dendritic cell algorithm to the KDD 99 data set and added
two additional functions, antigen multiplier and moving time windows, into the system for the purpose of optimization [103]. To overcome the problem of “antigen
deficiency”, the antigen multiplier makes several copies of each individual antigen,
which can be fed to multiple dendritic cells. With the moving time windows, the new
signals of each iteration are calculated through equation 2.3:
i+w

1X
OSnj ∀j
N Sij =
w n=i

(2.3)

where NSij is the new signal value of instance i in category j, w is the window size,
and OSnj is the original signal value of instance n in category j. The results suggest
that the antigen multiplier and moving time windows have the same effect on the
dendritic cell algorithm for the KDD 99 data set.
Oates et al. proposed the dendritic cell algorithm (DCA) as a possible solution
for a robotic classification problem [189]. The robotic dendritic cell algorithm is implemented as a stand-alone behavioral module for compatibility with a subsumption
architecture. It extends the Aria library’s ’wander’ architecture with two additional
modules: image processing and DCA executing. The DCA Module outputs MCAV
coefficients, approximately once per second. Three signals are used as inputs to the
DCA: PAMP, safe and danger. The PAMP is sourced from the image processing
module. The LRF is the source of the safe signal. The sonar array which has a
3600 FOV is considered as the danger signal. For the implementation in this paper,
the antigen is an integer number which uniquely identifies a segment of the test pen
indicating the positions and orientations of the robot.
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The original DCA is highly stochastic. A Deterministic Dendritic Cell Algorithm
(dDCA) was developed in [98]. In dDCA, signals with at least two categories and
antigen are required. A uniform distribution of lifespan values is used across the
population. Each dendritic cell in the population is exposed to identical input signal
and would process these signals in an identical manner. One further modification
is that the random sampling and storage in previous implementation of the DCA
are replaced by a simple array, which is used to store the value of the antigen and
the number of times a dendritic cell has collected antigens of this type. dDCA only
contains three parameters: the number of dendritic cells, the weighting schema for
the signal processing, and the output context value of an individual dendritic cell
(only one factor k). The signal processing equation is also modified in dDCA. Ka is
implemented with the dDCA as a measure of the proportion of antigen presented by
a fully mature cell to replace MCAV in the original DCA. The advantage of Ka is
to generate real valued anomaly scores encapsulating the magnitude of the difference
between normal and anomalous processes. This work also examined effects of the use
of time windows and variation on the number of cells and discussed the influence of
both parameters to the algorithm. [169] is another recent work related to the DCA,
which investigated the suitability of both classical DCA (cDCA) and deterministic
DCA (dDCA), for malware detection at run-time.
The work in [143] illustrated how closely the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)
matches the structure and functional requirements of sensor networks and further
presented a variation of DCA called ubiquitous DCA (UDCA) to detect “Interest
Cache Poisoning Attacks” on sensor networks. By summarizing the description of
UDCA in [143], UDCA is characterized by:
• A dendritic cell in UDCA collect signals from multiple data sources by continuously accumulating new output cytokines at each dendritic cell maturing
cycle.
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• UDCA maps the context information with antigens in a temporal manner: antigens (interests) are gathered when signals that deliver context information are
generated.
• The context status of a given antigen in UCDA is judged by multiple signals
and the collective decisions of multiple dendritic cells.
• UDCA detects an attack by examining how much a given node is misbehaving
via generated signals.
The work in [97] applied Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) to the detection of
outgoing port scans using TCP SYN packets. The TCP SYN scan itself is used to
determine which ports are open and which services are running on specified hosts. It
is an ideal model of an intrusion and leaves no trace in the normal system logs. By
comparison of their earlier work, this work uses same antigen representation but the
signals chosen differ from those in earlier work. SYN scan detection used seven signals.
Two PAMPs signals are taken from data sources, which indicate a scan specifically.
PAMP-1 is the number of ICMP ’destination unreachable’ error messages received per
second. PAMP-2 is the number of TCP reset packets sent and received per second.
Two danger signals and two safe signals are derived from attributes, which represent
changes in behavior. The first danger signal (DS-1) is derived from the number of
network packets sent per second, whereas DS-2 is the ratio of TCP packets to all
other packets processed by the network card of the scanning machine. Safe signal
will have high value when the changes are small in magnitude and vice versa. The
first safe signal (SS-1) encapsulates the rate of change of sending of network packets.
SS-2 is the average network packet size drops to a size of 40 bytes during SYN scans.
One inflammatory signal is simplified as a binary signal. If a remote root log-in is
detected, then this signal is set to 1. Otherwise, it is 0. Both passive normal and
active normal datasets were used in the experiments. The passive normal dataset
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emulates a ’night time’ scan, which should be relatively easy to detect anomalous
behavior in this data set since the machine is not being actively used at night. The
active normal dataset includes simultaneous web-traffic and scanning processes. All
experiments are performed on an AMD Athlon 1GHz Debian linux machine (kernel
2.4.10). Results showed that the DCA performed well with TCP SYN scan detection
except that some false positives were encountered when simultaneously scanning and
using other network services. This work has been further extended in [100], which
pointed out that dendritic cells perform information fusion which directs immune
responses.
Another application of Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) was presented in [178].
This work proposed and implemented a dendritic cell based distributed misbehavior detection system named BeeAIS-DC for a Bio/Nature inspired Mobile Ad Hoc
Network (MANET) routing protocol, BeeAdHoc. The authors claimed that this detection system not only enables BeeAIS-DC to dynamically adapt its detector set to
cater for a changing self due to mobility of nodes, but also is robust enough to provide
significantly smaller false positives as in comparison to self/non-self based AIS.

Other Newly Developed Models
SUPRAIC Algorithm
A suppression mechanism called Suppressor Artificial Immune Classifier (SUPRAIC)
was proposed to make an attempt to reduce the training set into a smaller subset that
contains the most significant samples without losing much capability of generation
[71]. In this algorithm, the database is divided into three subsets: training data
(antibodies), testing data (antigens), and validating data (antigens). SUPRAIC uses
Voronoi diagram in which dots are the centroids of the Artificial Recognition Balls
(ARBs) or antibodies that cover a certain group of nearest antigens.
Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA)

59

The Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA) [261] is one of the
latest developed AIS models inspired from Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs)
Model [125, 126]. According to PRRs Model, the self/nonself discrimination requests
co-stimulation from APCs but APCs do not co-stimulate unless activated via encoded
PRRs that recognize conserved pathogen-associated molecular patterns (PAMPs) on
bacteria. T cell or B cell would die if it recognized antigen (Signal 1) without the
costimulation from APC (Signal 2).
As noted, the PRRs model added additional layer of PAMPs to the Self-nonself
model but kept the features of Self-nonself model. CSPRA naturally involves negative
selection since it is inspired from the PRRs model. However, the anomaly detection in
CSPRA is done by combining the results from APCs self pattern recognition and T cell
negative selection. APCs self pattern recognition is not conducted unless the anomaly
called suspicious antigen cannot be confidently detected by T cell negative selection.
The APC detector represents for the conserved self pattern that are extracted from
the collected “Self” data. The experimental results from the experiments with this
algorithm have suggested that the CSPRA shows promise in assisting in reducing the
number of false positive errors without the increase of the complexity as in comparison
to the classical Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA).
Toll-like Receptor (TLR) Algorithm
TLR algorithm [9,241] was based on two populations of interacting cells, namely DCs
and T-cells. The DCs are created as immature detectors for collecting antigen from
an antigen store and process signals for a finite specified period of time. The DC is
termed mature if it receives a signal during antigen collection. Otherwise, it is termed
semi-mature. Once the DC’s lifespan is complete, the DC is transferred to a “lymph
node” in which the antigen presented by the DC is matched against a population of
T-cells. If a T-cell matches antigen presented by a mature DC, the state of the Tcell is set as “activated”. If the T-cell matches the antigen presented by semimature
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DCs, it is removed from the population. A session is classified as “anomalous” if a
population of activated T-cells (one or more) is generated.
The signals used in the TLR algorithm are more analogous to PAMP signals and
simplified as binary signals: “signal present” or “signal not present”. An infectious
signal list is initially generated to cover all possible signal values. Two things are done
in training phase by means of negative selection: 1) It deletes the values of signals
seen during training from the infectious signal list, resulting in a list of “nonself”
signal values; and 2) It generates a population of matured T-cells. The initial Tcell population is matched against normal antigen data and any T-cell matching a
normal antigen is deleted from the population. During the testing phase, when the
TLR algorithm detects the new coming data, DCs mature upon the activation by
any signal from the list of “nonself” signal values. The detailed steps in the TLR
algorithm can be found in [9]. The TLR algorithm achieves false positives rates of
0.15 and true positive rates of 0.75 when it was evaluated on a system call anomaly
detection problem.

2.2.2

AIS Applications

Optimization
In [196], Pasti and de Castro proposed a new meta-heuristics for solving traveling
salesman problems (TSP) inspired from neural network and the immune system.
Based on this early work, The RABNET-CVRP (Real-valued AntiBody NETwork to
solve the Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem) was proposed by combining concepts
from artificial immune systems and self-organizing maps [172]. RABNET-CVRP
showed to be capable of finding good quality solutions with a short computation
effort. This paper provided an informative flowchart to explain the RABNET-CVRP.
Herein, we summarize the major steps as follows:
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1. k sub-networks are initialized. Each sub-network represents one vehicle, including a number of antibodies, where one antibody is considered as the coordinate
vector of the depot and the other antibodies are randomly distributed on the
Euclidean plane.
2. Each city in the CVRP corresponds to one antigen. The antigens are iteratively
presented to the antibody network.
3. Determine the winner antibody to the presented antigen based on two terms: 1)
the Euclidean distance between the presented antigen and the attribute vector
of an antibody; 2) the current demand covered by a given vehicle.
4. Network cooperation inspired from self-organizing maps. The stimulus to the
winner antibody is propagated to its neighbors, which is restricted to the subnetwork to which the winner antibody belongs.
5. The adaptation is introduced to increase antigen-antibody affinity by moving
the winner antibody and its neighbors in the direction of the presented antigen
in the network.
6. The most stimulated antibody from each sub-network along one epoch is selected for cloning.
7. Convergence of the algorithm: the learning process is finished if 1) the antibodies
of all sub-networks must be related to at most one antigen; and 2) each antigen
must have one antibody related to it at a minimum distance, and this antibody
must be the current winner for this antigen.
8. Every antibody not related to any antigen is removed from the sub-networks.
Work in [13] presented a “T-Cell Model” based on the process that suffers the
T-cell for solving constrained optimization problem. This model operates on three
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populations: Virgin Cells (VC), Effector Cells (EC), and Memory Cells (MC). VC
is initially generated in a random way. Then, a percentage of VCs is inserted into
the ECs. A percentage of ECs is inserted into MCs after they try a predetermined
number of times to explore the conflicting zones of the search space. MCs then try
a predetermined number of times to explore the neighborhood of the best solutions
found so far. This model dynamically adapts the tolerance factor in order to improve
the exploration capabilities. One of the mutation operators is used to modify the
decision variables involved in the most violated constraint. The proposed model was
tested with a benchmark of 19 test functions, including maximization and minimization problems. The results were compared with Stochastic Ranking and previous AIS
approach.
Work in [242] applied Clonal Selection Algorithm (CLONALG) to the synthesis
and optimization procedure of a Steel Catenary Riser (SCR) for floating oil production
systems at deep and ultra-deep waters. The fitness in the optimization procedure
is evaluated by the behavior of riser configuration, which require a large number of
finite element analyses. Their experimental results indicated that CLONALG is more
effective than Genetic Algorithms (GA) in the term of the number of analyses.
A Bayesian Artificial Immune System (BAIS) has been developed for efficiently
solving hard optimization problems such as the effective handling of building blocks
[33] and multiobjective optimization [32]. BAIS replaces the traditional mutation and
cloning operators with a probabilistic model capable of properly capturing the most
relevant interactions among the variables of the problem. The proposed algorithm
adopted artificial immune system to implement the population-based search strategy
and a Bayesian network to implement the probabilistic model. After the population
is randomly initialized, BAIS starts the loop that is controlled by a stopping condition. BAIS executes these steps for each loop: 1) evaluate the population to select
the best solutions (antibodies) using any selection mechanism; 2) build a Bayesian
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network that better fits the selected solutions; 3) sample a number of new antibodies based on the generated Bayesian network; 4) eliminate the antibodies with
lower fitness and similar antibodies; and 5) insert a small percentage of randomly
generated antibodies to maintain diversity. [33] showed the ability of BAIS to handle non-overlapping and overlapping building blocks in the single-objective Trap-5
optimization problem. [32] extended BAIS for solving multi-objective Knapsack optimization problems. The corresponding proposal is called Multi-objective Bayesian
Artificial Immune System (MOBAIS). BAIS was also applied to perform feature selection using wrapper approach in [31, 33]. The multiobjective optimization problem
was also solved by a Population Adaptive Based Immune Algorithm (PAIA) in [36].
PAIA is abstracted from Clonal Selection Principle, Immune Network Theory, and
Antibodies’ Concentration. Hence, PAIA involves several steps similar to those in
CLONALG and AINE but has its own features: 1) clonal selection is emulated to
enable the selected antibodies to clone and mutate more frequently; and 2) the clone
size is adaptively decided by the number of selected antibodies and antibodies’ affinity. ZDT1 ZDT4 test suite was used in this work to compare PAIA to NSGA II,
SPEA, an VIS. The testing functions have two objectives. Two performance measurements (Generational distance and Spread) were used. The results suggested that
the PAIA produces better solutions. Another work on multiobjective optimization
is reported in [92]. Nondominated Neighbor Immune Algorithm (NNIA) was proposed in this work. NNIA includes three populations: dominant population, active
population, and clone population. NNIA stores the dominant population found so
far in an external population but only partial less-crowded individuals in dominant
population are selected to do proportional cloning, recombination, and static hypermutation. The individual from active population with greater crowding-distance
value is reproduced more times. Static hypermutation operator is used on the clone
population after recombination. The fitness of the individuals in the dominant pop-
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ulation is evaluated by the crowding-distance, which serves as an estimate of the
perimeter of the cuboid formed by the nearest neighbors as the vertices in objective
space. [92] compared PESA-II, NSGA-II, SPEA2, and MISA with NNIA in solving
13 well-known multiobjective function optimization problems including three lowdimensional bi-objective problems, five ZDT problems, and five DTLZ problems.
This work implemented the NNIA with Matlab 7.0 and the toolbox is available at
http://see.xidian.edu.cn/iiip/mggong/Projects/NNIA.htm. Three performance metrics including the coverage of two sets, the convergence metric, and the spacing were
used to evaluate the NNIA and the empirical study on NNLA showed that NNIA
is an effective algorithm for solving multiobjective optimization problems and scales
well along the number of objectives.
Work in [117] developed an AIS optimization methodology to solve an optimal
power flow (OPF) problem, which is in general a non-linear, non-convex and largescale problem. The proposed method used hypermutation for local search and receptor edition for exploring different areas in the solution space. The proposed method
enhances the original AIS by combining it with a gradient vector. This paper claimed
that this approach requires less computation time by decreasing the number of generations and clones during the hypermutation process.

Scheduling
By using concepts from Aspect-Oriented Program and Artificial Immune System, the
work in [118] presented a new methodology named Intelligent Dynamic Polymorphic
Agent (IDPA) for dynamic polymorphic agents scheduling and execution. This highly
flexible multi-agent system includes four sets of agents: Execution Agents, Problem
Agents, Monitor Agent, and Polymorphic Agent. Each agent has a Hyperdata responsible for informing its actions, variable and predicates. The functionalities of
these agents are that:
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• Execution Agents represent robots, conveyors, sensors, lifters, computational
systems and others that will solve a problem.
• Problem Agents is responsible for informing the final desirable state of the
system.
• Monitor Agent has multiple responsibilities: 1) seek all available Execution and
Problem agents in the system; 2) read the agents’ hyperdata; 3) plan the task
list; 4) weave the used Execution Agents along with the Polymorphic agent.
• Polymorphic Agent is a computational system that binds all the agents along
with Execution Agents to generate the Intelligent Dynamic Polymorphic Agent
(IDPA) responsible for accomplishing the final task.
An important part of IDPA is the planner based on Artificial Immune System. A
new algorithm named Cluster-Gradient-based AIS (CGbAIS) was proposed by adding
some clustering techniques in the GbCLONALG [258]. This Artificial Immune System
Planer is able to provide several local optima, keep alternative solutions, and check
for new solutions if a fault happens. A manufacturing scenario was built by using the
software VIRTUALMANUFACTURING [116] to validate the methodology of IDPA
in this work. The results showed that IDPA was able to find a plan and quickly
re-plan the actions if a fault presents.
Work by Han Yu [260] developed an algorithm based on Artificial Immune System to deal with the application of multiprocessor task scheduling for heterogeneous
computing environments. This approach distinguishes itself from many existing approaches in two aspects. This algorithm used AIS to find optimal task-processor
mapping while keeping heuristics task sequence assignment. The affinity was calculated in this algorithm by coupling both the solution quality and the distribution of
population in the solution space.
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Malim et al. compared the performance of Clonal Selection Algorithm, Artificial Immune Network, and Negative Selection Algorithm when applied to university
timetabling [167]. The university timetabling problems include exam timetabling
and course timetabling. One classroom cannot be assigned to multiple courses, but
it is allowed to assign multiple exams to one classroom. The benchmark datasets
(Carter and Schaerf) were used to evaluate the performance of the algorithms, which
are available from ftp://ftp.mie.utoronto.ca/pub/carter/testprob/ and http://www.
diegm.uniud.it/schaerf/projects/coursett/, respectively. A variety of hard and soft
constraints are usually required for the problem of university timetabling. For each
of the datasets, this work used Three hard constraints: (1) students can not be assigned to two different exams at the same timeslot; (2) timeslot must be subject to
the capacity; and (3) each exam must be assigned to exactly one timeslot. The soft
constraint is that number of students having two exams in adjacent (consecutive)
timeslots must be limited to the minimum extent. The experimental results showed
that the clonal selection and negative selection are more suitable to produce examination timetables; while the immune network and negative selection are more effective
for course timetabling.
Artificial Immune System (AIS) has been applied to energy scheduling problem
in [25]. This immune scheduling approach is based on opt-aiNet [26] and is divided
into two nested stages: the inner one defines the optimal production levels at each time
interval once the on/off profiles of the machines are defined, whereas the outer stage
defines the on/off status of the generation units. The optimization variables (on/off
intervals) are decoded in terms of 0-1 strings representing on/off status for each utility.
When including the constraint of Minimum On Time or Minimum Shut-down Time,
the number of possible values for each optimization variable is restricted to reduce
the search space and thus achieve a faster convergence to the optimal solution. This
approach only uses mutation operator and problem specific information to lower the
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complexity of the searching. A simple but effective energy management problem
was tested with the Immune Scheduling Approach and Mixed Integer Scheduling
Approach and the results were compared in terms of convergence time and number
of objective function calls.

Fraud/Fault Detection
Artificial immune recognition system (AIRS, [19, 247]) was applied to credit card
fraud detection in [80]. The database used in this work is from a large Brazilian bank,
with registers within time window between 07/14/2004 and 09/12/2004. There are
41647 registers in the database, among which 3.74% are fraudulent. A transaction is
considered fraudulent if, in the next two months client inquired the transaction, or the
bank suspects the transaction and confirms it does not belong to the client; otherwise,
the transaction is tagged as legitimate. The database was preprocessed by removing
unimportant attributes, categorizing the attributes, and sampling the database. The
database is finally divided into 9 samples with 17 independent attributes and 10
attribute groups. A cost function was used in this paper to evaluate the classifiers:
$cost = $100*fn + $1*(fp + tp)
where tp, fp and fn is the number of true positives, false positives and false negatives;
every verification costs 1 dollar and every undetected fraud loses 100 dollars. A
parameter set optimization was performed with a Genetic Algorithm (GA) for both
AIRS and Neural Networks. This work compared Artificial Immune System to Neural
Nets, Bayesian Nets, Nave Bayes and Decision Trees for credit card fraud detection
and the results showed Artificial Immune System has the best performance.
Guzella et al. presented a system called Dynamic Effector Regulatory Algorithm
for fault detection [104]. The initial data pre-processing is first performed, which applies a clustering algorithm to discard a larger number of redundant antigens. During
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the training phase, the populations of regulatory and effector cells are generated based
on resultant antigens in the pre-processing. The cytokine counters are initialized to
zero. The system presents the antigen to the T cell populations and the n cells with
the greatest affinities are selected. The classification of an antigen goes further only if
any effector cell has been selected. The selected effector cells secrete a stimulatory cytokine whereas the selected regulatory cells secrete suppressor cytokine. The secreted
cytokines are accumulated in the corresponding stimulatory or suppressing cytokine
counters. The combining effects of these cytokines are represented by stimulation
factor, which determines the activation of effector cells. After determining the stimulation factor for each iteration, each effector cell is assigned an activation threshold.
Finally, the system determines the anomaly severity based on the number of activated
effector T cells. The proposed approach was tested on DAMADICS fault detection
benchmark data available at http://diag.mchtr.pw.edu.pl/damadics and generated a
lower false alarm rate than other approaches evaluated such as V-detector and KMeans.

Computer Security
The recent work in [210] presented an Artificial Immune System (AIS) based security
framework to prevent from a number of serious Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in
IEEE 802.11b network such as de-authentication and disassociation attacks. The AIS
framework consists of two phases: Learning/training and detection phase. Because
the traffic is training traffic, the system is assumed to be under normal operation conditions during the training phase. The detection phase detects malicious traffic and
takes countermeasures to neutralize its impact. The variation in sequences numbers
in frames is significantly large in an attack scenario. In the real world, IEEE 802.11b
covers the Media Access Control (MAC) and the physical layer. In AIS framework,
A MAC frame is mapped on one of the two types of antigens that is correspondingly
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detected by one of two types of antibodies (detectors): type-1 consists of the fields
extracted from the de-authentication frame whereas type-2 consists of the fields from
the disassociation frame. Type-1 and type-2 detectors are tuned using separated sets
of training traffic. The antigen model in this AIS framework consists of five fields.
The first four fields ensure the appropriate management frame and vulnerabilities
type (de-authentication or disassociation) are encoded as antigen. The fifth field is
the 12 bit sequence control field containing the sequence number field of 802.11b
MAC frame. The fifth field is the place where the difference exists between the normal operation and the attack. The difference in the sequence numbers is only 1 in
the case when consecutive frames reach the Access Point (AP) without any drops.
In case of a loss environment, the difference in the sequence number even for a client
operating under normal conditions will be more than one. The detectors model the
average difference in the sequence numbers for every client. If the distance between
the antigen and the detector (antibody) is greater than pre-defined threshold value,
then the testing sample is classified as malicious activity. The data-sets used in this
work were collected using the tools that are available on the internet such as Ethereal and SMAC 2.0. The experimental results showed that the proposed framework
approximately achieved 100% detection rate with negligible false positive rate. [190]
also worked on DoS detection in the large scale network by using Artificial Immune
System, i.e., Idiotypic Network Theory.
The “libtissue” AIS framework [102] we have already reviewed above was used to
discover packets containing novel variations of attacks covered by an existing signature base in [231]. This framework incorporated with an existing intrusion detection
algorithm called intrusion alert correlation algorithm but expanded on their capability in detection of unknown attacks. The dendritic cells in “libtissue” are seen as
living among the intrusion detection system environment. A population of dendritic
cells is tied to the prediction vertices on the correlation graph, one dendritic cell for
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each predicted attack. The proposed system was evaluated and the initial results
were promising despite the high false positive rate.
Work in [209] implemented a number of methods of traffic data coding and generation of detectors for a system of AIS based anomaly detection in TCP/IP network.
More accurately speaking, we believe this system is based on negative selection algorithm but this paper didn’t clarify how the control and decision system in the
general architecture of anomaly detection system determines whether the suspicious
behavior is a wrong alarm. Two early proposed methods were used to code antigen
and antibody in AIS. The first one uses traffic parameters such as a number of bytes
per second (Bps) and a number of packets per second (Pps) to represent antigen
and antibody as real-valued vectors in the 2-dimensional space. Euclidean distance
is chosen as matching rule in this case. The second one uses the headers of TCP
SYN packets to represent antigen and antibody as binary arrays. Harming distance
is used to measure the similarities between antigens and antibodies in this case. This
work implemented three methods reported in the literature for antibody generation,
including positive characterization technique, random generation of antibodies, and
negative characterization technique. Five experiments were conducted in this work to
study the performance of different methods of detector generation for corresponding
traffic data coding. Two network data sets were used in the experiments, including
both intrusion detection data from MIT Lincoln Laboratory and the data collected
from the computer network of Institute of Computer Science PAS, Warsaw (IPI PAN).
Artificial immune systems have been applied to the application domain of Mobile
Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). The application of Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)
in MANETs [178] has been reviewed above. Work in [177] developed an AIS based
security framework, BeeAIS, in the network simulator ns-2, to solve the same problem
as in [178]. The stimulated results showed that the AIS based security system provides
a similar security level as that of the cryptographic security system, BeeSec, developed
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earlier for BeeAdHoc, but at significantly lower energy and communication cost. Work
on MANETs is also seen in [65], which outlined a multi-objective artificial immune
system (MOAIS) for network anomaly intrusion detection. The fitness in MOAIS
is evaluated with both effectiveness and efficiency. The effectiveness is measured
in terms of the false positive rate whereas the efficiency is measured by the time
that is used for classification. In addition, AIS based misbehavior detection, that
is, anomaly detection based on negative selection algorithm, is suitable for wireless
sensor networks [63]. [62] further concluded that the choice of genes from different
layers in wireless sensor networks profoundly influenced the performance of the AIS
and the MAC layer based gene is highly related.
Work in [69] introduced a hybrid model called Network Threat Detection with
Immune Inspired Anomaly Detection (NetTRIAD) for network intrusion detection.
This model includes Innate Layer and Adaptive Layer. The Innate Layer collects the
external data, including antigens from packets observed on the network, danger model
signals from observed events, and the state of the network and its hosts. This Layer
also classifies antigens as dangerous or safe. The Adaptive layer further recognizes
antigens (threats visible on the network) by combining self-nonself discrimination and
the classification results from the innate layer. The antigen in this model is a vector
of four real-valued features: destination address, source address, destination port,
and source port. A danger model signal includes a single feature value that affects
the signal’s binding potential and a signal level integer value that determines the
degree of danger or safety the signal represents. The implementation of NetTRIIAD
uses the Snort NIDS (version 2.6.1.3) as the misuse-based NIDS component, which
is an important component in the Innate Layer of the proposed model. The Nagios
network monitoring application is used in NetTRIIAD to gather host status information for the Host Monitor process. To demonstrate the performance improvements in
NetTRIIAD, this model was compared with DARPA / MIT 1999 Intrusion Detection
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Evaluation (IDEVAL99) in this work.
Work in [48] combined Artificial Immune System (AIS) and Genetic Algorithm
(GA) to develop an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The system is called Intrusion
Detection System (IDS-EVOLUSIRS) consisting of four stages: Data Conversion,
Generation and Training of Detectors, Intrusion, Detection, and Memory Cell Identification. This work used DARPA data set and a request in the raw data was converted
into binary strings of length 134, so IDS-EVOLUSIRS is a binary representation system. Both self and nonself data sets are required in Detector Generation stage. The
randomly generated detector candidate must pass Negative Selection and Positive
Selection to be matured; that is, the matured detector doesn’t match any self but
has the capability of detecting nonself. A request matching 3 or more detectors at
13 or more contiguous locations is classified as an anomaly in Intrusion Detection
stage. The matched number of contiguous bits between the detector and a new request (antigen) determines the fitness of that detector. A detector becomes activated
when detecting an anomaly. The clone threshold is defined as the average fitness
of all activated detectors. The following steps adopt the adaptive and evolutionary
property of Genetic Algorithm. Those activated detectors having a fitness value no
less than cloning threshold are selected for cloning. The set of winner detectors are
formed after cloning by combining the clones and the remaining activated detectors.
A memory cell with fitness value greater than all of the Winner Detectors is finally
developed after undergoing Mutation and Crossover.
Work by Luther et al. developed a cooperative AIS framework for intrusion detection [164]. The negative selection algorithm is chosen for detector generation and
anomaly detection. The statistics of the network-traffic on one client are used to define the feature vectors. A counter is incremented when the matching occurs between
the new feature vectors and the detectors. The detectors undergo clonal selection
when the counter reaches a predefined threshold. The detector is eliminated from
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the detector set if it does not reach its threshold during a pre-defined life period.
A P2P infrastructure based on a hybrid decentralized architecture was proposed in
this work to allow different AIS agents to cooperate by sharing their detection results and own status for achieving better detection performance. The central entity
is denoted as the server. The other AIS agents are simply called clients that communicate with all other peers autonomously. A “super node” is used for the initial
look-up of other peers containing AIS-systems. Every AIS agent is associated with
a status metric that represent the possibility of infection (anomaly), which is shared
through the P2P system. If a host’s own status reaches a predefined threshold, it
sends an event-driven message to its neighbors containing its status and the actual
detectors associated with the alarm. When receiving the event-driven messages, the
host adds the new detectors to its own detector set and updates its own status. The
proposed framework applied to the detection of malware within a network by means
of two specific simulated scenarios: compromised host in a subnetwork and detecting
a worm attack. A novel network security simulator (NeSSi) has been developed.
Work in [106] developed a new software called jREMISA and reported the testing
results with MIT-DARPA 1999 insider intrusion detection data set. The idea behind
this software is to integrate a multiobjective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA) to an
innovative artificial immune system (AIS). The new distributed intrusion detection
system called AIS-MOEA IDS measures the vector of solutions among detectors. The
optimal solutions are characterized by both best classification fitness and multiobjective hypervolume size. AIS antibody detectors are used to promiscuously monitor
network traffic for exact and variant abnormal system events. This process only
requires the detector’s own data structure and the application domain truth set.
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Spam Detection
Work in [5] applied cross-regulation model [24] to spam detection. The corresponding
model is named as the Immune Cross-Regulation Model (ICRM). The ICRM algorithm is designed to be first trained on N emails of “self” (a user’s outbox), harmless
“nonself” (a user’s inbox) and “harmful nonself” (spam arriving at a given user), then
cycles through three phases for every received e-mail: pre-processing phase, interaction phase, and decision phase. The pre-processing of an email includes lowercasing
and stemming of all words in email subject and body after filtering out the common
English stop words and short words. Only the features in the beginning and the end
of the email are selected in this model. The cross-regulation model includes three cell
types: Effector T-cells (E), Regulatory T-cells (R), and Antigen Presenting Cells (A).
In the interaction phase, the Ef for a given feature f proliferates only if they do not
find themselves sharing the same adjacent pair of binding slots with Rg. Otherwise,
only the Rg, associated with feature g, proliferate. The arriving email is assessed
based on the relative proportions of R and E for its n sampled features in decision
phase. Because more weight to R for ham features and more weight to E for spam
features are given in the labeled training stage, features with more R are classified as
ham while features with more E are more likely spam. This spam detection algorithm
was evaluated with six email corpora. The results showed the advantages of this algorithm in the areas of spam to ham ratio variation and also of tracking concept drifts
in spam detection.
Work in [264] proposed a behavior-based anti-spam technology for email service
based on Artificial Immune Network. This work first developed an algorithm to automatically extract the behavior-based characteristics (sender IP address, SMIT id
number, and URL link or reply email) of spam from a text file and calculate the
spam scores based on the equations given in this paper. The obtained behavior-based
characteristics and spam scores are used as input to cluster similar spam messages
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based on artificial immune network. This work further proposed a new incremental
immune-inspired clustering approach to enhance the incremental clustering capability
of the classical aiNet algorithm. This approach models the spam data stream as a sequence of time ordered “windows” that contain a very limited number of objects at a
given time and further create the date clusters incrementally and dynamically based
on the similarity between new data and the “internal image” of the memory network. Each cluster generated by this approach represents a very general description
of the data. From the experimental results reported in this paper, the new approach
outperformed conventional re-clustering.
Work in [204] presented a new artificial immune system for collaborative spam
filtering. A few antispam systems can collaborate with each other, each of which
is placed between the e-mail server and the Internet. The main outputs from the
antispam system are the decisions for the incoming emails. The incoming email is
either blocked or marked as spam if the antispam system decides it is spam. The
other outputs are the collaborating messages sent to other antispam systems. Three
types of inputs can be seen in the antispam system: 1) incoming e-mail messages;
2) email-account information and events for each protected email account; and 3)
messages coming from collaborating antispam systems. This paper provided a block
diagram for internal architecture and processing steps of the antispam system and
explained this diagram in the text. The antispam system includes “adaptive” part
and “innate” part but this paper only considered “adaptive” part. The text strings
of predefined length are sampled from a pending email at random positions and are
converted into the binary-string representation called proportional signature. The
proportional signatures are passed to the negative selection block and those that
survive become suspicious signatures. Each suspicious signature is duplicated and
passed to the maturation block and the detection block, respectively. If the suspicious
signature in the detection block is matched by a memory or active detector, then their
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corresponding email is declared as spam. The detector is activated in the maturation
block by local and remote danger signatures. The text strings are transformed into
the proportional signatures based on so called similarity hashing similar to Nilsimsa
method. The initial evaluation done by this work showed that the system achieves
promising detection results under modest collaboration, and that it is rather resistant
under the tested obfuscation.

Data Mining
In [90], Artificial Immune Recognition System (AIRS) with nonlinear resource allocation method is used as Traditional Malay Music (TMM) genre classification. Since
the classifier in this work was derived from some early works, we focus on reviewing
the interesting application presented in this work such as feature extraction, feature selection and experiments. This work used ten TMM genres, including Dikir
Barat, Etnik Sabah, Gamelan, Ghazal, Inang, Joget, Keroncong, Tumbuk Kalang,
Wayang Kulit, and Zapin. The features were extracted from the music files through
a semi-automatic music classification system called MARSYAS. Three feature sets
were obtained, representing the timbral texture, rhythmic content and pitch content
of the music signals. Feature selection (reduction) is conducted by using Gain Ratio
(GR) feature evaluation method along with searching strategy, e.g. best first search.
The experiments used a data set with 25 features and 193 instances. 17 classifiers
were chosen to evaluate the performance of proposed method. A 10-fold validation
approach was used to estimate the predictive accuracy of the algorithms. The proposed method obtained a classification accuracy of 88.6%. Work in [199] replaced
the resource allocation mechanism of AIRS with Fuzzy-Logic and the modified AIRS
(Fuzzy-AIRS) was used as a classifier in the diagnosis of atherosclerosis. The existing
resource allocation mechanism is done linearly with affinities and thus requires excess
resource usage in the system. Fuzzy-logic resource allocation is non-linear and the
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difference in resource number between high-affinity ARBs and low-affinity ARBs is
bigger compared to the existing approaches. This work reported that the classification
accuracy of Fuzzy-AIRS for Atherosclerosis disease is 100%.
Work by Wilson et al. [252, 253] presented Motif Tracking Algorithm (MTA) inspired by immune memory to successfully identify a population of motifs in both
Stemgen Data and Power Demand Data. Motif Tracking Algorithm follows the routine procedures like other pattern identification tool. One of the new ideas in this
algorithm is the concept of Tracker that plays an important role on motif detection
in the time series. A tracker represents a signature for a motif sequence that is seen
to repeat. The initial tracker population is constructed of size a to contain one of
each of the viable alphabet symbols predefined by the user. During an iteration each
tracker is taken in turn and compared to the set of words in the motif candidate
matrix M by using a simple string comparison between the tracker and the word.
All trackers with a match count less than 2 are eliminated. The MTA then uses the
Euclidean distance to measure the relationship between two motif candidates. If the
distance is less than pre-defined threshold, then a motif is found and the match count
of that tracker is stimulated. Any unstimulated tracker is removed afterwards. The
stimulated trackers undergo proliferation and mutation to extend the length of the
tracker so it can capture more of the complete motif.
Shafiq et al. proposed a novel set of intelligent information theoretic features, including burstiness of session arrivals, multi-resolution session rates, entropy of destination IP address, and divergence in destination port distributions, for the well-known
problem of malware portscan detection [211]. This work used a malware-infected network traffic dataset collected on diverse endpoints for a period of 12 months. Because
automated malicious traffic should have different burstiness behavior than benign traffic, this work models the discrete session arrivals as a Gilbert Markov chain to capture
the burstiness of session arrival events, which helps highlight anomalous traffic activ-
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ity. Network traffic volumes from a compromised machine are generally higher than
from a benign host. Hence, the second intelligent feature in this work is using five
aggregate session arrival processes with bin lengths of τ =0.001, 1, 2, 3, 4 seconds to
compute session rates at different time resolutions. A compromised host is featured
by the significantly increased number of unique IP addresses per time-window, so this
work proposed to use entropy of destination IP address to reflect this effect. Finally,
the Resistor-Average (RA) divergence is chosen as one of the intelligent features to
quantify the difference between the destination port distributions of the worm traffic
and the benign traffic on a port-by-port basis. To validate the performance of the proposed intelligent features, six classifiers were compared in this work, including Real
Valued Negative Selection (RVNS) based on the adaptive immune system, Dendritic
Cell Algorithm (DCA) based on the innate immune system, Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy
Inference System (ANFIS), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and two state-of-the-art
statistical malware detectors (Rate-Limiting (RL) and Maximum-Entropy (ME)).
Wang et al. have applied Clonal Selection Algorithm to the classification of the
brain MRI [244]. 9 antibody populations are initialized from a 5*5 neighborhood
pixel unit matrix in the experiment. The affinity of the antibody is calculated using
equation 2.4:

R=

z
X

min {D1p , D2p , D3p , ..., Dcp }

(2.4)

p=1

where D is the Euclidean distances between the antigens and antibody; Z is the total
number of pixels in the image; P is the reading sequence number of the input data
(pixel); and C is the quantity of antibodies in the antibody set. Only 5 antibody sets
with the highest affinity are kept and assigned a clone’s number based on equation 2.5:

Nc =

n
X

round

k=1

β•N
K

(2.5)

where Nc is the total number of clones; β is a multiplying factor; N is the total
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number of antibodies; k is the sequence number of n highest affinity antibodies. The
mutation method used in the experiment is randomized normal distribution. The
experimental results showed that artificial immune system can really be applied in
the area of medical image analysis and even superior to other clustering algorithms.
Work in [138] incorporated the clonal selection algorithm for bootstrapping the
Bayesian network learning. It provides a population-based learning algorithm for
subsets of given training data by simultaneously handling learning Bayesian network
structures and the bootstrapping procedure. A Bayesian network structure is considered as an antibody in clonal selection algorithm. The Markov propagation model
is used to construct the observed energy distributions. Each antigen has the same
predefined size consisting of randomly selected instances from D. The affinity between
an antigen and an antibody is measured by one of the existing scoring schemes for
Bayesian network structures. The mutation operators used in this work include edge
addition, edge deletion, and edge reversion. This work applied the proposed approach
to identify the route of energy transfer from the estimated energy status of residues in
a 1be9 protein and a quantitative map of route for energy transfer between residues
were derived by analyzing the results.
A new method for constructing ensembles of classifiers was proposed in [84] based
on Immune Network Theory. In classifier ensembles, different classifiers collaborate
to solve the given problem. Each antibody in the immune network is a classifier
potentially usable to form the ensemble. The problem to be solved is considered
as antigens, each of which is a random subspace of the original space of variables
and represents a random non-linear projection. Antigens are actually the training
data in this work. The affinity between antigen and antibody is evaluated by the
number of patterns that are correctly classified by the antibody (a classifier). Both
parametric mutation and structural mutation are used in the system. The stimulation
value is composed by the affinity between antigen and antibody and the interaction
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between antibody and the rest of the antibodies of the population. This work used five
standard methods for creating ensembles of classifiers and selected 35 data sets to test
the validity of the proposed model. The obtained ensembles by using the proposed
model have a very good performance in terms of learning and generalization error.
Work in [208] applied both CLONALG and Parallel artificial immune recognition
system version 2 (AIRS2) to classify petroleum well drilling operations as Rotary
Drilling (RD), Rotary Reaming (RR), Oriented Drilling (“Sliding Drilling”) (SD),
Back-reaming or Tool adjusting (TA), Tripping (TR), and Circulating (CI). This
work used real records of mud-logging data consisting of 3784 samples of three days
well drilling to train and test the implemented immune classifier. Each record contains the information monitored by the mud-logging system, including Bit Depth,
Weight on Hook (WOH), Stand Pipe Pressure (SPP), Drillstring Rotation (RPM),
and Weight on Bit (WOB). However, this work found that for the drilling operations classification problem the AIS classifiers are not competitive when comparing
to Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network (NN) with backpropagation (BP)
learning algorithm (MLP-BP) and Support Vector Machine (SVM).
Puteh et al. [202] proposed immune network based model to classify heterogeneous
data in its original types. The model is able to process the data with the types as
represented in the database and it prevents from degrading the originality of the data.
Experimental results showed that the proposed model produced a better accuracy rate
by comparison with existing population-based immune algorithm and the standard
classifiers on most of the data. Another immune network based biclustering algorithm,
denoted BIC-aiNet, has been developed to carry out text mining [213]. In BIC-aiNet,
the biclustering problem is divided into several two-way bipartition problems, instead
of considering a single two-way permutation framework.
Work in [42] presented a novel approach for high dimensional contextual text
data clustering. The contextual document processing consists of two main stages.
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The first stage generates a hierarchical model by recurrently dividing a collection D
of documents into homogeneous groups consisting of approximately identical number of elements. The second stage divides terms space (dictionary) into subspaces
of terms specific to each context. The immune algorithm aiNet was selected in this
work to cluster the collection of documents with a number of improvements such as
fast identification of redundant antibodies, fast generation of mutated clones, timedependent parameters, and fast identification of winners (most stimulated memory
cells). Three quality measures of the clustering were used in the experiments, including average document quantization, average weighted cluster purity, and normalized
mutual information. The quality of the immune network was evaluated based on the
analysis of the edge lengths of the minimal spanning tree (MST) constructed over the
set of antibodies, in each iteration of the learning process. The experiments proved
that the contextual approach is fast, of good quality, and scalable.

Robots
Recent work presented a combined Short-Term Learning (STL) and Long-Term Learning (LTL) approach to solve mobile robot navigation problems [249]. The immune
system learns to recognize antigens through “two timescale” approach: over the lifetime of the individual (Short-Term Learning, STL) and over the lifetime of the species
(Long-Term Learning, LTL). Short-Term Learning used in this work is an idiotypic
Artificial Immune System (AIS) network based on Farmer et al.’s [70] model of Jerne’s
idiotypic network theory. Long-Term Learning used a Genetic Algorithm (GA) that
rapidly evolves sets of behaviors in simulation. These diverse sets of behaviors derived from TLT are then transferred to an STL phase, and the system is said to be
seeded. This paper described the proposed system architecture in details. There are
eight antigens (changing environment) and six basic types of antibody (variability of
robot behaviors). An antibody set consists of eight behaviors corresponding to eight
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antigens, and five distinct antibody set are used, so there are total 40 antibodies in
the system. The relative fitness of each antibody set in the STL system is calculated
by equation 2.6:

µi =

(τi + ρci )

1
Px−1

−1
k=0 (τk + 8ck )

(2.6)

where τi , ci is the antibody sets’ associated task completion times and the numbers
of collisions, respectively; x is the number of the antibody sets; ρ=8 to give c equal
weight compared to τ . The RL sores, analogous to antibody paratope values, are
calculated by equation 2.7:

pij =

Lij µi
ϕ

(2.7)

pij represents a comparative estimate of how well each antibody matches its antigen,
where Lij is the antibody’s final score; ϕ is set to 20. Each antibody initially makes
1000 clones in the STL system but the numbers fluctuate according to a variation
of Farmer’s equation. The antibody selection process comprises three stages: 1) The
system chooses the antibody a with the highest of these paratope values from five
distinct antibody sets as the first stage winner; 2) The stimulatory and suppressive
effect of antibody a on all the all the antibodies in the repertoire is considered; and
3) The system calculates the activation λ of each antibody and the winning antibody
β in the third stage has the highest λ value. Reinforcement learning in the STL
system scores the performance of an antibody by comparing old and new environment
information. The final score given is dependent on how many environmental changes
have taken place and whether the change is negative or positive.
The STL is conducted with an e-puck, a miniature mobile-robot with a small
frontal camera and eight infra-red (IR) sensors. Both virtual and real environments
were used for testing in this work. There are two stimulated environments (World
1 and World 2) that have been designed using Webots software. Once the robot
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has arrived at the target, the number of collisions c and the time to complete the
task t are recorded. A wandering e-puck acts as a dynamic obstacle. To make
a changing environment, the starting positions of the robots and target block are
changed automatically after each run in the stimulated environment, whereas the
obstacles, robots and ball are randomly placed in different starting positions after
each run in real environment. Two testing cases were studied in this work: 1) the
combined LTL-STL approach is compared with using STL only; and 2) the STL phase
is tested when the idiotypic mechanism is turned off. The experiments showed that
the best results are generated by using the architecture that merges LTL with an
idiotypic AIS for the STL.
Work in [187] proposed a model for integration of low-level response to damage,
potential damage and component failure in robots. This model draws on the notion of
three important aspects of the innate system: the notion of Toll-like receptors (TLRs),
inflammation, and localization. This work investigated a simplistic robot comprising
of four motors, two fans, and four sensors each measuring the temperature of one
motor. If one motor is overheating while the others are functioning correctly, the sensor associated the motor generates a PAMP signal which passed to the related TLR.
Once the TLR receives the signal, it evaluates it according to predefined condition
and response pairs and returns the inflammation level associated with the particular
response. Self-Organizing Map (SOM) is used to encode the higher level state representation of the robot. Neuro-endocrine control system was borrowed to achieve the
response of the system. If the robot is in an unstable state, the artificial immune system first deals with the problem locally at the level of TLRs. If the problem couldn’t
be solved locally, inflammation starts to spread to neighboring nodes of the current
state node until the robot is returned to a stable state. The simulation is conducted
to demonstrate the potential benefits of the proposed model.
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Inspired by the suppression hypothesis in the immune system, Ko et al. presented
the design and application of a General Suppression Control Framework (GSCF)
based distributed wireless sensor network prototyping system for tracking search and
rescue robot in the open field [147,150]. The framework consists of five major components: Affinity Evaluator, Cell Differentiator, Cell Reactor, Suppression Modulator,
and the Local Environment. These reactive components influence each other through
the humoral and cellular signals. This work tried to demonstrate that it is possible
for the proposed distributed wireless robot tracking system to apply low-cost Zigbee
based sensor network to locate a small group of mobile robots and identify that there
are some potential technological constrains in the physical system. However, the test
environment used in this work was far from practical one that will use the designed
system.
An immune system based multi-robot mobile agent network was described in [88].
This paper provided a table listing the immunological metaphors used in the multirobot system. The system comprises nodes, mobile agents and robots. Mobile agents
migrate from one node to another when receiving a stimulus from the robot. Robots
communicate with the agent to provide information when they encounter complex
situation such as an obstacle in front. The complexity of a situation is measured
in terms of pain, which is calculated by Pain = wB *P(B) + wL *P(L). P(B) is the
battery sensor value used for measuring battery charge whereas P(L) is the distance
sensor value used for measuring the distance from the obstacle. wB and wL are
weights that are used to balance between P(B) and P(L). The information that robot
receives from the mobile agent is termed as rule-set. The robot utilizes the rule-set
to respond to the complex situation and send the feedback to the agents. A robot
randomly discovers a large number of actions to overcome the obstacles. The action
is evaluated by the change of pain (∆P), which is also used to determine whether a
robot need seek help from the agent or its rule-set. The prototype of the system was
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tested by using the mobile agent platforms Java J2SE 1.4.2 and JADE 3.4.1 coupled
with Lego Mindstorm robots.
Some initial work on developing an immune-inspired solution for detecting anomalies in a foraging swarm robotic system with an immuno-engineering approach has
been reported in [203].

Other AIS Applications
There are some other AIS applications that have been reported in the literature but
cannot be categorized into the application domains listed in previous sections. [157]
employed ideas from antigen-presenting cells, T-cell interaction, and cytokine interaction with neural systems to develop a real-time tracking system for tracking
morphing moving targets over non-benign backgrounds. [213] used a hybrid model
for the prediction of bankruptcy of companies. This model combines modified Negative Selection, Positive Selection and the Clonal Selection Algorithms. [152] tried
to develop self-adjustable, intelligent navigation control functions for autonomous
underwater vehicles (AUVs). They applied the Clonal Selection Algorithm to determine the optimal combination of three gain coefficients, KP, KD, KI of the PID
controller, which proved by the simulation to provide better responses than the existing Ziegler-Nichols technique with respect to the settling time, overshoot and an
affinity in submerging under water and turning the yaw angle. [59] presented a framework for a self-organizing SpeckNet based on Cohen’s model of the immune system.
In the SpeckNet, specks consist of minute, autonomous, semi-conductor grains. They
sense and compute locally, communicate wirelessly, and collaborate as programmable
computational networks. [105] developed an automated blog design generation system
through a population-based artificial immune algorithm. In the algorithm, an antibody corresponds to a blog design represented as a string by using the slicing tree layout and HSV color space model. An antigen represents a user’s requirement. Clonal
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selection algorithm (CLONALG) was used in several applications: software mutation
testing [176], rounding error correction in Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) based
fragile image watermarking techniques [14], assessment of the power-generating system with wind power penetration [245], Recognition of Handwritten Indic Script [83],
and protein sequence alignment with benchmarks from BaliBASE library (v.1.0 and
v.2.0) [46]. [149] used Artificial Immune System for English grammar checking and
correction. [154] presented a network based AIS for intelligent home and describer
the corresponding scenario. The antigens represent the requests to the home and
the antibodies the responses to these requests. The system cannot only perform the
usual control functions but also learn and adapt to varying requirements. [139] applied artificial immune system to select and construct air combat maneuvers. These
maneuvers represent motion-based plans that can be expressed by autopilot mode
and target commands. Intruder aircraft can be views as antigens and antibodies represent maneuvers that are used in response to the threat. Artificial immune system,
including Negative Selection, Immune Network, and Clonal Selection, is used to select,
modify, and tune maneuvers that have been randomly generated or retrieved from a
maneuver database. Once appropriate maneuvers that know how to respond to the
different enemy aircraft system have been generated, the command sequences associated with these maneuvers are sent to a tactical autopilot system for execution. [256]
developed an AIS algorithm - Support Vector Machine (AIS-SVM) hybrid algorithm
to identify voltage collapse prone areas and overloaded lines in the power system network. [203] presented an optimization tool based on the Artificial Immune System
to solve the problem of Transmission expansion planning by taking into account the
least cost solution, bearing in mind investments, and ohmic transmission losses. Inspired by the cell-mediate immune response of T-cells, [153] proposed an autonomous
and decentralized vehicle dispatching algorithm. The simulation studies show the
propose algorithm generates a good vehicle utilization and low computational cost

87

when comparing with a GA-based algorithm.

2.3

Summary

The biological immune system has been recently drawn significant attention as a potential source of inspiration for developing novel computational intelligence paradigms.
Table 2.1 summarizes the main AIS algorithms and the corresponding recent references that are commented in this survey. Among various mechanisms in the complex
immune system that have been explored for AIS, self/nonself discrimination was one
of the earlier mechanisms identified as a useful metaphor for computation and recently given continued attention. Given this rise in attention to Danger Theory, an
extensive survey of the applications of Danger Theory and Dendritic Cell Algorithm
is presented. This survey found that negative selection algorithms (NSA) are continuously gaining the most popularity and various variations are constantly proposed
in the recent development of the AIS field. These NSA variations are mostly concentrated on developing new detector generation scheme to improve the algorithm
performance [11, 81, 132, 160, 163–165, 200, 212]. Both artificial immune networks and
clonal selection algorithm are being studied extensively. Pacheco et al. presented an
Abstract Immune System Algorithm [193] based on Farmer et al.’s immune network
model [70]. Several variations of aiNet were proposed to solve optimizations problems
(omni-aiNet [44]), clustering problems (MOM-aiNet [43], opt-aiNet-AA-Clust [206]),
and capacitor placement problem in radial distribution networks [227]. Ciccazzo et al.
introduced a new clonal selection algorithm called the elitist Immune Programming
(EIP) [41]. Halavati et al. added the idea of symbiosis to CLONALG [107]. Other
recently proposed algorithms in [47,176,254] are also inspired by clonal selection principle. In reviewing recent works in the research area of artificial immune networks and
clonal selection algorithm, we found that these areas focus on the algorithm applica-
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Table 2.1 Summary of AIS algorithms and recent references
Model

References

Negative selection

[81] [82] [212] [191] [192] [161] [163] [162] [160] [159]
[257] [265] [134] [165] [132] [133] [129] [38] [42] [200]
[219] [222] [220] [225] [223] [216] [217] [21] [96] [12]

Immune networks

[193] [205] [44] [43] [206] [45] [227] [221]

Clonal selection

[41] [107] [176] [47] [254]

Danger theory

[8] [101] [8] [201] [121] [207]

Dendritic cell algorithms

[99] [102] [103] [189] [98] [169] [143] [97] [100] [178]

Other algorithms

[71] [261] [9] [241]

tions rather than extensions and improvements of the models. As listed in Table 2.2,
this survey has revealed many and varied applications of AIS in recent works in this
field. A significant field of research is that of network security, data mining, and optimizations in which AIS methods have been widely used for solving various important
problems. Some of the pioneering works in AIS were done in the field of robots behavior controlling [88,147,150,187,249]. Recent researches in the application areas of
AIS include a diverse range of problem domains, for example, with the help of Clonal
Selection Algorithms, Lee et al. tried to develop self-adjustable, intelligent navigation control functions for autonomous underwater vehicles [152]; Kaneshige et al.
applied artificial immune system to select and construct air combat maneuvers [139];
Lehmann et al. [154] presented a network based AIS to control the Heating System
of intelligent home. Woolley and Milanovic [256] applied an AIS algorithm - Support
Vector Machine (AIS-SVM) hybrid algorithm to identify voltage collapse prone areas
and overloaded lines in the power system network.
Undeniably, there have been many successes of AIS techniques. However, some
open issues need to be addressed in the future. There are some overlaps that ap-
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Table 2.2 Summary of recent AIS applications
Application

References

Optimization

[196] [172] [13] [242] [33] [32] [36] [92] [92] [117]

Scheduling

[118] [258] [116] [260] [167] [25]

Fraud/Fault detection

[80] [104]

Computer Security

[210] [190] [102] [231] [209] [178] [177] [178] [65]
[63] [62] [69] [48] [164] [106]

Spam detection

[5] [24] [264] [204]

Data mining

[90] [199] [252] [253] [211] [244] [138] [84] [208]
[202] [213] [42]

Robots

[249] [187] [147] [150] [88] [203]

Other Applications

[157] [213] [152] [59] [105] [176] [14] [245] [83] [46]
[149] [154] [139] [256] [203] [153]

parently exist among Artificial Immune Network, Clonal Selection Algorithm, and
Genetic Algorithms. The key components for all of these three algorithms include
cloning, selection and mutation. The debate has to be had: are they actually a single algorithm assuming that both Artificial Immune Network and Clonal Selection
Algorithm can be considered as variations of Genetic Algorithms? It is necessary to
be able to illustrate that each algorithm really carves out its own distinctive niche
and thus deserves a unique name for the algorithm. We would think carefully about
two opposite directions on futuristic immune inspired techniques. The first ambitious
idea is to develop a unified architecture that to maximum extent mimics natural defense mechanisms by integrating a set of heterogeneous immune components. On the
contrary, we would develop distinctive immune inspired algorithms without any logical and technique overlap for any existing techniques. Despite its uniqueness, such
algorithms can successfully solve very hard real world problems that other techniques
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fail. A greater communication among biologist, computer scientist, and engineers is
needed for exploring and progressing towards the field of AIS.
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Chapter 3
Introducing the Revised Sense of
“Self ” as a New Immunity-based
Approach: Conserved Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm
Self-nonself model makes a lot of sense in the mechanisms of self versus nonself recognition in the immune system, but it failed to explain a great number of findings. Some
new immune theory is proposed to accommodate incompatible new findings, including
Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs) Model and Danger Theory. Inspired from the
PRRs model, a novel approach called Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm
(CSPRA) is presented in this chapter. The algorithm is tested using the famous
benchmark Fisher’s Iris data. Preliminary results demonstrate that the proposed approach lowers the false positive and thus enhances the efficiency and reliability for
anomaly detection without the increase in complexity comparing to the conventional
Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA).
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3.1

Introduction

Biologically inspired computing, in particular, the Artificial Immune Systems (AIS)
is a promising solution to develop automated and adaptive defensive tools for current
and future threats in the larger IT systems. Currently major types of AIS methods
include Negative Selection Algorithms, Immune Network, Clonal Selection, and Danger Theory [50]. Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) was first conceived mimicking
the negative selection in the T-cell maturation process. Negative selection eliminates
inappropriate and immature T-cells that bind to self antigens and thus allows the
system to detect non-self antigens without mistakenly detecting self-antigens. NSA
could be applied to one of the central challenges with computer security: determining normal and potential harmful activity, so it has attracted many AIS researchers
and practitioners and found broader applications comparing to the other AIS models. Various features of the NSA make it by far the most popular algorithm, notably
for anomaly detection [85]. However, NSA has its intrinsic limit by assuming foreign patterns are intrusions and thus a high false positive error rate caused from this
assumption [10]. On the contrast, non-self patterns would not necessarily indicate
intrusions [20]. Within Biological Immune System (BIS), the traditional self-nonself
model has failed to explain many findings. The new theories such as Modified SelfNonself Model [175], Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs) Model [125, 126, 179],
and Danger Model [175] are proposed. These models center on renewing the sense of
self. A brief overview for these models will be provided in section 3.2.
Some efforts are made to tackle the above limit of NSA, for example, the more flexible boundaries are applied between self and non-self space using fuzzy rules [91]. Not
all AIS are based on negative selection, the other major branch in AIS is emerged
based on the new immune theory - Danger Theory. BIS employs a multilevel defense against invaders through nonspecific (innate) and specific (adaptive) immunity.
Adaptive immunity has the features of learning, adaptability, and memory, so many
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computer scientists and engineers use adaptive immunity as inspiration for producing
immune-based defensive tools and algorithms. However, our interests have extended
to the principle of innate immunity such as the Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs)
model. PRRs model assumes that Antigen Presenting Cells (APCs) are quiescent until they are activated via encoded PRRs that recognize conserved pathogen-associated
molecular patterns (PAMPs) on bacteria [125]. The encoded PRRs allow APCs to
discriminate between “infectious nonself” and “noninfectious self” [126].
Currently, the AIS methods that are inspired from innate immunity are rare. The
recent work [259] used the functionality of Dendritic Cell (DC) with Danger Theory as
inspiration for developing the algorithm for anomaly detection. The author imported
the concept of PAMPs in PRRs model to Danger Theory and regarded it as one
of the danger signals within the tissue to determine the function that the DC will
perform when the body is under attack. PAMPs are used as one of the signals in
the experiment of detecting port scan attach and are represented as “unreachable
destination” errors. The signal value is a normalized real-number recorded during
data collection from the monitored system. That is, PAMPs in this application
are regarded as signal molecules like the other signals in Danger Theory, which are
established based on pre-defined anomalies. However, PAMPs in PRRs model are the
conserved pattern within the antigen object and the signal refers to the process that
PAMPs active the APCs rather than the PAMPs itself. In this work, we report our ongoing investigation - an immune based anomaly detection approach called Conserved
Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA) from the abstraction of PRRs model.
Our work extensively mimics the PRRs model but PAMPs are built based on normal
behaviors. PAMPs in [259] are arbitrary, depending on application domain. In our
algorithm, PAMPs are well-defined mandatory components in the training stage based
on the inputted normal data in the system. The rest of this chapter is organized as
follows: Section 3.2 briefly introduces the immune theories on the mechanisms of self
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versus nonself recognition; Section 3.3 outlines the Pattern Recognition Receptors
(PRRs) model; Section 3.4 describes the proposed algorithm; Section 3.5 reports the
experimental results; finally, summary are given in Section 3.6.

3.2

Self versus Non-self

“Of all the mysteries in modern science, the mechanisms of self versus nonself recognition in the immune system ranks at or near the top” [148]. Self-nonself model
suggested that the immune system functions by discriminating self (defined early
in life) and nonself (anything that comes later), tolerating self and attacking nonself [175]. Although the self-nonself discrimination model has often served us well, it
has failed to explain new findings. For example, “why do organisms not attack their
newly changed tissues when they become older? Why do mammalian mothers not
attack their newly lactating breasts that were not part of earlier “Self”? Why does
the immune system not respond to vaccines composed of foreign proteins?” [175]
To accommodate incompatible new findings, the concept of costimulation was
added to self-nonself model, that is, the activation of individual effector cells requires
not only ligation of the specific Receptors but also a second signal (name “costimulation”) delivered from “stimulator” cell such as APCs. Costimulation principle
suggested that the immune response is initiated by APCs. However, APCs are not
antigen specific but they capture all sorts of self and foreign substances. Therefore, an
unacceptable conclusion can be derived from cositmulation that the immunity cannot
be directed against nonself. In 1989, Janeway published the PRRs model. He proposed that APCs are quiescent until they are activated via a set of germ line - encoded
PRRs that recognize conserved pathogen-associated molecular patterns (PAMPs) on
bacteria [125]. We will describe this model in details in section 3.3.
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Like self-nonself model, the PRRs model couldn’t explain all the findings in the
immune system. For example, the conserved PAMPs are only experimentally discovered in bacteria, so this model couldn’t explain why viruses stimulate immunity. The
basis for discrimination in another immune theory - danger model was not centered
around ’self’ or ’non-self’, but to the presence or absence of danger signals. It is
thought that danger signals, such as those exposed to pathogens, toxins, mechanical
damage, and so forth, are detected and processed through professional APCs. The
danger model is presented in [175] and the applications of danger model to AIS were
identified and discussed in depth in [8].

3.3

The Pattern Recognition Receptors Model

This work takes the PRRs model and explores the relevance of this model to the application domain of computer security. We are going to give some background on this
model in this section. To solve the problems stated in section 3.2 emerging from Selfnonself discrimination model and co-stimulation, the basic idea for the PRRs model
is that APCs can recognize evolutionarily distant pathogens. The self/nonself discrimination requests co-stimulation from APCs but APCs do not co-stimulate unless
activated via encoded PRRs that recognize conserved pathogen-associated molecular
patterns (PAMPs) on bacteria [125,126]. As shown in Fig. 3.1, T cell or B cell would
die if it recognized antigen (Signal 1) without the costimulation from APC (Signal 2).
The nonclonal receptors in the surface of APC appear to detect common constituents
of pathogenic microorganisms. These microbial structures cannot be modified by the
pathogen without changing its core structure. Receptors for these structures have
been selected over evolutionary time to provide broad-spectrum recognition of harmful foreign materials [126]. PRRs model only responds to the potential threat that
is very foreign (evolutionarily distant infectious non-self). The encoded PRRs allow
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of the Pattern-Recognition Receptors Model
APCs to discriminate between “infectious nonself” and “noninfectious self” [126],
therefore, PRRs model is also known as the Infectious Nonself Model [175].
Over the years, the PRRs model has been modified to account for some issues.
Medzhitov et al. [179] discussed three strategies of immune recognition in the innate
immune system of vertebrate animals, which are summarized as follows:
• Recognition of “Microbial Nonself”: the host recognizes conserved pathogenassociated molecular patterns that are unique to microorganisms and are not
produced by the host. This strategy allows the innate immune system to discriminate between “infectious nonself” and “noninfectious self”.
• Recognition of “Missing Self”: this strategy relies on the detection of “marker
of normal self”. Such recognition is coupled with various inhibitory pathways
that block initiation of immune responses against self. Markers of normal self
are unique to the host and absent from microorganisms.
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• Recognition of “Induced or Altered Self”: recognition of induced self is based on
the detection of markers of abnormal self that are induced upon viral infection
and cellular transformation. Markers of abnormal self tag the affected cells for
elimination by the immune system.

3.4

CSPRA - Conserved Self Pattern Recognition
Algorithm

NSA performs a high false positive error rate because of its assumption of foreign
pattern. Inspired from relatively new immune theory - the PRRs model, the motivation of developing a new algorithm is to overcome the intrinsic limits of NSA high false positive rate and improve the system performance. This section gives the
general overview of the proposed algorithm. In our algorithm, both APCs Pattern
Recognition and T cell Negative Selection are combined to detect anomalies in new
samples, which efficiently reduces high false positive error rate.

3.4.1

Subspace Definition

PAMPs in the PRRs Model are pre-defined bacterial signatures, causing the maturation of APCs through the expression of mature cytokines [259]. Each high-dimension
antigen (or self protein) in our system is regarded as the information vector (or object).
Depending on application domain, we can explore a strong pattern of conservation,
analogous to PAMPs in the nature immune system, along a subset of their dimensions
from the antigen objects. That is, there is a subset of the original dimensions in which
the similarities are very high within the antigen objects. Such subset of dimensions
is often referred to as a subspace in the area of data mining. The number of the
dimensions in the subspace, as well as, the similarity of each dimension within the
objects is varied for different application domain. The dimensions in the subspace
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are not necessary to be contiguous.
The system we proposed works over two distinct phases: Initialization and Detection. The first task for the system is to define the subspace based on the training
data set, which could be considered as preprocessing phase. In the intrusion detection
system, it is practical to build up “Self” database from the normal behaviors of each
process of interest or protected data but the abnormal behaviors usually remain unknown. We are interested in building an anomaly detection system, not an accurate
simulation. Therefore, we change the concept of PAMP by considering it as the conserved self-associated pattern rather than conserved pathogen-associated molecular
patterns in the nature immune system. If the relationship between the objects and
the dimensions of their feature space can be derived from the empirical data based
on the scientists’ lab results, the subspace, as described above, could be pre-defined.
The other approaches to establish the subspace can be seen in other chapters.

3.4.2

Algorithm Overview

In the proposed algorithm, APC is treated as the detector capable of recognizing
the conserved self pattern in the antigen objects. The representation and recognition of APC detectors are very different from the other AIS methods, which will be
described later. In the system, T cell detectors are generated by using the negative selection to eliminate invalid (self-recognized) candidates. Euclidean distance measure
is employed to compute the affinity between T detectors and antigens and a partial
matching rule is used, as described in [51].
PRRs model assumes that APCs are quiescent until they are activated via encoded
pattern recognition receptors that recognize conserved pathogen-associated molecular
patterns (PAMPs) [125]. To mirror this, T cell detectors in the proposed algorithm are
first used to recognize the antigen according to negative selection. The co-stimulation
of APC detector will not be conducted until the so-called suspicious antigen is en99

countered in the system. The suspicious antigen is defined as: 1) the affinity between
the T cell detector and the suspicious antigen is very low; 2) the decision for abnormal (non-self) is made based on the other antigen epitope instead of the subspace
where the conserved self pattern is located. For example, an antigen is defined as m
= hm1 , m2 , . . . mL i, which can be considered as a point in an L-dimensional realvalued shape space. If the antigen m epitope is hm1 , m2 i but the conserved pattern
is hm5 , m6 i and the distance between the T detector d and the epitope hm1 , m2 i is
greater than the defined threshold (low affinity), then the T cell detector d fails to
recognize the antigen m without the co-stimulation of APC detector.

3.5

Empirical Evaluation

To study the algorithm property and evaluate the performance of our system, experiments were carried out with the famous benchmark Fisher’s Iris Data. We start
by describing some properties of Fisher’s Iris Data, then go on to show that our
algorithm can detect anomalies very efficiently comparing to NSA.

3.5.1

Some Properties of Iris Data

The Iris data set was created by R. A. Fisher [72]. This is perhaps the best known
database to be found in the pattern recognition literature. The data set contains 3
classes of 50 instances each, where each class refers to a type of iris plant. There are
four attributes in the data set. Adopted from the document in [72], the attribute
information and some brief statistic analysis are presented in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 The statistics of the attributes for Iris data set
Attribute Name Min

3.5.2

Max

Mean Class Correlation

Sepal Length

4.3

7.9

5.84

0.7826

Sepal Width

2.0

4.4

3.05

-0.4194

Petal Length

1.0

6.9

3.76

0.9490

Petal Width

0.1

2.5

1.20

0.9565

The Representation and Recognition of the APC Detectors

As stated before, APC detector represents for the conserved self pattern that is extracted from the collected “Self” data. In the algorithm, zero-based column (dimension) indexes are used to mark the positions of the conserved self pattern. For Iris
data used in our experiments, as shown in Table 3.1, the class correlation for the
attributes of both petal length and petal width is very high. Therefore, the subset
from both the 2nd and 3rd dimension of the original dimensions is considered as the
conserved self pattern. For the benchmark Iris Data, the APC detector is represented
as {hloc1, min, max, meani , hloc2, min, max, meani , . . .}. For the training data
of 50% Iris Setosa, we calculate the max, min and mean of all of the values in the
2nd and 3rd column and then the APC detectors are represented as follows:
{h2, 1, 1.9, 1.46i , h3, 0.1, 0.5, 0.248i}
During the detection phase, for each suspicious antigen to be co-stimulated by APC
detector d, after extracting the conserved antigen peptide based on the position information in APC detector, for the above example, the conserved antigen peptide is
projected from the attributes indexed (zero-based) as 2 and 3 in the original antigen,
the distance between the antigen peptide p and the APC detector d is computed by
equation 3.1, which can be viewed as a scaled manhattan distance.
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Dist(p, d) =

w
X
|pi − di |
i=1

mi − ni

(3.1)

where w is the number of the dimensions for the conserved pattern; mi and ni represent
the lower and upper bounds of the i-th attribute in the entire training data; pi is the
value of the i-th attribute for the antigen object to be examined; di is the mean of all of
the values in the i-th column in the entire training data. If the distance calculated by
equation 3.1 is less than the pre-defined threshold, then the suspicious antigen peptide
is similar to the conserved self pattern and thus the suspicious antigen is concluded
as “Self”, possibly analogy to “Altered Self” in the PRRs model. Otherwise, the
suspicious antigen is classified as “Non-self”. As noted, APC recognition is occurred
between each antigen peptide and the single APC detector, so the time complexity is
O(1) for detecting each antigen. Comparing to NSA, the proposed algorithm acts as
adding a special detector (APC detector) to the total size of the detectors but doesn’t
increase the complexity.

3.5.3

Algorithm Pseudo Code for Anomaly Detection

The algorithm implementation is very straightforward. The pseudo code is listed as
follows:
//Initialization phase
GenerateTDetector() //same as NSA
GenerateAPCDetector() //see section 3.5.2
//Detection phase
//System Input
S: set of antigen data
t1 : threshold for T detector
t2 : threshold for APC detector
t3 : threshold for suspicious antigen
d: distance between T detector and the tested antigen
int loc[]: array for storing the positions for the antigen epitope
//Start recognition
for every si in S={Si , i=1, 2, }
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if(CheckWithTDetector(Si , t1 , d, loc ) = = true) // d and loc will be returned
if(d > t3 ) //low affinity
if(loc doesn’t match positions in APC) //not conserved pattern
if(CheckWithAPCDetector(Si , t2 ,) = = true )
Si is non-self
else
Si is self
else
Si is non-self
else
Si is non-self
else
Si is self
end for
//implement CheckWithTDetector()
D: set of T detectors
w : sliding window size for projecting the antigen into peptides
P: set of peptides for tested antigen
bool CheckWithTDetector(Si , t1 , d, loc )
ChopAgPeptide(Si , w, P, loc) //like NSA, P and loc will be returned
for every pi in P={pi , i=1, 2, }
for every dj in D=dj , j=1, 2,
if(Dist(pi , dj ) < t1 ) // compute Euclidean distance
d = Dist(pi , dj )
return true;
end for
end for
return false;
//implement CheckWithAPCDetector()
d: APC detector
bool CheckWithAPCDetector(Si , t2 )
if(Dist() < t2 ) //compute the distance with equation 3.1 in section 3.5.2
return false;
else
return true;

3.5.4

Experimental Results

The results reported in this section are the summary of the 100 repeated tests for
each method and parameters setting with the training data of 50% Iris Setosa. One of
the three types of iris is treated as normal data, whereas the other two are considered
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as abnormal. For each experimental case, we take 50% of the normal data to train
the system and the remaining 50% data are used to test the system capability of
recognizing unknown normal data.
To be fair to the other approaches, it is very difficult to make reasonable comparisons between our method and some other AIS methods. But, it is meaningful
and relatively fair to choose the classic NSA to compare with CSPRA. There are
two reasons for this. Firstly, the PRRs model added additional layer of PAMPs to
the Self-nonself model but kept the features of Self-nonself model. CSPRA naturally
involves negative selection since it is inspired from the PRRs model, so we can employ
the same values for the common parameters in the two methods to make the comparisons fair. Secondly, since CSPRA is targeted at overcoming the intrinsic limits of
NSA, we must examine whether this goal is achieved. In this section, we report the
experimental results and all conclusions are derived from such comparisons since it is
noted that Iris data are smaller.
Since T detectors are randomly generated, different values for detection and false
alarm rates are observed. Table 3.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of the
results of 100 repeated experiments for CSPRA and NSA, respectively. The readers
can reproduce the results with these parameter settings: sliding window size is 2; the
threshold for T detector and APC detector are 0.1 and 1, respectively; T detector
size is set to 35; the threshold for discriminating suspicious antigen is 0.02. These
parameters are not meant to generate the best results from the system but enough to
show that CSPRA outperforms the classical NSA. We found through the experiments
that the threshold for T detector is the most sensitive parameter that influences the
experimental results. Detection Rate (DR), False Alarm Rate (FA), and False Positive
Rate (FPR) are computed in equation 3.2, equation 3.3, and equation 3.4, where TP,
TN, FP, and FN are the counts of true positives (anomalous elements identified as
anomalous), true negatives (normal elements identified as normal), false positives
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Table 3.2 Experimental results for CSPRA and NSA

Training data

Detection

False

False

Rate

Alarm

Positive

Rate

Rate

Algorithm

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

CSPRA

97.67

2.76

0.92

1.15

0.31

0.38

NSA

97.24

3.19

4.76

2.54

1.59

0.85

CSPRA

78.71

1.23

0.92

0.15

0.31

0.005

NSA

79.79

1.22

3.36

0.20

1.12

0.007

CSPRA

84.40

0.57

1.66

0.17

0.55

0.006

NSA

89.91

0.63

10.58

0.44

3.53

0.015

Setosa 50%

Versicolour 50%

Virginica 50%

(normal elements identified as anomalous) and false negatives (anomalous elements
identified as normal).
DR =

TP
TP+FN

(3.2)

FA =

FP
FP+TN

(3.3)

FPR =

FP
FP+TP+FN+TN

(3.4)

The results show that CSPRA has higher detection rate with far lower false alarm
rate. The CSPRA does not simply classify all nonself samples as anomalies. Instead,
those suspicious samples are further examined by APC detector to check if they
are very foreign to the “self”. This strategy prevents the system from mistakenly
detecting self samples as anomalies and thus reduces the false positive error rate. As
expected, Table 3.2 also shows that CSPRA has the lower false positive rate, which
is the major reason that CSPRA has higher performance.
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Figure 3.2 The influence of T detector size on detection rate and false alarm
rate
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Figure 3.3 ROC curves show the performance of CSPRA in comparison
with NSA using the training data of 50% Setosa
The trend of T detector size’s effect on the system performance is studied. As
shown in Fig. 3.2, the detector size initially influences the detection rate dramatically
in CSPRA. However, the detection rate is close to 100% with lower false alarm rate
when the detectors are increased to the size of around 40. V-detector is featured
with a smaller number of detectors and thus requires less space [132]. Our results are
apparently comparable to V-detector. Fig. 3.2 also shows that false alarm rate is not
sensitive to the detector size in CSPRA.
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curve reflects the tradeoff between false
alarm rate and detection rate and is usually used to evaluate the system performance.
Experiments are carried out to obtain different values for detection rate and false
alarm rate by changing T detector thresholds. ROC curve is plotted for both NSA
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Figure 3.4 ROC curves show the performance of CSPRA in comparison
with NSA using the training data of 50% Versicolour
and CSPRA. The ROC curves in Fig. 3.3, Fig 3.4, and Fig. 3.5 indicate that the
performance of CSPRA is very promising no matter what type of Iris plant is treated
as normal data. It always produces higher detection rate with the same false alarm
rate as that in NSA.

3.6

Summary

In immunology, new theories are constantly being proposed explaining how the immune system responds to pathogenic material. This chapter explores the relevance
of the relatively new theory: PRRs Model in innate immunity to anomaly detection.
By mimicking the concept of costimulation, PRRs and PAMPs in the PRRs Model, a
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novel immune-based approach called Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm
(CSPRA) is presented. The major advantages of the CSPRA are as follows:
• The pre-defined anomalies are required to establish the PAMPs in recent work
[3]. However, only normal data are used in CSPRA during the training phase
and the special APC detector gains the capability of recognizing the conserved
self pattern in the antigen object from extracting the useful knowledge from the
Self.
• False positive error rate for anomaly detection is greatly reduced with CSPRA,
as the algorithm takes its inspiration from PRRs model, which allows APCs
to discriminate between “infectious nonself” and “noninfectious self” and thus
prevents from detecting altered self.
• The algorithm acts as adding only one robust detector to the total size of the
detectors in NSA and thus doesn’t increase the complexity of the system.
• It makes the system more efficient that APC detector is quiescent until the
decision on “Non-self” made by T detectors is unsure.
The algorithm is implemented and evaluated with the best known benchmark
Fisher’s Iris data. The experimental results show that the algorithm request smaller
number of detectors and its performance is clearly better in comparison with the
conventional NSA, particularly for the discrimination between altered self and nonself.
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Figure 3.5 ROC curves show the performance of CSPRA in comparison
with NSA using the training data of 50% Virginica
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Chapter 4
Conserved Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm with Novel
Detection Strategy Applied to
Breast Cancer Diagnosis
This chapter presents a novel approach based on an improved Conserved Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm to analyze cytological characteristics of the breast fine-needle
aspirates (FNAs) for clinical breast cancer diagnosis. A novel detection strategy by
coupling domain knowledge and randomized methods is proposed to resolve conflicts
on anomaly detection between two types of detectors investigated in chapter 3 on
Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA). The improved CSPRA is
applied to detect the malignant cases using clinical breast cancer data collected by
Dr. Wolberg and the results are evaluated for performance measure (detection rate
and false alarm rate). Results show that our approach has promising performance on
breast cancer diagnosis and great potential in the area of clinical diagnosis. Effects
of parameters setting in the CSPRA are discussed and the experimental results are
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compared with previous works.

4.1

Introduction

Normally, breast cells grow and then rest in cycles. The periods of growth and rest
in each cell are controlled by genes in the cell’s nucleus. Genes sometimes develop
abnormalities, which cause to lose their ability to control the cycle resulting in uncontrolled growth of breast cells (cancer). Breast cancer is the most common cancer
and the second largest cause of cancer deaths among women [171]. Based on the
estimation (from www.BreastCancer.org) in 2007, there are about 178,480 new cases
of invasive breast cancer and 62,030 new cases of non-invasive breast cancer diagnosed in the United States. Early detection of this disease via accurate diagnosis
and treatment can greatly improve the chances for survival. Most breast cancers
are symptomatic of lump in the breast but the majority of breast lumps are benign.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish benign lumps from malignant ones. The
methods for diagnosing breast cancer include mammography, fine-needle aspirates
(FNA) with visual interpretation, and surgical biopsy. The detection ability of both
mammography and fine-needle aspirates with visual interpretation to correctly diagnose breast cancer is unstable [74,87]. Surgical biopsy, although accurate, is invasive,
time consuming, and costly. The anticipated course of the cancer not only determines
whether chemotherapy is needed but also affects the mental state and personal goal
of the patient. Therefore, developing an accurate, efficient and inexpensive method
for breast cancer diagnosis is an important and challenging goal for the treatment of
this disease. The great economic and social values of breast cancer diagnosis have
attracted many researchers. Some methods such as linear programming [168, 255],
neural network [4,226], and ant colony based system [195] were applied to breast cancer diagnosis. Over the last decade, immunity-based approaches have been applied to
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solve problems in a wide variety of domains such as anomaly detection, pattern recognition, data mining, computer security, adaptive control, and fault detection [50]. The
majority of breast lumps are benign, which could in practice provide a large training
data set of normal class. Hence, Artificial Immune System (AIS) can be applied to
breast cancer diagnosis by taking advantage of one-class classification. In this chapter,
we describe an improved Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA) for
breast cancer diagnosis. The details of the algorithm are described in Section 4.2.
Section 4.3 outlines the breast cancer diagnosis problem. Section 4.4 describes how
the algorithm can be applied to the breast cancer diagnosis problem and reports some
experimental results. Section 4.5 provides discussions on algorithmic parameters and
comparative results. The section 4.6 provides the summary of this chapter.

4.2

A Novel Detection Strategy in Conserved Self
Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA)

4.2.1

Motivation of this Work

Inspired by the biological Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs) model [125], we
proposed a novel algorithm called Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm
(CSPRA) [261]. The basic steps involved in the CSPRA are as follows:
1. Build up the “Self” training samples from the collected normal data and store
the samples as a multiset S0 of equal length strings, L over a finite alphabet.
2. Establish a model of normal behavior by generating the set of T detectors (R1 )
and a specific APC detector (R2 ), respectively. The negative selection strategy
[77] is employed in the generation of T detectors. However, the generation of
the specific APC detector includes two major steps:
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• Based on the relationship between the antigen objects and the dimensions
of their feature space, define the conserved self pattern. It can be predefined from the empirical data based on the scientists’ lab results. This
chapter introduces a new technique for finding conserved self pattern, as
described in section 4.4.1.
• Within the conserved self pattern consisting of the features located in loc1,
loc2, , generate APC detector R2 :
{hloc1, min, max, meani , hloc2, min, max, meani , . . .}
by calculating maximum, minimum and mean of all of the values in the
features (or descriptors) of loc1, loc2, , respectively.
3. Monitor the system by detecting the anomaly in the incoming new data in the
testing data set S1 using the generated T detectors and APC detector in R1
and R2 . The matching rule (Euclidean distance) is used for T detectors to
report the anomaly. The distance between APC detector and the new sample is
calculated by equation 3.1. If it is greater than the pre-defined threshold, then
the anomaly is detected by APC detector.
4. The new sample (antigen) is firstly checked with T detectors. The co-stimulation
of APC detector is conducted if and only if both of the following conditions are
fulfilled during the phase of T cell detection:
• The affinity between the T cell detector and the new sample is very low,
that is, the Euclidean distance between the T cell detector and the incoming sample is greater than the predefined suspicious threshold.
• The decision for abnormal (non-self) is made based on the other antigen
epitope instead of the antigen peptide where the conserved self pattern is
located.
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The new sample satisfying the above conditions is named suspicious antigen. APC
detector finally determines whether it is the anomaly in this case.
Now, we extend the proposal in [261] aiming at resolving the conflicts in anomaly
detection between two types of detectors in the detection phase of the algorithm.
In biology, the PRRs model added additional layer of pathogen-associated molecular
patterns (PAMPs) to the self-nonself model. Inspired by this metaphor, our earlier proposal in [261] combined both APCs Pattern Recognition and T cell Negative
Selection to detect anomalies in new samples, which had been proven to efficiently
reduce high false positive error rate that often occurred in Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA). By exploring this idea, a question is naturally raised: if the conflicts on
anomaly decision happen when testing the new samples using the APC detector and
T cell detector, respectively, for example, T cell detector recognizes the new sample as
“Nonself” whereas the same sample is classified as “Self” by APC detector, how does
the system make the final decision for the new sample? The solution in the previous
proposal mirrors the biological metaphor: APCs are quiescent until they are activated via encoded PRRs that recognize conserved PAMPs [125]. The co-stimulation
of APC detector will not be conducted until the detection from T cell detectors becomes unsure, that is, the suspicious antigen is encountered in the system. Although
this solution shows its strength in terms of algorithmic complexity, its performance
relies on the application domain since the definition of suspicious antigen is not always
in accordance with a specific application. Our recent work proposes the mathematical
methods to resolve the conflicts. By wisely using the domain knowledge and randomized method, the novel detection strategy we present in this chapter has been proven
to enhance the efficiency for anomaly detection when testing with multiple data sets.
In this chapter, we center on the application of this modified Conserve Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm to breast cancer diagnosis. More results from the other data
sets will be reported in next chapter. In this section, we are going to describe the
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novel detection strategy, the interesting readers can refer to [261] for the details of
the algorithm.

4.2.2

Ambiguous Boundary in Anomaly Detection

An important concept in our proposal is ambiguous boundary. Fig. 4.1 illustrates
the interpretations of ambiguous boundaries for T cell detection and APC detection,
respectively. The representation for the single T detector in Fig. 4.1(a) is different in
two detection cases:
• If the new sample matches with any of the T detectors, that is, the distance
between the new sample and the current T detector is less than the pre-defined
threshold, then the new sample is detected as “non-self”. The single T detector
in Fig. 4.1(a) represents the one in the set of T detectors that recognizes the
new sample that is currently being tested.
• The new sample is detected as “self” if it does not match any T detectors. In
this case, the single T detector in Fig. 4.1(a) is the one in the set of T detectors
that is the nearest to the new sample that is currently being tested. From the
viewpoint of algorithm implementation, the Euclidean distance between the new
sample and each T detector is calculated while the testing sample is checked
against all T detectors but only the shortest distance is returned.
Now, it becomes very straightforward to explain the ambiguous boundary for both
T detector and APC detector. The ambiguous coefficient α in this proposal is applied
to adjust the range of the ambiguous region, that is, increase/decrease the shadow
area in Fig. 4.1.
• As shown in Fig. 4.1(a), the ambiguous region for T detector is a ring-shaped
region contained between the two circles (upper ambiguous boundary and lower
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Figure 4.1 Interpretations of ambiguous boundary on anomaly detection
ambiguous boundary) with the radius of (1 + αt )×t1 (outer circle) and (1 − αt )×
t1 (inner circle), where t1 represents the threshold for T detector activation and
αt is the ambiguous coefficient for T detector detection.
• Similarly, as shown in Fig. 4.1(b), the ambiguous region for APC detector is
also a ring-shaped region contained between the two circles with the radius of
(1 + αp ) × t2 (outer circle) and (1 − αp ) × t2 (inner circle), where t2 represents
the threshold for APC detector activation and αp is the ambiguous coefficient
for APC detector detection.

4.2.3

Proposal of the Novel Detection Strategy

Once the ambiguous boundary is defined, the following rules are set to resolve the
conflicts in anomaly decision between T detector and APC detector by using the
domain knowledge and randomized method.
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Domain Knowledge
When the antigen (the new incoming sample) is loaded into the system, we check
the matching rule of Euclidean distance against each T detector. If the matching is
found, we keep the matching distance in record. If the matching is not found after
all T detectors are checked, we only keep the distance to the nearest T detectors
in record. Similarly, the matching distance is also kept in record when the antigen
is checked against the APC detector. The information from the matching distances
for both T detector and APC detector obtained in the detection phase is considered
as valuable domain knowledge, which is used in the proposed detection strategy to
resolve the conflicts in the following cases:
• Case 1: The anomaly decision from APC detector is granted but the results
from T detector detection are discarded if and only if both of the following
conditions are fulfilled:
1. The new sample falls into the ambiguous region that is predefined by the
ambiguous boundary when testing with T detector.
2. The new sample is not in the ambiguous region when testing with APC
detector.
• Case 2: It is opposite of case 1. T detector finally determines whether the new
sample is anomalous but APC detection is simply ignored if and only if both of
the following conditions are fulfilled:
1. The new sample is not in the ambiguous region when testing with T detector.
2. The new sample is in the ambiguous region when testing with APC detector.
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Randomized Method
Randomized method is selected to resolve the conflicts for all other cases rather than
case 1 and case 2 described in above section. In other words, randomized method
is used under one of the following conditions as: 1) the new sample falls into the
ambiguous region when it is matched against with either T detector or APC detector;
2) the new sample does not fall into the ambiguous region when it is matched against
with either T cell detector or APC detector. When implementing this algorithm, a
list L (n1 , n2 , n3 , n4 , n5 . . .) is established in which to store these ambiguous testing
samples while the system loops through every testing sample. Another parameter
called pattern weight w is introduced in the algorithm to control the randomized
decision making. When the loop is terminated, the algorithm randomly picks up n*w
samples, provided that the list L containing n ambiguous samples, to form a new
sublist l (m1 , m2 , m3 , . . .). For every sample in the sublist l, APC detector solely
determines whether it is anomalous regardless of the results from T detector decision.
Anomaly decision for the remaining n*(1-w) samples in the parent list L follows T
detector decision process.

Pseudo-code for the Detection Algorithm
Fig 4.2 is the pseudo-code for the detection algorithm that reflects the novel detection
strategy we have outlined in previous sections.
As noted in Fig 4.2, in line 2 and 3, each sample is examined by T detector and
APC detector, respectively. We keep the distance (dt and dp ) in record when we
check the matching rule for both APC detector and T detector, which are used to
determine the resolution of the conflicts, as seen between line 9 and 15. In line 14 and
15, we save the index (i ), T detector detection result (TDecision), and APC detector
detection result (APCDecision) to the defined struct for each ambiguous testing sample (ambiguousAg), and then add ambiguousAg to the list of the ambiguous testing
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Figure 4.2 Detection algorithm with new decision strategy
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samples (randList). Hence, we no longer loop through all testing samples again when
we determine the anomaly for the new sample using the randomized method in line
32 and 36, which greatly enhances the algorithm efficiency. As shown in line 20 in
Fig. 4.2, in the list of the ambiguous testing samples, the total number of the samples
to be determined by APC conserved pattern recognition is affected by the pattern
weight w. Line 23 through line 37 show how to determine the anomalies using the
randomized method. The pseudo-code shown in Fig. 4.2 is only part of the algorithm
implementation showing the difference from our previous proposal in the detection
phase for this algorithm. Readers interested in this information can refer to [261] for
the entire pseudo-code for the algorithm implementation.

4.3

Breast Cancer Diagnosis Problem

This breast cancer database is downloaded from the UCI machine learning repository,
which was collected by Dr. William H. Wolberg from the University of Wisconsin
Hospitals, Madison [255]. The dataset is comprised of elements that consist of various
scalar observations. The total number of the original samples is 699 but 16 samples
with missing values are removed to construct a new dataset with 683 samples that are
actually used in our experiments. The dataset contains two classes referring to benign
and malignant samples. There are 444 samples in the dataset that are assigned to
benign and the other 239 samples are malignant. The original dataset contains 11
attributes including both sample id number and class label, which are removed in the
actual dataset that are used in our experiments. The remaining 9 attributes represent
9 cytological characteristics of the breast fine-needle aspirates (FNAs), as shown in
Table 4.1. The cytological characteristics of breast FNAs were valued on a scale of
one to ten, with one being the closest to benign and ten the most malignant.
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Table 4.1 Attributes in the breast cancer databases
No.

Attribute

0

Clump Thickness

1

Uniformity of Cell Size

2

Uniformity of Cell Shape

3

Marginal Adhesion

4

Single Epithelial Cell Size

5

Bare Nuclei

6

Bland Chromatin

7

Normal Nucleoli

8

Mitoses

Samples arrived periodically as Dr. Wolberg reported his clinical cases [168, 255].
The original database therefore includes the information about this chronological
grouping of the data, having been removed from the data itself. Some brief statistical
analysis is presented in Table 4.2. The calculation of class correlation in Table 4.2 is
introduced in section 4.4.1.
Prior to the experiments, we normalize the raw data by columns in the range of
[0, 1] with max-min normalization, as shown in the equation 4.1.

f (x) =

4.4

x − min (column)
max (column) − min (column)

(4.1)

Application of CSPRA to Breast Cancer Diagnosis

In this section, we begin by describing the data preprocessing, then further to discuss the algorithm parameters and report the experimental results showing that the
122

Table 4.2 Statistical analysis of attribute values in 683 samples
Attribute No. Mean Standard deviation

Class correlation

0

4.44

2.82

0.7148

1

3.15

3.07

0.8208

2

3.22

2.99

0.8219

3

2.83

2.86

0.7063

4

3.23

2.22

0.6910

5

3.54

3.64

0.8227

6

3.44

2.45

0.7582

7

2.87

3.05

0.7187

8

1.60

1.73

0.4234

algorithm is able to predict the breast cancer quite efficiently.

4.4.1

Finding Conserved Self Pattern

The first task to use CSPRA is to find the conserved self pattern based on training
data. The Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient that was developed by
Karl Pearson is the most widely used measure of correlation between two variables
X and Y [180]. The correlation coefficient γ can be simply described as the sum of
the product of the Z-scores for the two variables divided by the number of scores, as
shown in equation 4.2.
P
γ=

ZX ZY
N

(4.2)

However, it is fairly difficult to calculate the correlation coefficient using equation 4.2. We use the computational formula that is mathematically identical but is
much easier to use, as shown in equation 4.3, to calculate the Pearsonian γ between
the values (X) in the column of each attribute and their corresponding class labels
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(Y) in breast cancer data. The corresponding class correlations for different sample
size in breast cancer data are listed in Table 4.3.
P
P
XY − ( X) ( Y )
γ=q P
P 2q P 2
P
2
N X − ( Y ) N Y − ( Y )2
N

P

(4.3)

From the results in Table 4.3, the cytological characteristics of breast fine-needle
aspirates such as uniformity of bare nuclei, uniformity of cell shape and cell size are
ranked first three places in terms of class correlation. Hence, the subset from 1st,
2nd and 5th (zero-based index) dimension of the original dimensions in training data
is considered as conserved self pattern. As noted, the abnormal samples (malignant
samples for this application) are required if the conserved self pattern is defined by
computing the class correlation. However, as shown in Table 4.3, the same conclusion
about conserved self pattern is obtained when we calculate the class correlation using
100% currently collected samples, 50% of the samples from each class, and 25% of the
samples from each class. It indicates that the conserved self pattern can be found with
Pearsonian γ method even if the samples from abnormal behaviors are smaller. With
this observation, the Pearsonian γ method to find conserved self pattern becomes more
practical since it does not require the collection of a large number of the abnormal
samples.

4.4.2

Effectiveness Measurement

It is a step forward from the previous works that we consider not only to what
extent the system can detect the anomalies (malignant samples) but also to what
extent the system possibly misclassify the normal samples (benign samples) when we
evaluate the system performance. Two measures of effectiveness (Detection Rate and
False Alarm Rate) for detecting an anomaly are calculated using equation 3.2 and
equation 3.3.
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Table 4.3 Correlation between attribute and class in breast cancer data
Class correlation
No.

Attribute
100% Sample

50% Sample

25% Sample

0

Clump Thickness

0.7148

0.7513

0.7184

1

Uniformity of Cell Size

0.8208

0.8024

0.7598

2

Uniformity of Cell Shape

0.8219

0.8156

0.7905

3

Marginal Adhesion

0.7063

0.6848

0.6241

4

Single Epithelial Cell Size

0.6910

0.6889

0.6665

5

Bare Nuclei

0.8227

0.8029

0.7238

6

Bland Chromatin

0.7582

0.6823

0.6046

7

Normal Nucleoli

0.7187

0.7025

0.6937

8

Mitoses

0.4234

0.4509

0.4439

Various system parameters, i.e., detector thresholds, control the sensitivity of the
system. By employing various strategies to change the parameter values, different
values for detection rate and false alarm rate are obtained that are used for plotting
the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, which reflects the tradeoff between false alarm rate and detection rate. Since high detection rate and low false
alarm rate are the two goals between which a balance is needed, the ROC curve is
used in this chapter to evaluate the influence of the various parameters on the system
performance for breast cancer diagnosis.

4.4.3

Experiments and Results

The experiments are carefully designed to objectively evaluate the performance of
the algorithm and analyze the experimental results. By combining the idea of kfold cross validation and the features of one-class classification of our method, three
groups of training data, as seen in Table 4.5, are generated with the following schema
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to effectively reduce the ordering effect that perhaps exists in the original collections:
• Scheme 1 for training data of 100% benign samples: The first training data are
obtained by shuffling the original benign samples; the re-ordered samples are
shuffled again to output the second training data. Repeating this step 10 times
generates 10 different training data sets.
• Scheme 2 for training data of 75% benign samples: For each of the 10 training
data sets generated with scheme 1, randomly pick up 75% of the 444 benign
samples to constitute the training data. The remaining 111 benign samples are
used for testing.
• Scheme 3 for training data of 50% benign samples: Pick up 5 randomly reordered training data sets that are generated in the last five rounds of the
scheme 1 to guarantee the collected samples have been fully randomly reordered.
Each dataset is partitioned into 2 subsamples and thus total 10 subsamples are
obtained. The 10 subsamples are the actual 10 training data of 50% benign
samples. When one subsample in each dataset is used as training data, another
one automatically goes to the testing data set.
When all the available benign samples are used to train the enhanced CSPRA,
the total 683 samples, including the same benign samples used in the training phase,
are considered as testing data. Although such testing case can demonstrate the
system’s capability to recognize known normal data, the false alarm rate could be
deceptive because the resultant model may overfit the training data. Therefore, the
training data are removed in our testing with training data of 50% benign samples
and 75% benign samples. When 50% benign samples are used as training data, the
remaining 50% benign samples and all malignant samples are combined as testing
data. Similarly, if the training data are 75% benign samples, the testing data include
the remaining 25% benign samples and all malignant samples.
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Table 4.4 The values of the parameters that are used in the experiments
Parameters

Value

T detector threshold (t1 )

0.1

APC detector threshold (t2 )

0.5

T ambiguous coefficient (αt )

0.5

APC ambiguous coefficient (αp )

0.4

Pattern weight (w )

0.7

T detector size

300

APC detector size

1

Sliding window size

3

Through repeatedly running the algorithm and observing the generated results,
the parameter settings listed in Table 4 produce better results. As noted, when 50%
benign samples are used as training data, 10 different randomly-reordered training
data with 50% benign samples, known as subsamples, are generated from the original
collections. The 10 subsamples are used to train our proposed method subsequently.
Since T detectors are randomly generated with the negative selection in the CSPRA,
different values for detection rate and false alarm rates are observed. Therefore, each
subsample undergoes 100 repeated runs and the statistics for these repeated experiments is summarized and recorded. When the experiments with all 10 subsamples
are completed, the average values of the statistics from 10 subsamples are calculated,
which are reported in Table 5. The same procedures are applied in our experiments
when 75% benign samples and 100% benign samples are used as training data, respectively.
As shown in Table 4.5, the performance of the enhanced CSPRA regarding to
breast cancer diagnosis is very promising, which indicates the great potential of the
AIS methods in the area of clinical diagnosis. The experimental results also show
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Table 4.5 Detection rate and false alarm rate with different training data
Detection Rate (%)

False Alarm Rate (%)

Training data
Max

Min

Mean

SD

Max

Min

Mean

SD

100% benign samples 99.08 95.10

97.15

0.84

3.13

2.05

2.60

0.24

75% benign sample

99.54 95.82

97.81

0.76

6.58

2.16

4.11

0.93

50% benign samples

99.87 96.53

98.40

0.67

7.48

3.69

5.44

0.83

Table 4.6 Best results picked out from 100 repeated experiments for each
training data of 100%, 75%, 50% benign samples
Training data

Detection Rate (%) False Alarm Rate (%)

100% benign samples

98.74

2.23

75% benign samples

99.25

2.97

50% benign samples

99.54

4.23

that the detection accuracy with the enhanced CSPRA is very high, even if we use
the smaller training data. Table 4.6 shows the best experimental results we picked
out from 100 repeated experiments for each training data of 100%, 75%, 50% benign
samples by comprehensively considering the balance of the detection rate and false
alarm rate. To clarify this, the best result is actually chosen among the experiments
having the highest accuracy rate in the 100 repeated experiments. Because there
are 10 randomly-reordered subsamples for each group of training data, the values of
detection rate and false alarm rate reported in Table 4.6 are the average of the best
results obtained from the experiments with 10 subsamples. As seen in Table 4.6,
the detection rate is 98.74% companying with the false alarm rate of 2.23% with the
training data of 100% benign samples. When using the training data (75% benign
samples), we obtain the detection rate of 99.25% and the false alarm rate of 2.97%.
When training with 50% benign samples, the detection rate is 99.54% at the false
alarm rate of 4.23%.
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By closely observing the influence of unknown normal data when using our algorithm, less normal training data only slightly increase the false alarm rate in breast
cancer diagnosis. However, in a negative selection algorithm and its variants, the
false alarm rate usually increases dramatically when the normal training data decrease [137]. This phenomenon exactly demonstrates the strength of APC detector in
the CSPRA. By comparison of the canonical negative selection algorithm, the complexity of the proposed algorithm has not been increased. As shown in Table 4.4, the
size of the APC detector is only 1. The proposed algorithm acts as adding only one
robust detector (APC detector), which is used to detect the conserved self pattern,
to the total size of the detectors in a negative selection algorithm. The only observed
side-effect for APC detector in the CSPRA is that the system produces the average
false alarm rate of 2.23% even if we use 100% training normal samples whereas the
false alarm for this case is zero in the negative selection algorithm. However, as already discussed, the false alarm rate is deceptive when all normal samples are used
to train the system and are included in the testing data.

4.4.4

Influence of Various Parameters in the Algorithm

To further explore the effects of various control parameters in the algorithm on the
performance of breast cancer prediction, experiments are done by changing the values
for a certain parameter while the values for other parameters remain unchanged
as listed in Table 4.4. The results reported in this section are obtained from the
experiments with training data set of 50% benign samples randomly selected from
the original collections.
Fig. 4.3, Fig. 4.4, Fig. 4.5, and Fig. 4.6 show that both T detector threshold and
APC detector threshold strongly affect the system performance. Both detection rate
and false alarm rate increase when the T detector threshold increases. As shown in
Fig. 4.4, the detection rate rises rapidly before the value for T detector threshold
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reaches 0.1. However, when the T detector threshold is over 0.1, the false alarm rate
starts a slow increment. APC detector threshold influences both the detection rate
and false alarm rate along the opposite direction as seen in Fig. 4.6; that is, both detection rate and false alarm rate decrease when the APC detector threshold increases.
We find that the false alarm rate drops dramatically when the APC threshold gradually increases to 0.5 whereas the decrement of the detection rate speeds up when the
APC threshold is greater than 0.5.
The influence of the parameter of pattern weight on the system performance is
also studied. However, the curves of both detection rate and false alarm rate are
close to being a horizontal line in Fig. 4.7, which indicates that the influence of the
parameter of pattern weight is very slight when the breast cancer data are tested with
the proposed algorithm. The influence of T detector size on the system performance
is also limited based on the experimental results reported in Fig. 4.8. The detection
rate almost arrives at 100% when the size of the T detectors increases to 250. The
larger T detector set (greater than 250) does not help the detection rate. Instead, it
sometimes lowers the detection rate. The Fig. 4.8 also illustrates that the size of the
T detectors has little impact on the false alarm rate.

4.5
4.5.1

Discussion
The Sensitivity of Parameters

To make the algorithm reliable and usable on the application domain, the tradeoff
between the number of the control parameters and the algorithm performance is worthy of being considered when we design the algorithm. Less control parameters make
the algorithm simpler but less flexible. On the contrary, if more control parameters are provided, the algorithm becomes more flexible and thus makes it possible to
maximize the algorithm performance by tuning various parameters specific for the
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Figure 4.3 Performance (ROC) curve obtained by changing T detector
threshold with the training data of 50% normal samples
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Figure 4.4 Influence of T detector threshold on both detection rate and
false alarm rate with the training data of 50% normal samples
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Figure 4.5 Performance (ROC) curve obtained by changing APC detector
threshold with the training data of 50% normal samples

133

Figure 4.6 Influence of APC detector threshold on both detection rate and
false alarm rate with the training data of 50% normal samples
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Figure 4.7 Influence of pattern weight on both detection rate and false alarm
rate with the training data of 50% normal samples
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Figure 4.8 Influence of T detector size on both detection rate and false
alarm rate with the training data of 50% normal samples

136

application. Providing a good value for the certain parameter, however, may not be
very intuitive. More control parameters make the algorithm operation more complicated, so it is hard to make the algorithm work well if we have poor intuition on
the parameters. The results reported above show that the performance of the modified CSPRA is very sensitive to the threshold values of both T detector and APC
detector, so both thresholds are key parameters to balance between sensitivity and
generation and are required to be tuned with the application data to obtain better
performance. The result in Fig. 4.8 indicates that a good value for the parameter
of T detector size could easily be found because the detection rate quickly reaches
100% with lower false alarm rate when the size of the T detector increases. We find
in our experiments that the influence of the parameters of both ambiguous coefficient
and pattern weight on the algorithm performance is minor, so the values for both
ambiguous coefficient and pattern weight could be set to 0.5 by default when we start
tuning the proposed algorithm for a specific application. When the other parameters have been optimized, the ambiguous coefficient and pattern weight can be fine
tuned to enlarge the algorithm performance. Better understanding the sensitivity of
the parameters on the algorithm performance will direct us to first tune the parameters with higher sensitivity while ignoring the parameters with lower sensitivity by
setting these parameters with the default values. Therefore, it not only reduces the
workloads of tuning multiple parameters but also makes full use of the flexibility of
multiple parameters.

4.5.2

Comparison with Previous Works

The typical methods applied to breast cancer diagnosis in previous works include
linear programming [168, 255], neural network [4, 226], and ant colony based system
[195]. In this section we compare our approach against these previous works. To
make the comparison more appropriate, our experiments also calculate the accurate
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Table 4.7 Accurate rate with different training data
Training data

Max (%)

Min (%)

Mean (%)

SD

100% benign samples

98.11

96.43

97.31

0.36

75% benign samples

98.54

95.74

97.20

0.58

50% benign samples

97.72

95.21

96.55

0.49

rate of the breast cancer prediction using equation 4.4. The corresponding results are
reported in Table 4.7.

AccurateRate =

TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN

(4.4)

The earliest work on breast cancer diagnosis [255] employed linear programming as
the basic computational tool to determine two planes in an n-dimensional real space,
as close together as possible, so that only the region between contains points from
both sets of benign samples and malignant samples. Classification of the two sets is
achieved by checking whether each point lies outside the region between the first pair
of parallel planes. The validity of the method was tested with 369 samples. When 50%
of the samples (185 samples) were used as a training set, 6.5% of the testing samples
(the remaining 50% of the samples) were misclassified. This work was later extended
in [168] by replacing 9 cytological characteristics for each sample with 30-dimensional
feature vector that are generated by Xcyt system. The work in [168] used 569 vectors
to train a linear programming-based diagnostic system and the highest predicted
accuracy, estimated with cross-validation, was 97.5% with three features (extreme
area, extreme smoothness and mean texture), a subset of the 30-dimensional feature
vector. Compared to these previous works, we tested the larger dataset (683 samples)
and achieved a better result (the highest accurate rate is 97.72% with training data
of 50% of benign samples). Moreover, the requirement of ample malignant samples
that are hardly collected in the clinic is mandatory in the training phase for these
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previous works [168, 255], whereas our approach only requires normal samples (the
majority of the clinical cases) to train the system. Abbass presented an evolutionary
artificial neural network approach based on the pareto differential evolution algorithm
augmented with local search for breast cancer diagnosis [4]. He used the same dataset
as the one used in this chapter. He chose the first 400 instances as the training set and
the remaining 283 as the test set and the average test accuracy for his method is 98.1%.
Although Abbass’s method produces a higher accuracy rate than that obtained in
our experiments, the larger training data used in his experiments could potentially
overtrained the classifier. Because Abbass used the order of collections (first 400
instances) to define the training set, there could be ordering effects. Our experiment
design as described in section 4.4.3 takes into account the problem with ordering
effect, so our experiments are more reliable and reasonable. In [226], the Wisconsin
breast cancer database is used to train three different feedforward artificial neural
network, including Cancer-Bin, Cancer-Norm, and Cancer-Cont network. CancerBin is trained with binary input patterns; Cancer-Norm is trained with normalized
input patterns; Cancer-Cont is trained with the original data set. Three different
rule extraction techniques (Binarized Rule Extraction, Partial Rule Extraction, and
Full Rule Extraction), along with the rule ordering and integration mechanism are
used to extract rules from these networks. Total 683 samples are evenly divided into
a training set and a test set. The dimensionality of the breast-cancer input space is
reduced from 9 to 6 inputs. When using the test set, the match rate for the trained
networks of Cancer-Bin, Cancer-Norm, and Cancer-Cont are 96.20%, 95.91% and
95.61%, respectively. By comparison with our method presented in this chapter, the
system used in [226] was apparently complicated. Based on the results in Table 7,
our proposed method outperformed the hybrid symbolic-connectionist system in [226].
An ant colony based system was also applied to breast cancer diagnosis [195]. The
artificial Ant Colony System first specifies how ants construct or modify a solution
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for the problem domain, i.e., the discovery of classification rules, in a probabilistic
way and then update the pheromone trail considering the evaporation rate and the
quality of the current solution. The predictive accuracy obtained with this method is
95.47%. In addition to the poor performance in comparison to our proposed method,
the ant colony system was computationally expensive, especially when the search
space (number of predicting attributes) is too large [195].

4.6

Summary

In this chapter, a novel strategy on anomaly detection for the Conserved Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA) is proposed. To explore the new detection strategy,
we first put forward the concept of ambiguous boundary, which determines a ringshaped region where unsure antigen objects reside. The novel detection strategy
employs the domain knowledge and randomized method to resolve the conflicts in
anomaly detection between two types of detectors (T detectors and APC detectors)
during the detection phase of the algorithm. In particular, when the conflicts emerge,
there are two cases that can be observed in the detection phase: 1) the new sample
falls not only into the ambiguous region of the T detector but also into the ambiguous
region of APC detector; 2) the new sample falls into neither the ambiguous region of
the T detector nor the ambiguous region of APC detector. The randomized method
is selected to resolve the conflicts if one of the above cases is observed. Domain
knowledge is used to arrive at the final anomaly decision for a new testing sample
for the observed cases other than the cases suitable for randomized method. The
improved CSPRA is applied to breast cancer diagnosis and the promising results
reported in this chapter show that the potential usage of the CSPRA is an efficient
and reliable technique to diagnose the breast cancer. The total 683 clinic samples
collected by Dr. Wolberg are experimented with our proposed method after max-min
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normalization. The conserved self pattern is discovered by computing Pearsonian
γ between the values for each column of the attribute and the class labels. The
experimental results are evaluated by considering not only the capability of the system
to detect the anomalies (malignant samples) but also the extent of the system to
misclassify the normal samples (benign samples). As shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6,
the CSPRA produces very promising performance. Importantly, the best detection
listed in Table 4.6 can remain unchanged because the set of T detectors and the indices
of the randomized method can be on-line recorded and reused for future detection.
The influence of various control parameters on the performance of predicting breast
cancer is also studied. The results indicate that the performance of the modified
CSPRA is very sensitive to the threshold parameters of both T detector and APC
detector. By comparison with the results in the literature from the previous works
on breast cancer diagnosis, our method outperforms the other methods in addition
to the advantage of its one-class classification. However, there is still a long way to
apply our proposed method to the actual diagnosis in the clinic. There may be two
reasons for immaturity of the proposed approach. One, the available breast cancer
data are unbalanced between the two cases. The number of benign samples is almost
double than that of malignant samples. Because of this limitation, we cannot exclude
that the promising performance of our method is due to overfitting towards benign
cases. Two, the available data set is too small and the variation of the attributes is
too low. For some attributes in raw breast cancer data, the same values are observed
in most samples. Therefore, we still question that these observations in the source
data might contribute to the good results generated by our method and previous
works. These problems could be lessoned when we can obtain a much larger number
of samples balanced over two cases. Although relatively limited, the encouraging
results of the CSPRA on the available breast cancer data still give weight to further
study this technique with more data sets and real world applications and compare
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this technique with other AIS methods and machine learning algorithms.
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Chapter 5
An Empirical Study of Conserved
Self Pattern Recognition
Algorithm: Performance,
Properties, and Implications
1

Early work has demonstrated that Conserve Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm

(CSPRA) produces promising performance in the field of anomaly detection. This
chapter further extends the applications of CSPRA to Fisher’s Iris data, Indian Telugu data and Wisconsin breast cancer data. A formal description of the difference
between two detection strategies (Classical CSPRA and Selective CSPRA) is given
and the results show that Selective CSPRA performs better for the tested data. Numerous experiments were carried out to investigate the performance and properties
of the CSPRA in this work. The comparative study of CSPRA to other one-class
1

Partial material c [2010] IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from [World Congress on Nature &

Biologically Inspired Computing, 2009. NaBIC 2009, An empirical study of Conserved Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm: Comparing to other one-class classifiers and evaluating with random number
generators, Senhua Yu and Dipankar Dasgupta].

143

classifiers (NSA, V-detector and One-class SVM) shows that the performance of the
CSPRA is obviously better. This chapter also investigates the influence of various
random number generators on the performance of the CSPRA and NSA. Our experiments indicate that non-uniform random number generators tend to produce worse
performance than the uniform random number generators and quasi-random number generator has the potential to enhance the system performance in comparison to
other uniform random number generators. An important question “why the CSPRA
performs better than NSA” is asked in this chapter and then the possible answers are
illustrated, analyzed and discussed.

5.1

Introduction

Inspired by self-nonself discrimination - one of the major mechanisms that are explored for Artificial Immune System (AIS), Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) is
one of the earliest and the most popular models. NSA discriminates between normal
and anomalous data based on the knowledge of the normal data. It has the distinct
advantage over traditional signature-based detection as it is capable of detecting
novel anomalies or intrusions. Since NSA is first conceived [77], it has attracted
many AIS researchers and practitioners and has been applied in various applications [56, 113, 144]. However, NSA can be prone to the generation of false alarms because it assumes all foreign patterns are anomalies or intrusions [144]. Many different
variations of NSA are also being proposed in order to tackle the intrinsic limitations
of NSA [34, 136, 165, 212].
Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA) [261] is one of the latest
AIS methods inspired by a newer theory of self-nonself discrimination known as the
Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs) model [125]. Preliminary results have suggested that the CSPRA shows promise in assisting in reducing the number of false
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positive errors. Two detection strategies were proposed for the CSPRA, which in this
chapter are named Classical CSPRA [261] and Selective CSPRA [262]. Both Classical
CSPRA and Selective CSPRA have been described in detail in chapter 3 and chapter 4, respectively. The Classical CSPRA mirrors the immunological metaphor. The
costimulation of APC detector will not be triggered until T cell detector suspects the
encountered anomalous sample. In Selective CSPRA, both domain knowledge and
randomized methods are used to resolve the conflicts based on the matching results
from both types of the detectors in the system. The CSPRA is characterized by
one-class classification. This chapter first describes the vital difference between two
detection strategies and then further compares the CSPRA to other one-class classifiers (NSA, point-wise V-detector, boundary-aware V-detector and One-class SVM)
by conducting experiments with multiple datasets to show the advantages of our
methods.
No matter how different one NSA variation is from another, the initial candidate
detectors are randomly generated. Although randomness is the first and an important
aspect that influences detector coverage in the NSA family, the influence of various
random number generators on detector coverage has not been studied yet. This work
selected six types of random number generators, including the standard method from
the C++ library, Mersenne Twister (MT), Mother of All (MA), Combination of MT
and MA, Quasi random, and Gaussian distribution, to investigate their influences on
the performance of the CSPRA and NSA. The experimental results are reported and
discussed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the main idea
of the CSPRA and compares two detection strategies for anomaly detection in this
algorithm; Section 5.3 reports and discusses the experimental results for performance
evaluation of the CSPRA; Section 5.4 analyzes and discusses the properties of the
CSPRA; Section 5.5 draws the conclusion.

145

5.2

Conceptual Comparison of Two Detection Strategies in Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm

5.2.1

Algorithm Overview

The self-nonself discrimination model has been challenged by a great number of findings. The Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs) model was proposed to solve the
problems emerging from the self-nonself model [125]. The development of the CSPRA
is inspired from the PRRs model. In the PRRs model, an additional layer - Pathogenassociated Molecular Patterns (PAMPs) is added on the basis of the self-nonself
model. Correspondingly, the current version of the CSPRA remains the feature of
negative selection while the anomaly detection in CSPRA combines the results from
APCs self pattern recognition and T cell negative selection. Because two detectors
exist in the system simultaneously, it is possible to encounter conflict when employing
the CSPRA to predict a new sample. For example, the T cell detector detects a new
sample as “Nonself” whereas the same sample is classified as “Self” by APC detector.
To resolve this conflict, both Classical CSPRA and Selective CSPRA were proposed.

5.2.2

Classical CSPRA

PRRs model explained that APCs are quiescent until they are activated via encoded
PRRs that recognize conserved pathogen-associated molecular patterns (PAMPs)
[125]. By mirroring this idea, the first version of CSPRA [261] proposed that the
co-stimulation of APC detector is conducted if and only if both of the following conditions are fulfilled during T cell detection:
1. The affinity between the current T cell detector and the new sample is very
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Figure 5.1 Flow chart of detection algorithm in Classical CSPRA
low, that is, the Euclidean distance between the current T cell detector and the
incoming sample is greater than the predefined suspicious threshold (t3 ).
2. The decision for abnormal (nonself) is made based on the antigen epitope different from the location where the conserved self pattern resides.
A flow diagram of this strategy is presented in Fig. 5.1. The new sample (antigen)
is firstly checked with T detectors. If the above conditions are fulfilled, the new
sample is named suspicious antigen. The APC detector solely determines whether it
is anomalous.
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5.2.3

Selective CSPRA

This detection strategy was proposed in [262]. It applies both domain knowledge
and randomization technique to resolve the conflicts that might occur in the CSPRA
during the detection phase. As depicted in Fig 5.2, the major ideas of this approach
for anomaly detection are as follows:
• When the antigen (the new incoming sample) is loaded into the system, the
matching rule of Euclidean distance against each T detector is checked. If a
match is found, the matching distance is kept in record. If a match is not found
for all T detectors, only the nearest distance to the T detectors is recorded.
• Similarly, the antigen is checked against the APC detector and the distance is
also recorded.
• The concept of ambiguous boundary is proposed to delimit the ambiguous region
for both the T detector and the APC detector. The ambiguous region is a ringshaped region contained between the two circles (upper ambiguous boundary
and lower ambiguous boundary) with the radius of (1+α)*t (outer circle) and
(1-α)*t (inner circle), where t represents the detector threshold and α is the
ambiguous coefficient. Both parameters can be set to different values for T
detector (t 1 , αt ) and APC detector (t 2 , αp ), respectively.
• Domain knowledge is used to resolve the conflicts under the following conditions:
1) If the new sample falls into the ambiguous region of APC detector but not in
the ambiguous region of T detector, based on the recorded matching distance
during the detection, then the T cell decision on anomaly is granted but the
result from the APC detector decision is abandoned; 2) If the condition is
exactly opposite, then the APC detector makes the final anomaly decision.
• Random method is applied to the remaining undecided samples, among which,
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Figure 5.2 Flow chart of detection algorithm in Selective CSPRA
a certain number of samples are randomly picked up. The selected samples are
determined by the APC detector and the others follow the T detecting results.
This process is controlled by the parameter called pattern weight(w).

5.3

Performance of the Algorithm

Experiments were carried out with three real world datasets, including Fisher’s Iris
data, Indian Telugu data, and Wisconsin breast cancer data, to demonstrate the
performance difference between our algorithm and other one-class classifiers and show
the influence of various random number generators on the system performance in
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CSPRA and NSA. The results reported in this section are the summary of the 100
repeated experiments for each method and parameters setting.

5.3.1

Experimental Data and Parameters

Fisher’s Iris Data
The famous benchmark Fisher’s Iris data were tested. Iris data set [72] contains 3
classes of 50 instances each, where each class refers to a type of iris plant such as
Iris Setosa, Iris Versicolour, or Iris Virginica. There are four attributes in the data
set, including sepal length, sepal width, petal length and petal width. The class
correlations for the attributes of both petal length and petal width are very high [72],
so the subset from the corresponding columns is considered as conserved self pattern.
One of the three types of iris is treated as normal data, whereas the other two are
considered as abnormal. For each experimental case, we take 50% of the normal data
to train the system. The remaining 50% normal data and the abnormal data are
used as the testing data. This chapter only reports the results from the experiments
with the training data of 50% Iris Seta because the results from the experiments with
the training data of 50% Iris Versicolour and 50% Iris Virginica derive the consistent
conclusions as summarized in this chapter. Table 5.1 lists the parameters setting we
used for this dataset.2
Indian Telugu Data
This data set consists of 871 patterns (rows) of vowel sounds in the language of Indian
Telugu. There are 6 overlapping vowel classes and each pattern is represented by 3
input features (formant frequencies) [194]. By considering the feature of NSA oneclass classification and the balance of sample size between classes, the patterns from
2

The definition of the parameters in the tables of this chapter: t1 : T detector threshold; t2 :

APC detector threshold; t3 : suspicious antigen threshold; αt : T ambiguous coefficient; αp : APC
ambiguous coefficient; w : pattern weight; st : T detector size; Sw : sliding window size;
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Table 5.1 Parameters setting for Fisher’s Iris data
Algorithm

t1

t2

t3

αt

αp

w

st

Sw

NSA

0.1

-

-

-

-

-

35

2

-

-

-

35

2

0.5 0.5 0.5 35

2

Classical CSPRA

0.1 1.0 0.02

Selective CSPRA

0.1 1.0

-

Table 5.2 Parameters setting for Indian Telugu data
Algorithm

t1

t2

t3

αt

αp

w

st

Sw

NSA

0.1

-

-

-

-

-

100

2

-

-

-

100

2

0.6 0.4 0.7 100

2

Classical CSPRA

0.1 0.7 0.02

Selective CSPRA

0.1 0.7

-

the class 4 and class 5 were used in our experiments. We selected class 5 as the
“normal” class since we needed more normal samples for an even division into the
training and the testing group. The first 50% of the normal samples (104 patterns)
are used to train the system. The remaining 50% normal samples and the samples
from class 4 (abnormal class) are used as the testing data. Because this data set
only has 3 dimensions and the sliding window size is set to 2, there are only three
combinations of the original dimensions for the conserved self pattern: (1, 2), (2, 3),
(1, 3). In performing initial experiments with these three combinations, we observed
that the best results are output when both features in columns 1 and 2 are considered
as a conserved self pattern. The experimental parameters used for this data set are
listed in Table 5.2.
Wisconsin Breast Cancer Data
Wisconsin breast cancer data set [255] originally has 699 samples but 16 samples with
missing value are removed, so our experiments actually use 683 samples, where 444
samples are assigned to benign class and the other 239 samples belong to malignant
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Table 5.3 Parameters setting for Wisconsin breast cancer data
Algorithm

t1

t2

t3

αt

αp

w

st

Sw

NSA

0.1

-

-

-

-

-

300

3

-

-

-

300

3

0.5 0.4 0.7 300

3

Classical CSPRA

0.1 0.5 0.02

Selective CSPRA

0.1 0.5

-

samples. We also removed the attributes of the sample id number and class label, so
there are total 9 attributes in the actual data set that are used in our experiments.
The 50% of the benign samples are used as the training data, whereas the remaining
50% benign samples and malignant samples are treated as the testing data. With
the sliding window sized of 3, the subset from 1st, 2nd, and 5th (zero-based index)
dimension of the original dimensions in the breast cancer dataset is concluded as
the conserved self pattern by comparing the class correlation (Pearson γ) for each
dimension in the original dataset [262]. Table 5.3 shows the parameters setting used
in our experiments for this dataset.

5.3.2

Comparisons of CSPRA and Other One-class Classifiers

As one-class classification algorithms, the probability distribution of only self space
is known in NSA family, including CSPRA. This means no information of nonself
is defined. Hence, one-class classification is considered as an unsupervised learning.
This feature makes NSA capable of detecting novel anomalies or intrusions. On the
other hand, it can also become a limitation of one-class classification. The knowledge of the probability distribution of data directly influences the performance of
a classification algorithm. However, one-class classification assumes that the probability distribution of the second class is never known. Undeniably, we can expect
that some supervised learning methods will perform better than the CSPRA under
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some conditions, although this type of good performance perhaps benefits from the
assumption that the knowledge of anomalies or intrusions has been known. However,
such comparisons are perhaps inappropriate and sometimes unfair because there are
fundamental differences between supervised learning methods and one-class classification algorithms. These thoughts motivated us to compare the CSPRA only to other
one-class classifiers. V-detector is one of the latest AIS methods in the NSA family,
which provides better detector coverage with the smaller number of detectors [136].
Both point-wise V-detector and boundary-aware V-detector were as comparisons to
our algorithm. To estimate detector coverage, two methods (naive estimation and
hypothesis testing estimation) are introduced in V-detector. In our experiments, we
employed only hypothesis testing estimation because this method has the advantage
of more informative statistical confidence in the estimation of detector coverage and
is highly advocated by the authors of V-detector in their latest paper [136]. As instructed by [131], the threshold values for self radius and expected coverage are set
to 0.1 and 99%, respectively.
Developed on the basis of the statistical learning theory, one-class SVM (Support
Vector Machine) is a widely used one-class classification tool. The well-implemented
SVM software, LIBSVM [35], was used in the experiments. There are 14 adjustable
control parameters in SVM, so it is relatively difficult to tune these parameters to
obtain meaningful results. The results reported in this chapter were obtained with
default values for all control parameters.
By comparison of the results from Fisher’s Iris data (Fig. 5.3), Indian Telugu
data (Fig. 5.4), and Wisconsin breast cancer data ( Fig. 5.5), the CSPRA obviously
outperforms the original NSA, point-wise V-detector, boundary-aware V-detector,
and one-class SVM. One-class SVM almost fails to detect anomalies in all three data
sets because of unacceptable false alarms. The more detailed results are summarized
in Table 5.4. By comparing the two detection strategies in the CSPRA with respect to
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Figure 5.3 Fisher’s Iris data: comparisons of detection rate (left series) and false alarm rate (right series) using
Classical CSPRA, Selective CSPRA, NSA, point-wise V-detector, boundary-aware V-detector, and one-class SVM (left
to right)
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Figure 5.4 Indian Telugu data: comparisons of detection rate (left series) and false alarm rate (right series) using
Classical CSPRA, Selective CSPRA, NSA, point-wise V-detector, boundary-aware V-detector, and one-class SVM (left
to right)
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Figure 5.5 Wisconsin breast cancer data: comparisons of detection rate (left series) and false alarm rate (right series)
using Classical CSPRA, Selective CSPRA, NSA, point-wise V-detector, boundary-aware V-detector, and one-class SVM
(left to right)

accuracy rate in Table 5.4, we demonstrate that the performance of Selective CSPRA
is better than that of Classical CSPRA for the tested data sets. It is interesting to
see from Table 5.4 that Selective CSPRA generally presents the lower values of the
standard deviations for the detection rate, accuracy rate and false alarm rate, which
indicate the consistency, stability and accuracy of this method.

5.3.3

Influence of Various Random Number Generators on
the Performance of the Algorithms

Various Random Number Generators
This study evaluates the performance of the CSPRA and NSA with 6 types of random
number generators.
Standard
It is a basic random number generator in C++ standard function library, which
generates floating point or integer random numbers with uniform distributions.
Mother of All Method
The Mother of All algorithm was developed in 1994 by George Marsaglia for producing
uniformly distributed pseudorandom 32 bit values with period of 2250 [170]. This
algorithm uses multiplication to produce a multiply-with-carry sequence. George
Marsaglia explained the idea of how the algorithm works with a simple example [170].
Starting with n=123456, the seed, the random 3-digit integers are returned from the
integers of six decimal digits as follows:
n=672*456+123=306555, return 555;
n=67*555+306=373266, return 266;
n=672*266+373=179125, return 125;
··· ···
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Breast

Telugu

Fisher’s

Dataset

Algorithm

Detection Rate (%)
Max Min Mean SD
Classical CSPRA
100 92.00 97.21 2.36
Selective CSPRA
100 99.00 99.95 0.22
NSA
100 93.00 97.81 1.87
Point
100
100
100
0
V-Detector
Boundary 100
100
100
0
One-Class SVM
100
Classical CSPRA
94.04 82.78 91.01 1.83
Selective CSPRA
95.36 86.76 93.17 1.54
NSA
96.69 73.51 94.53 2.94
Point
94.70 91.39 94.06 0.75
V-Detector
Boundary 100 99.34 99.99 0.07
One-Class SVM
100
Classical CSPRA
97.49 88.70 94.39 1.61
Selective CSPRA
98.74 95.82 97.50 0.68
NSA
97.91 91.21 94.90 1.48
Point
95.82 89.54 93.05 1.28
V-Detector
Boundary 100 97.49 99.03 0.57
One-Class SVM
100
3.15
4.50
8.11
3.60
11.26

31.07
31.07
58.25
37.86
85.44

False
Max
4.00
8.00
16.00
8.00
64.00

Alarm Rate
Min Mean
0
1.40
0
3.40
4.00
9.96
4.00
4.16
28.00 42.96
60.00
19.42 25.08
18.45 26.34
33.01 49.38
32.04 36.30
73.79 78.09
83.50
0.90
2.05
1.80
3.09
3.15
5.42
1.35
2.33
3.60
6.28
65.32

(%)
Accuracy Rate (%)
SD Max Min Mean SD
1.92 100 92.80 97.49 2.03
2.92 100 98.40 99.28 0.56
3.24 98.40 92.00 96.26 1.56
0.78 99.20 98.40 99.17 0.16
5.67 94.40 87.20 91.41 1.13
88.00
2.70 87.40 78.74 84.48 1.65
1.91 88.58 81.50 85.26 1.24
4.50 84.65 63.39 76.72 2.56
1.27 83.46 79.53 81.75 0.62
2.27 70.08 65.35 68.33 0.92
66.14
0.48 97.61 93.49 96.10 0.86
0.64 98.05 96.31 97.22 0.38
1.14 96.53 92.19 94.74 0.91
0.56 96.96 93.93 95.27 0.70
1.07 97.61 94.14 96.47 0.58
68.55

Table 5.4 Experimental results from various datasets by comparison of the different algorithms

The above example is a multiply-with-carry sequence that is calculated as: x(n)=672*x(n1) + carry mod b=1000, where the carry is the number of b’s dropped in the modular
reduction.
Mother of All algorithm uses less memory than the other generators. It has passed
stringent tests for randomness. However, this algorithm has shorter cycle length and
lower dimensions of equidistribution.
Mersenne Twister Method
The Mersenne Twister algorithm was developed in 1997 by Makoto Matsumoto and
Takuiji Nishimura for generating uniform pseudorandom numbers [173]. The algorithm is a large linear-feedback shift register, with state bit reflection and tempering.
It has two distinct phases: the recurrence which changes one 19,937-bit state to its
successor, and the procedure for extracting multiple 32-bit values from that state.
The details of this algorithm are not going to be extended since it is beyond the
scope of this chapter. The features of Mersenne Twister algorithm are as follows:
• It provides a super astronomical period of 219937-1 that is able to constitute
approximately 4.3*106001 unique combinations enough to be used in most applications.
• The sequence it generates is not cryptosecure but has excellent statistical randomness.
• It has 623-dimensional equidistribution. This implies that there is free of longterm correlations between successive values in the output sequence.
Mersenne Twister has become very popular in recent years due to its long cycle
length and high dimensions of equidistribution. This algorithm also has some disadvantages. For example, it fails a few of the most stringent tests for randomness and
uses more memory than the other generators.
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Combination
A combination of two random number generators is generally better than any of the
two alone. Hence, we examine a combination of Mersenne Twister and Mother of
All random number generators to investigate whether a better performance can be
produced.
Gaussian Randomness
In our experiments reported in this chapter, we investigate how the system performance is affected by the non-uniform random numbers with a specific probability
distribution such as Gaussian distribution. Such random number generator converts
a random number with uniform distribution to the desired distribution, e.g., Gaussian
distribution. Gaussian distribution is known as normal distribution and the graph of
its probability density resembles a bell. Both error functions erf and complementary
error function erfc are frequently used in probability theory. The error function represents the probability that the generated random number is within a range between
+ σ√x 2 and − σ√x 2 , while the complementary error function provides the probability
that the generated random number is outside that range. When the random numbers
are generated by a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ and expected


a
is the probability that the generated random number lies bevalue 0, the erf σ√
2
tween -a and +a, for positive a. For detector generation in NSA, Classical CSPRA or
Selective CSPRA, the candidate detector is an object vector consisting of the values
within the range of 0 and 1. Hence, we are only interested in the random number
that is normally distributed (X N(µ, σ 2 )) but lies between 0 and 1. To generate such
a random number with the specific probability distribution, it is very straightforward
that we shall pick up the mean µ = 0.5. Now, let’s discuss how to choose the parameter σ. Looking at the error function table [6], if x ≥ 2.3, erfc(x) ≤ 0.001. In our case,
√ since the normally distributed random number is expected to lie between 0
x= σ0.5
2
0.5√
and 1 with the mean µ = 0.5. If σ= 2.3×
, the probability that the random number
2
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is outside the range of 0 and 1 is only 0.001. Therefore, we can guarantee that the
random number is extremely close to the normal distribution with mean µ = 0.5 and
the standard deviation σ = 0.154, although all random numbers that are greater than
1.0 or less than 0 are abandoned in our experiment.
Quasi Randomness
Quasi random numbers are generated in a highly correlated manner. The next random
point is generated based on the distribution of previous random points. Hence, quasi
random number generator provides a deterministic sequence of numbers and seeks to
fill space more uniformly. Better results are expected in NSA by using this type of
random number generators.
Quasi-random numbers are generated by using the source code in [1]. Other
random varieties are generated with the libraries provided from the open source by
Agner Fog [75]. Since detection rate and false alarm rate can be balanced by employing different T detector thresholds in CSPRA and NSA, ROC (receiver operating
characteristics) curve is used to compare the performance of the algorithms. The
ROC curves of the CSPRA do not cover the whole range of the detection rate [0, 1]
because they are plotted by only changing the T detector threshold without considering the influence of the APC detection. To overcome this limitation, NSA is also
used to evaluate various random number generators.

Results and Analysis
The experiments were conducted to investigate the influence of various random number generators on the performance of the algorithms, including NSA, Classical CSPRA
and Selective CSPRA. The experimental results are reported in Table 5.5 (Fisher’s
Iris data), Table 5.6 (Indian Telugu data), and Table 5.7 (Wisconsin breast cancer
data). Various ROC curves are plotted from the experimental results with NSA
(Fig. 5.6 - Fig. 5.8), Classical CSPRA (Fig. 5.9 - Fig. 5.11), and Selective CSPRA
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(Fig. 5.12 - Fig. 5.14). It is observed that there is a slight difference in the influence
of random number generators between NSA and CSPRA. The ROC curves obtained
from the experiments with NSA (Fig. 5.6 - Fig. 5.8) show that Gaussian random
number generator produces the poorest performance in all three data sets. However,
Fig. 5.9 - Fig. 5.14 show that the influence of Gaussian random number generator
on the performance of the CSPRA is trivial, which can be explained by the effects
of the collaborative detection of the APC detector. Compared to most uniform generators (Standard, Mother of All, Mersenne Twister, and Combination), Fig. 5.10
and Fig. 5.13 show that CSPRA performs better in the application of Indian Telugu
data when using Gaussian random number generator, instead. This result reflects
the instability of this type of generator. The advantage of quasi random numbers is
only observed in the experiments with the Indian Telugu data (Fig. 5.7, Fig. 5.10,
and Fig. 5.13). Other uniform random number generators present very similar performance. Our experimental results, as shown in Table 5.5 - Table 5.7 and Fig. 5.6 Fig. 5.14, can be summarized as:
1. The different random number generators influence the performance of NSA,
Classical CSPRA, and Selective CSPRA.
2. Non-uniform random number generators tend to produce lower performance
compared to uniform random number generators. The experimental results further confirm that non-uniform distribution of the generated detectors produces
a big “hole” on the nonself space and thus reduces the probability of detecting
the anomalies.
3. Quasi-random number generator has the potential to enhance the system performance, although the exceptions do exist.
4. The influence of various random number generators on the performance of the
CSPRA is lower than that of the traditional NSA, which indicates that the
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Figure 5.6 NSA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from experimental
results with Fisher’s Iris Data using various random number generators
CSPRA is more stable and reliable.

5.4

Properties and Implications of the Algorithm

The emphasis of this section is on extending the theoretical basis of the CSPRA by
analyzing the applicability and complexity of the algorithm, exploring the relationship
between CSPRA and NSA, and addressing why the CSPRA performs better than the
NSA.
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Selective

Classical

NSA

Algorithm
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi

Random Method

Detection
Max Min
100 93.00
100 92.00
100 85.00
100 92.00
99.00 87.00
99.00 91.00
100 92.00
100 90.00
100 88.00
100 95.00
96.00 88.00
100 94.00
100 99.00
100 98.00
100 98.00
100 99.00
99.00 96.00
100 98.00

Rate (%)
Mean SD
97.81 1.87
97.70 2.30
97.67 3.32
98.16 1.91
92.74 3.06
97.93 1.34
97.21 2.36
97.48 2.38
97.18 2.45
98.16 1.32
92.47 2.14
99.07 1.27
99.95 0.22
99.90 0.35
99.76 0.45
99.90 0.30
97.17 0.94
99.97 0.22

False
Max
16.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
8.00
28.00
4.00
4.00
8.00
4.00
8.00
12.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
4.00
8.00

Alarm Rate
Min Mean
4.00 9.96
0
10.20
0
9.72
0
7.88
0
4.72
4.00 14.48
0
1.40
0
1.80
0
2.00
0
2.20
0
0.48
0
2.20
0
3.40
0
3.76
0
3.04
0
3.72
0
0.56
0
3.64

(%)
SD
3.24
6.03
6.36
5.38
2.30
5.51
1.92
2.00
2.09
2.00
1.91
2.81
2.92
3.40
2.91
3.02
1.39
3.37

Accuracy
Max Min
98.40 92.00
100 92.00
100 84.80
100 92.80
98.40 88.80
98.40 89.60
100 92.80
100 92.00
100 90.40
100 95.20
96.80 90.40
100 93.60
100 98.40
100 96.80
100 97.60
100 98.40
99.20 96.00
100 97.60

Rate (%)
Mean SD
96.26 1.56
96.12 2.41
96.19 3.21
96.95 1.69
93.25 2.54
95.45 1.62
97.49 2.03
97.62 1.85
97.34 1.98
98.09 1.29
93.88 1.59
98.82 1.29
99.28 0.56
99.16 0.71
99.20 0.71
99.18 0.61
97.62 0.77
99.25 0.71

Table 5.5 The results from Fisher’s Iris data by using various random number generators in different algorithms
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Selective

Classical

NSA

Algorithm
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi

Random Method

Detection
Max Min
96.69 73.51
96.69 86.09
96.69 83.44
96.69 84.77
94.04 19.87
96.69 91.39
94.04 82.78
92.72 79.47
93.38 82.12
92.72 83.44
90.73 23.84
96.69 92.05
95.36 86.76
96.03 88.08
96.03 85.43
96.03 88.74
94.04 50.33
97.35 93.38

Rate (%)
Mean SD
94.53 2.94
94.62 2.01
94.64 2.41
93.79 2.91
65.36 17.58
95.40 1.09
91.01 1.83
90.64 2.64
90.79 2.08
91.32 1.47
61.05 18.00
95.42 1.09
93.17 1.54
93.36 1.25
93.13 1.77
93.15 1.48
83.79 7.75
95.84 0.86

False Alarm Rate
Max Min Mean
58.25 33.01 49.38
58.25 37.86 49.04
58.25 37.86 50.05
58.25 36.89 49.85
58.25 6.80 31.82
59.22 39.81 51.61
31.07 19.42 25.08
31.07 18.45 24.99
30.10 16.50 24.98
30.10 20.39 25.12
25.24 4.85 12.75
49.51 28.16 43.38
31.07 18.45 26.34
29.13 19.42 25.89
30.10 16.50 25.74
29.13 19.42 25.34
33.01 1.94 16.11
31.07 21.36 26.00

(%)
SD
4.50
3.74
4.20
4.23
12.04
3.26
2.70
2.80
2.28
2.22
5.66
3.75
1.91
1.80
2.02
1.83
7.97
1.97

Accuracy
Max Min
84.65 63.39
81.89 70.08
81.50 69.29
82.68 68.50
89.76 34.25
81.50 73.23
87.40 78.74
87.80 76.77
88.19 79.53
87.01 78.74
90.94 49.21
85.83 76.38
88.58 81.50
89.37 81.89
89.37 79.92
89.37 82.28
94.09 61.81
88.98 85.04

Rate (%)
Mean SD
76.72 2.56
76.91 2.01
76.52 2.17
76.09 2.45
66.51 11.05
76.34 1.49
84.48 1.65
84.30 1.93
84.40 1.50
84.65 1.34
71.68 10.70
79.69 1.59
85.26 1.24
85.56 1.13
85.48 1.29
85.65 1.26
83.83 5.62
86.98 0.89

Table 5.6 The results from Indian Telugu data by using various random number generators in different algorithms
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pSelective

Classical

NSA

Algorithm
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi
Standard
Mersenne
Mother
Combination
Gaussian
Quasi

Random Method

Detection
Max Min
97.91 91.21
97.91 89.54
97.91 89.96
98.33 90.38
69.87 59.00
97.49 93.31
97.49 88.70
97.49 90.38
97.91 88.70
97.07 90.38
71.97 59.00
98.33 93.31
98.74 95.82
99.16 96.23
99.16 95.40
99.16 95.82
90.80 86.61
99.16 95.82

Rate (%)
False Alarm Rate
Mean SD Max Min Mean
94.90 1.48 8.11 3.15 5.42
94.63 1.65 8.56 2.70 5.46
94.85 1.66 9.01 3.15 5.71
95.00 1.59 8.11 2.25 5.68
64.23 2.39 4.96 1.80 2.98
95.67 0.98 9.46 3.60 6.32
94.39 1.61 3.15 0.90 2.05
94.45 1.51 3.60 0.90 2.04
94.51 1.61 4.05 0.90 2.09
94.68 1.36 3.60 0.90 2.09
64.09 2.73 2.25 0.90 1.10
95.81 1.08 3.60 0.90 2.17
97.50 0.68 4.50 1.80 3.09
97.56 0.64 4.96 1.35 3.18
97.56 0.72 4.96 1.80 3.08
97.56 0.73 4.50 1.35 3.06
88.79 1.02 3.60 1.35 2.08
97.90 0.64 4.50 0.90 3.18

(%)
SD
1.14
1.25
1.22
1.13
0.60
1.12
0.48
0.56
0.63
0.55
0.30
0.49
0.64
0.65
0.68
0.66
0.45
0.69

Accuracy
Max Min
96.53 92.19
96.53 92.41
96.75 91.78
96.31 92.19
82.86 77.66
96.31 93.06
97.61 93.49
97.61 93.93
97.83 93.06
97.40 93.93
85.03 78.31
98.05 95.01
98.05 96.31
98.48 96.10
98.48 95.88
98.26 96.31
94.36 91.97
98.48 96.31

Rate (%)
Mean SD
94.74 0.91
94.59 1.02
94.58 0.99
94.68 0.92
80.02 1.23
94.72 0.73
96.10 0.86
96.14 0.79
96.15 0.84
96.23 0.70
80.85 1.41
96.78 0.57
97.22 0.38
97.20 0.45
97.25 0.45
97.26 0.42
93.19 0.54
97.38 0.44

Table 5.7 The results from Breast Cancer data by using various random number generators in different algorithms

Figure 5.7 NSA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from experimental
results with Indian Telugu data using various random number generators
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Figure 5.8 NSA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from experimental
results with Wisconsin Breast Cancer data using various random number
generators
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Figure 5.9 Classical CSPRA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from
experimental results with Fisher’s Iris Data using various random number
generators
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Figure 5.10 Classical CSPRA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from
experimental results with Indian Telugu data using various random number
generators
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Figure 5.11 Classical CSPRA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from experimental results with Wisconsin Breast Cancer data using various random
number generators
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Figure 5.12 Selective CSPRA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from
experimental results with Fisher’s Iris Data using various random number
generators
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Figure 5.13 Selective CSPRA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from
experimental results with Indian Telugu data using various random number
generators
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Figure 5.14 Selective CSPRA: comparisons of ROC curves plotting from experimental results with Wisconsin Breast Cancer data using various random
number generators
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5.4.1

Applicability

It is well known that the NSA was inspired from the immunological self-nonself model.
The CSPRA attempts to solve some problems in the NSA by borrowing the ideas from
an evoluted self-nonself model, that is, the PRRs models. The PRRs models added
another layer of cells and signals to the self-nonself model, proposing that antigenantibody binding is not activated without costimulation of the APC. Parallelly, the
CSPRA is in fact the technique that adds an additional APC detector to the NSA
(phenomenon of T detector in the CSPRA) and thus prevents the NSA from detecting
noninfectious nonself as anomalies. The applicability of the CSPRA is bidirectional.
The techniques for APC detector and T detector proposed in the CSPRA can either be
used as a standalone strategy to solve a specific problem or be combined with the other
algorithms to enhance its performance. On the other hand, two types of detectors
(APC detector and T detector) in the CSPRA are independently generated and are
used to detect the anomalies in the separated processes. Although we only discussed
the original NSA in the previous chapters, any other improved variants in the NSA
family, which remains the main characteristics of the NSA, can be easily integrated
to the CSPRA as the strategy of the T detector, for example, V-detector [136] is a
perfect fit for this purpose. Such flexibility enables the CSPRA to make full use of
the advantages of other NSA variants to the CSPRA.

5.4.2

Complexity

The article [61] represents the first systematical theoretical work in the research areas
of the NSA. Some of the notions used in [61] are also adopted in this dissertation to
analyze the theoretical aspect of the CSPRA:
• NS : the size of the self set;
• NX : the size of the testing set;
175

• NR0 : the size of initial detector repertoire;
• NR : the size of T detector set;
• Pm (0 < Pm < 1): the probability that a randomly chosen object (self or antigen)
and detector match according to the defined matching rule;
• l: the length of the self and antigen (it is meant to the peptides if partial
matching is applied)
The Complexity of Classical CSPRA
The time complexity of the T detector generation in Classical CSPRA is proportional
to NR0 and NS . Because each candidate T detector needs to go through all samples in
the self set, the time complexity of the T detector generation is O(NR0 ×NS ). The time
complexity of the APC detector generation in Classical CSPRA is far simpler, that is,
O(1). Space complexity of the algorithm depends on how to implement the algorithm.
For the implementation of the T detector generation, we store the list of the self for
fast tracking during program execution, so space complexity is proportional to NS .
The APC detector is directly stored to the file, so the generation of the single APC
detector does not cost any memory space. The complexity of detector generation in
Classical CSPRA is summarized as:
• time: O(NR0 × NS + 1) ≈ O(NR0 × NS )
• space: O(NS × l)
As noted, the complexity of detector generation in Classical CSPRA is the same as
that of the NSA.
In the detection phase of Classical CSPRA, the incoming sample from the testing
set is first checked against the T detector. In the worst case, all samples in the testing
set cannot be detected by T detector and thus the time complexity is O(NR × NX ).
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Although almost impossible, the best case is that all samples in the testing set is
detected by the first detector in the set of T detectors. In the best case, the time
complexity of the detection by T detector is as small as O(NX ). If all samples in the
testing set need to be detected by APC detector, then the time complexity of the
APC detection is O(NX ). If Pc stands for the probability that the incoming samples
in the testing set cannot be confidently detector by the T detector (0 < Pc < 1), the
time complexity in the detection phase of Classical CSPRA is:
O((1 − Pm ) · NR · NX + Pc · NX ) ≡ O(((1 − Pm ) · NR + Pc ) · NX )
In our implementation of the detection, the information for the T detectors, APC
detector, and the testing samples are directly read from the corresponding files instead
of building several lists to store in the memory. The obvious advantage of such
implementation is to enable the system to handle large testing sample with less cost
of the memory space. Therefore, space complexity in the detection phase of Classical
CSPRA is constant and only small memory is needed to calculate the matching
distance and store the detection results.

The Complexity of Selective CSPRA
The difference between Classical CSPRA and Selective CSPRA is only in the detection phase. Therefore, we only need to discuss the complexity of the detection of
Selective CSPRA. In the Selective CSPRA, all samples in the testing set are needed
to check with both T detector and APC detector. It also needs some time to finally
determine the classification of the incoming sample by using the domain knowledge
and randomized method. Because the detecting results are recorded in previous steps
and the repeated detections are not necessary, the time complexity in this stage is
counted as O(c), where c is a constant variable. The detecting time complexity in
Selective CSPRA can be summarized as:
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O((1 − Pm ) · NR · NX + NX + c) ≈ O(((1 − Pm ) · NR + 1) · NX )
We implemented the Selective CSPRA in the way similar to the implementation
of Classical CSPRA. The slight difference is that a list is established to store the small
portion of the samples from the testing set that cannot be detected by T detector and
APC detector. These samples are finally determined with the randomized method
for their classifications. Let Pu (0 < Pu < 1) be the probability that the testing
samples are classified with the randomized method, space complexity of the detection
in Selective CSPRA is:
O(Pu · NX )
Although the Selective CSPRA shows better performance than the Classical CSPRA,
as we demonstrated in section 5.3, our analysis reveals that Selective CSPRA has
slightly higher complexity. Our analysis further clarifies that the complexity of either
Classical CSPRA or Selective CSPRA is not increased in comparison to the original
NSA.

5.4.3

Will CSPRA Perform Worse Than NSA

The influence of various Parameters on the performance of the CSPRA has been
investigated in section 4.4.4 in chapter 4. The experimental results show that the
performance of the CSPRA is very sensitive to the threshold parameters of both T
detector and APC detector while the other control parameters in the CSPRA could be
set to the default values at the beginning of the parameter tuning. Now, we want to
ask this question: is it guaranteed that the CSPRA performs no worse than the NSA
by tuning the control parameters? In other words, can we find the appropriate values
for the control parameters to enable the CSPRA to produce, at a minimum, the results
that the NSA is able to achieve? The similar question has been generally ignored by
the other researchers when various NSA variants were proposed. Although they were
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able to demonstrate that their proposed NSA variant outperforms the original NSA
in some specific applications they selected, it is still questionable whether the variant
performs worse than the original NSA in other applications. To answer the question
we raised, let’s first propose two theorems.
Notation
• xi : an arbitrary sample in the test set X.
• ti : an arbitrary T detector in the set of T detectors T .
• dist(xi , ti ): distance between xi and ti .
• xiepitope : the peptide of xi that the detection of T detector is based on.
• xiconserved : the peptide of xi where the conserved self pattern is located.
• rself : threshold for the detection of T detector.
• rsus : suspicious antigen threshold.
THEOREM 1. The Classical CSPRA is readily convertible to NSA.
Proof. In Classical CSPRA, the detection procedures for T detectors are the same
as those in the NSA. The conditions for the detection of APC detector are shown in
the following code fragment:
if(dist(xi , ti ) < rself )
if(xiepitope ! = xiconserved )
if(dist(xi , ti ) > rsus )
the detection of APC detector is triggered.
Suppose that the Classical CSPRA is not convertible into NSA, that is, the detection
of APC detector must happen in Classical CSPRA. To satisfy this assumption, the
condition dist(xi , ti ) > rsus must be always true. In other words, for a given real value
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(dist(xi , ti )), we could not find another real value rsus that is greater than dist(xi , ti ).
This contradicts with the fact that the real number could be infinite. Theorem 1 is
proven.
THEOREM 2. The Selective CSPRA is readily convertible into NSA.
Proof. The detection procedures for T detectors in Selective CSPRA are also the
same as those in the NSA. To prove Theorem 2, we only need to prove that there
exist the conditions under which the detection of APC detector is not occurred. As
described in section 4.2.3 in chapter 4, the result from the detection of APC detector
is discarded in the Selective CSPRA if and only if two conditions as follows are
fulfilled:
1. The testing sample is not in the ambiguous region when testing with T detector.
2. The testing sample is in the ambiguous region when testing with APC detector.
We can establish the two conditions by shrinking the ambiguous region of T detector
and expanding the ambiguous region of APC detector, as illustrated in Fig. 5.15. The
ambiguous region for T detector and APC detector is a ring-shaped region contained
between the two circles with the radius of (1 + α) × t (outer circle) and (1 − α) × t
(inner circle), where t and α represent the detection threshold and ambiguous coefficient, respectively. The ambiguous region for T detector can be removed when the α
for T detector is set to zero and thus the first condition is satisfied. If the α for APC
detector is set to 1, the radius of the inner circle becomes zero and thus the inner
circle is fully replaced by the self ambiguous region, whereas the radius of the outer
circle is doubled and thus non-self ambiguous region of APC detector is large enough
to meet the second condition in most practical applications. Theoretically, the α for
APC detector can be infinitely increased. Hence, theorem 2 holds.
Theorem 1 and theorem 2 could be verified in a series of experiments that have
been conducted with Indian Telugu data. The data was proceeded with same pro180

Figure 5.15 Changing ambiguous region to discard the results from APC
detection
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cedures as described in section 5.3.1 and the experiments were repeated 100 times
for each parameter setting. Fig. 5.16 shows that the performance of the Classical
CSPRA is much better than that of the NSA when suspicious antigen threshold is
set to 0.01. However, the ROC curve plotted from the experiments with Classical
CSPRA tends to the one plotted from the experiments with NSA when suspicious
antigen threshold is set to a higher value. Fig 5.17 indicates that the performance of
the Selective CSPRA is very promising compared to the original NSA when T ambiguous coefficient and APC ambiguous coefficient are set to 0.6 and 0.4, respectively.
The other ROC curves in Fig 5.17 are plotted from the experiments by decreasing T
ambiguous coefficient by 0.1 and increasing APC ambiguous coefficient by 0.1 in each
step. It is observed that these ROC curves related to Selective CSPRA are gradually
close to the one plotted from the experiment with NSA.
According to theorem 1 and theorem 2, we can conclude that the performance of
the CSPRA is never worse than that of the NSA because at a minimum, we can find
the appropriate values for the control parameters to enable the CSPRA to work like
NSA. This conclusion can not only be demonstrated by real applications but also be
theoretically proved.

5.4.4

Why CSPRA Performs Better than NSA

We have already addressed two important and unique features of the CSPRA. First,
the CSPRA is flexible to exploit the advantages of other NSA variants. Second, the
performance of the CSPRA is never worse than that of the NSA if the appropriate
parameter values, which can be readily found, are selected. In this section, we attempt
to explore the fundamental difference between the CSPRA and NSA and further
answer why the CSPRA performs better than the NSA. It is well known that the
NSA produces a high false positive error rate in the field of anomaly detection. It is
an inevitable limit of the NSA since the NSA assumes that all foreign patterns (non182
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Figure 5.16 ROC curves plotted from the results of Indian Telugu data show that the ROC curve of Classical CSPRA
tends to the ROC curve of NSA when suspicious antigen threshold is increasing
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Figure 5.17 ROC curves plotted from the results of Indian Telugu data show that the ROC curve of Selective CSPRA
tends to the ROC curve of NSA when increasing T ambiguous coefficient (T) and decreasing APC ambiguous coefficient
(A)

Table 5.8 Parameters setting for synthetic stripe data
Algorithm

t1

t2

t3

αt

αp

w

st

Sw

NSA

0.001

-

-

-

-

-

1000

1

-

-

-

1000

1

0.5 0.5 0.5 1000

1

Classical CSPRA

0.001 0.4 0.0005

Selective CSPRA

0.001 0.4

-

Table 5.9 The detection results from synthetic stripe data
Detection Rate

False Alarm Rate

Algorithm
t1 = 0.001

t1 = 0.002

t1 = 0.001

t1 = 0.002

NSA

77.55

58.49

45.93

24.30

Classical CSPRA

77.55

58.49

26.73

9.84

Selective CSPRA

86.71

75.78

27.70

14.22

self), relative to the early established “self”knowledge, are anomalies or intrusions.
This intrinsic limit of the NSA has been significantly alleviated in the CSPRA. The
simple idea - “nonself is an anomaly” - is not always true in the CSPRA. Instead,
these “nonself” discovered by the T detector is further guarded by the APC detector
in the CSPRA. Only those “nonself” samples that are very foreign to the self are
classified as anomalies.
Numerous experiments with real world data have been carried out to demonstrate
that the CSPRA outperforms the NSA, as reported in section 5.3. Now, we want to
design some experiments with 2-D synthetic stripe data [130] mainly to demonstrate
the difference between the CSPRA and the NSA. The experiments are conducted
with 500 “self” training data and 1500 testing data (823 “self” and ‘677 ‘nonself”).
As shown in Fig. 5.18, in the context of 2-D data, the entire searching space (universe
space) is a 2-D square [0, 1]2 and the training self points are distributed randomly
over the self space (the shaded region) of the stripe shape. The parameter settings
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for the experiments reported in this section are listed in Table 5.8. The purpose of
the experiment design in this section is to show what the issues of the NSA are and
how the CSPRA achieves the better results under the same experimental settings
instead of finding the best results for either CSPRA or NSA by tuning the control
parameters. Thus, the parameter values listed in Table 5.8 are not meant to produce
the better performance for the CSPRA or the NSA. To remove the impact of the
random-based generation of T detectors and make the comparison relatively fair, the
T detector set is only generated once for each self threshold(t1 ) and is then shared
by all three algorithms (NSA, Classical CSPRA and Selective CSPRA). The first
column in stripe data is viewed as the conserved self pattern based on the results
from our initial testing. The advantage of the 2-D data is to make it possible to plot
the result data and intuitively analyze the effect of the detection. The visual results
are depicted in Fig. 5.19 - Fig. 5.24, where the blue circles stand for true negatives
(TN) whereas gray circles are false negatives (FN). The self region in these figures are
also shaded. The red circles represent “anomalies” reported by the algorithm. If the
red circles are located inside the self region, then the false positives (FP) are counted;
otherwise, they represent true positives (TP). The results from Fig. 5.19 to Fig. 5.21
are obtained with the self threshold of 0.001. The red circles inside the self region in
Fig. 5.20 and Fig. 5.21 are obviously less than those in Fig. 5.19, which indicates that
the CSPRA has significantly reduced the false positives compared to the detection of
the NSA. On the other hand, the number of red circles outside the shaded region is
very similar in Fig. 5.19, Fig. 5.20 and Fig. 5.21. These observations are consistent
with the actual detection results reported in Table 5.9. The experimental results
with different self threshold (t1 = 0.002), as shown in Fig. 5.22 - Fig. 5.24, also
confirms that the CSPRA greatly alleviates the NSA’s intrinsic issues by lessening
false positives.
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Figure 5.18 Synthetic stripe data (the shaded region is self): (a) training
data; (b) testing data

5.5

Summary

As a computational imitation of the PRRs model, the anomalies in the CSPRA
are determined by combining the results from APCs self pattern recognition and T
cell negative selection. To resolve the conflicts for anomaly detection between the
two types of the detectors, two strategies, known as Classical CSPRA and Selective
CSPRA, were proposed. This chapter provides the flow charts to clarify differences
between the two detection strategies. Additionally, comparisons of the CSPRA to
other one-class classifiers show that our algorithm produces better performance. Our
work also suggests that non-uniform random number generators are unsuitable to
be used for detector generation in the NSA family. The properties, complexity and
features of the CSPRA are extensively studied in this chapter with additional experiments and theoretical analysis. This study concludes that it is flexible to import
the other NSA variants to the CSPRA as the strategy of T detector and thus the
advantages of other NSA variants can be inherited in the CSPRA. This study also
reveals that the performance of the CSPRA is never worse than that of the NSA
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Figure 5.19 Detecting results from NSA (FP = 378): self threshold 0.001
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Figure 5.20 Detecting results from Classical CSPRA (FP = 220): self
threshold 0.001
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Figure 5.21 Detecting results from Selective CSPRA (FP = 228): self
threshold 0.001
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Figure 5.22 Detecting results from NSA (FP = 200): self threshold 0.002
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Figure 5.23 Detecting results from Classical CSPRA (FP = 81): self threshold 0.002
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Figure 5.24 Detecting results from Selective CSPRA (FP = 117): self
threshold 0.002
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because we can always find the appropriate parameter values to enable the CSPRA
to at least work like NSA. This chapter argues that the CSPRA could alleviate some
issues in NSA because it applies a revised assumption - only those nonself samples
that are very foreign to the self are anomalies.
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Chapter 6
An Efficient and Effective
Network-based Intrusion Detection
Using Conserved Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm Augmented
with Near-deterministic Detector
Generation
The Human Immune System (HIS) employs multilevel defense against harmful and
unseen pathogens through innate and adaptive immunity. Innate immunity is inherent and protects the body from the known invaders whereas adaptive immunity
develops a memory of past encounter and has the ability to learn about previously
unknown pathogens. These salient features of the HIS are inspiring the researchers
in the area of intrusion detection to develop automated and adaptive defensive tools.
This chapter presents a new variant of Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm
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(CSPRA) called CSPRA-ID (CSPRA for Intrusion Detection). The CSPRA-ID is
given the capability of effectively identifying known intrusions by utilizing the knowledge of well-known attacks to build a conserved self pattern (APC detector) while
it retains the ability to detect novel intrusions because of the nature of one-class
classification of the T detectors. Furthermore, the T detectors in the CSPRA-ID
are generated with a novel near-deterministic scheme that is proposed in this chapter. The near-deterministic generation scheme places the detector with Brute Force
method to guarantee the next detector to be very foreign to the existing detector.
Moreover, the placement of the variable-sized detector is online determined during
the Monte Carlo estimate of detector coverage and thus the detectors with an optimal
distribution are generated without any additional optimization step. A comparative
study of the CSPRA-ID to one-class SVM shows that the CSPRA-ID is promising on
DARPA network intrusion data in terms of detection accuracy (measured by detection
rate and false alarm rate) and computation efficiency.

6.1

Introduction

While the network-based computer systems serve uncountable personal and professional needs for millions of people and corporations by connecting hundreds of millions
of computers across the world, they have become the target of intrusions and attacks
by our enemies and criminals. Computer Economics (www.computereconomics.com)
estimated that annual worldwide economic damages from Malware (viruses, spyware,
adware, botnets, and other malicious code) exceeded $13 billion. Various techniques
such as encryption and firewalls have been developed for preventing intrusions. Intrusion detection is another significant technique used to monitor malicious or unwanted
network and/or system activities. It can be broadly categorized into anomaly detection and misuse detection. Anomaly detection systems base its decision on the
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established normal usage profiles while misuse detection system use patterns of wellknown attacks or weak spots of the systems to match and identify known intrusions,
patterns or signatures. It is the widely-held brief that the nature of current and future
threats in conjunction with ever larger computer systems makes it more important
to develop an automated and adaptive detection system. Anomaly detection system
shows its unique advantages in detecting previously unseen intrusions or anomalies
because no information of intrusions or attack signatures is defined in the system.
The Human Immune System (HIS) can detect and defend against harmful and
unknown pathogens. It achieves this protection by the distributed, self-organized,
lightweight and multi-layered nature of the mechanisms. Artificial Immune System
(AIS) seeks to use observed immune components and processes as metaphors to produce systems that encapsulate these beneficial properties in the HIS. Among which,
both network-based models and self-nonself models are mostly explored in the AIS
field. The negative selection approach (along with other newer algorithms) has been
by far the most popular when building intrusion detection system [144]. However,
the traditional self-nonself model in the HIS has failed to explain many findings such
as alerted self, pregnancy, aging and so forth. The new theories such as costimulation
self-nonself model, pattern recognition receptors (PRRs) model, and danger model
have been proposed [175]. Recently, a Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm
(CSPRA) was developed with the abstraction of the PRRs model [261] and proved
that it produces promising performance in the field of anomaly detection [262, 263].
In a Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA), a collection of detectors is used to classify
the incoming sample as normal (self) or abnormal (nonself). Rather than presetting
the number of the detectors, several works were carried out attempting to use an estimate of detector coverage as a criterion to decide when the generation of detectors is
terminated [12,95,133]. These early works are briefly reviewed and the existing issues
are discussed in section 6.2 to provide the concise and indispensable background of
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our work that is to be presented in this chapter.
In this chapter, we develop a novel scheme of detector generation that is characterized by generating the detectors in a near-deterministic manner with the optimal
distribution without requiring additional step of the optimization. The section 6.3
first provides the detailed description of the algorithm and the fundamental idea behind the algorithm to facilitate the understanding and replication of our proposed
approach. The algorithm makes use of Quasi-Monte Carlo Integration to automatically generate very efficient variable-sized detector. Unlike the random-based generation in the early works, the placement of the next detector in our algorithm is
determined with the Brute Force method at the same time when the coverage is
estimated. Another important feature of the proposed algorithm is that self radius
(rself ), which is a usually defined control parameter in the NSA and its variations, is
removed to make the algorithm more operable and reliable. Section 6.3 also discusses
the rational and advantages of the removal of this control parameter. The strength
of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated in section 6.3 by comparing with a recent
NSA variation called V-detector [129, 133] in terms of fundamental ideas, estimate of
detector coverage, and detecting performance.
Despite the method of near-deterministic detector generation, another contribution of this chapter is an immunity-based efficient and effective intrusion detection
system, as described in section 6.4. This system is built upon our early proposal of
the CSPRA in which the anomaly is reported based on a group decision from both
APC detector and T detector. We call this work Intrusion Detection Conserved Self
Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA-ID) because it is specific for network-based
intrusion detection. There are two major differences between the proposed CSPRAID and the early version of the CSPRA [261]. First, the T detectors are generated
in a near-deterministic manner described in section 6.3.1, which can produce higher
detection rate with fewer detectors as indicated in the experimental results reported
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in section 6.3.2. Second, on the basis of the complexity analysis for the detection
by different detectors (APC detector or T detector), the incoming sample (network
connection record) is first checked against APC detector instead of T detector (like in
the first version of the CSPRA [261]) in the CSPRA-ID. This change seems trivial but
the effect is more subtle than it appears because the CSPRA-ID shows an impressive
performance in accurately detecting the intrusions while the time it responds to the
attacks has been dramatically reduced. To evaluate the performance of our algorithm
and make a relatively definitive conclusion, we tested the CSPRA-ID on the DARPA
network intrusion data [114] by using a large testing data set consisting of more than
4.4 million network connection records. The experimental results are compared with
these obtained by the one-class SVM (Support Vector Machine), which is consistently
considered as an effective method on the DARPA intrusion data [134,222]. The comparative study in section 6.4.3 confirms the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed
intrusion detection algorithm.

6.2
6.2.1

Related Works
Real-valued Negative Selection Algorithms

Since the binary representation was used in the first version of the NSA [77], it has
dominated the NSA research area due to its advantage of being easily analyzed by
enumerative combinatorics [15, 66]. However, Gonzalez et al. reported that binary
representation is unable to capture the structure of simple problem spaces and thus
prevents the extraction of meaningful domain knowledge [93]. Many applications
that are naturally real valued cannot be represented effectively in a binary form.
Applying real-valued representation to these problems makes it easier to extract highlevel knowledge from the training data and interpret the output from the algorithm.
Real-valued NSAs are relatively less explored in comparison to binary alternatives.
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[94] and [95] represent the earlier works related to real-valued NSA in the existing
literature. More recent work in real-valued NSAs is the development of V-detector
[132]. V-detector algorithm generates candidate detectors randomly, but it records the
Euclidean distance during the detector generation and assigns a variable radius based
on the minimum distance to each matured detector. In V-detector, each detector has
its own radius, which is basically decided by the closest self sample and used in the
detection phase. V-detector was extended in [129] through introducing the concept
of boundary-aware. The only difference between boundary-aware V-detector and the
earlier version of V-detector is that the assignment for the radius of each detector
that is going to be retained is changed. For the boundary-aware V-detector, the
detector’s radius to be decided is exactly the distance from the center of the detector
candidate to the nearest self point. An antigen feedback mechanism to generate
effective detectors was proposed in [165]. In addition to the randomly generated
detectors, the unmatched antigen is copied into the detector space called feedback
detector. Work in [12] used genetic algorithm to generate the detector set in realvalued NSA. Each chromosome represents a possible detector set where each gene
represents a pointer (index) to a certain n-dimension point (detector’s center) in a
sequence of samples with a probability distribution. The volume of the detector set
is used to evaluate the fitness of the solution coded in the chromosome.
Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA) [261] has been recently
developed, which takes it as inspiration a newer theory of self-nonself discrimination
known as the Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRRs) model [125]. In comparison
to the single type of detectors (T detectors) in real-valued NSA, this algorithm introduces an additional type of detector, known as APC detector, specific for the
detection of conserved self pattern in the problem spaces. The anomaly detection in
CSPRA considers the effectiveness of self pattern recognition by APC detector and
negative selection by T detector under different conditions, two detection strategies
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(Classical CSPRA and Selective CSPRA) were proposed [261–263] in order to wisely
select the detection results from two detectors. Section 6.4.2 will further explore the
detailed techniques specific for the intrusion detection problems we solved in this
chapter. While the early experiments and comparative study showed that CSPRA
produces promising performance in the field of anomaly detection, the efficiency and
effectiveness of the CSPRA have not been assessed with a larger and more complicated data set. This reason leads to the work in this chapter and a new idea of
generating detectors is derived to efficiently solve the target problem.

6.2.2

Estimate of Detector Coverage

Detector coverage is the ratio of covered nonself space by detectors to the entire nonself space. The number of detectors directly influences the detecting performance
in the field of anomaly detection. Fewer detectors generate a lower detection rate
in most cases. More detectors not only significantly raise the false alarm rate but
also greatly slow down the detecting process. Therefore, covering larger nonself space
with minimum detectors is the major goal that many researchers in this area attempt
to achieve. Estimate of detector coverage is expected to help determine the optimal
number of detectors for a problem domain to be solved. Some efforts for estimating
detector coverage in NSAs were reported [12, 61, 77, 95, 133, 225]. This section introduces the estimate methods of hypothesis testing and Monte Carlo integration that
we are going to further compare and explore.

Hypothesis Testing
Ji et al. introduced the method of hypothesis testing to estimate detector coverage in
a negative selection algorithm. This method involves the following major steps [133]:
1. State the null/alternative hypothesis.
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2. Determine the cost associated with the Type 1 error (rejecting the true null
hypothesis) and Type II error (accepting a false null hypothesis).
3. Collect the data and compute z score based on training samples
4. Reject or accept the null hypothesis.
When estimating detector coverage, the null hypothesis is defined as “The coverage
of the nonself region by all the existing detector is below percentage pmin ”. The
detector is continuously generated until the null hypothesis is rejected. If the null
hypothesis is mistakenly rejected, that is, the detector generation is terminated too
early with fewer than actual coverage, the system makes a Type I error. If there are
q
x
- np
. If the test statistic is in the critical
x points covered, for n samples, z = √npq
q
region (z > z α ), the null hypothesis is rejected and enough coverage is reached. This
method has been integrated to V-detector to estimate detector coverage [133].

Monte Carlo Integration
The Monte Carlo Integration methods are usually used for the approximate evaluation
of definite multidimensional integrals. To estimate the area of a domain D using
Monte Carlo Integration, the normal procedure includes the following steps:
1. Pick a simple domain d which satisfies two requirements: a) it contains domain
D; b) its area is known or easily calculated.
2. Pick a sequence of random points that fall within the domain d.
3. Calculate the fraction of those points in step 2 that falls within the domain D.
The area of domain D is then estimated as this fraction multiplied by the area
of domain d.
Mathematically, given a multidimensional definite integral of the form
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where and V is the integration volume. Suppose that N samples x1 , x2 , , xN are
picked, then the estimate for the integral is given by equation 6.1.
N

1X
I≈Q≡V
f (xi )
N i=1

(6.1)

According to the central limit theorem the variance of the above estimate can be
approximated by equation 6.2

var (Q) = V

2σ

2

(6.2)

N

By applying Monte Carlo Integration, we have to determine the smallest sample
size N that guarantees the estimate error no larger than . Fishman had given
a sufficient discussion for this fundamental question in his book [73]. To count for
randomness, a confidence level 1 - δ with 0 < δ < 1 is specified. By using Chebyshev’s
inequality, the worst-case sample size was derived by equation 6.3


1
nc (, δ) =
4δ2


(6.3)

Monte Carlo Integration method was used in several works in the researches on the
NSA. [225] discussed several properties of hyperspheres in the artificial immune system and summarized a simple algorithm to estimate the volume of overlapping hyperspheres based on the principle of Monte Carlo Integration. However, this work didn’t
put the proposed algorithm in practical use. Gonzalez et al. proposed a Randomized
Real-valued Negative Selection Algorithm based on Monte Carlo methods [95]. This
work generalized the inputted self set (a subset of the self set) by introducing a parameter r self and assumed that an element that is close enough (defined by r self ) to a
self sample is also a self. Monte Carlo Integration method is then used for estimating
the volume of the generalized self set. The volume of the non-self space (V non-self =
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1 - V self ) determines the number of the detectors that are necessary for detecting
anomalies. A potential problem for the proposed RRNS is that if the volume of the
self set is estimates as 100%, then the algorithm will be terminated without generating any detector. The possibility of the unexpected termination could be influenced
by the size and distribution of the training data and the uniform degree of the random
points. Based on the discussion in [225], the occurrence of this problem, in particular, is greatly increased when training with high-dimensioned data. [12] proposed a
scheme of detector generation based on Genetic Algorithm. The fitness of the solution
coded in the chromosome is evaluated by the volume of the detector set. However,
the answers for two important questions remain unknown in this paper, which make
this work unreplicable. First, the author established a rule (decoding function) for
detector placement, that is, the further detector placement will have a certain overlap
with the existing detectors and no overlap at all with the self set. Undeniably, it is
really an optimal detectors placement rule. However, how can we verify whether the
detector is overlapped by all others? Second, this paper stated “the closer the volume
of the detector set represented in the chromosome is to the value of V ns , the better
the solution”. V ns is the volume of non-self space and can be calculated as V ns = 1V s . Now, we are concerned about the volume of the self set V s because we cannot
evaluate the fitness of the chromosome if V s cannot be calculated. Regretfully, this
paper didn’t show a solution to calculate V s . These problems in the existing works
motivate us to further examine this method in AIS area.

6.3

A Novel Approach: Near-deterministic Detector Generation

Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) is modeled off the negative selection in the T -cell
maturation process that happens in the thymus and basically consists of two phases.
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First, the detector set is generated by eliminating those detectors that match any of
the self samples from a randomly generated candidate pool. Then, the new sample
is examined using the detector set. Each detector in the context of Real-valued NSA
is modeled as a hyperspheres having its own radius in addition to the location. The
earlier Real-valued NSA used constant-sized detectors [94,95]. To solve the scalability
limitation and well-known issues of “holes” when using the constant-sized detector
to cover non-self space, V-detectors [132] and Quadtree automatic detector generation [11] extended the detector representations to allow variable geometry. To date,
however, the deterministic generation mechanism for real-valued vector representation has not been reported yet. The overlapping of the detectors is totally out of
control using the existing random generation. Our efforts focus on finding the optimal location for the detector placement. The algorithm introduced in this section
demonstrates that the detector generation is no longer purely random-based and the
better performance can be achieved with fewer detectors.

6.3.1

Algorithm and Analysis

To take advantages of the recent NSA researches, our approach also generates hyperspheres-shaped and variable-sized detectors. However, the assignment of the radius
and center for each detector is our original contribution by sufficiently considering
the reliability and efficiency of the algorithm. The detector number in our algorithm
is controlled by the volume of the overlapping hyperspheres, which is estimated with
Monte Carlo Integration method. Before the estimated coverage reaches 100%, the
random points that don’t fall within any existing hyperspheres are considered as
potential candidates for the center of the next detector to be retained. To reuse these
“outside” random points at the same time when the coverage is being estimated,
which candidate should we select if there is more than one “outside” points? The
answer to this question is the one that is very foreign to the detectors that have been
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already included in the detect set. Fig. 6.1 can be used to explain how we find the
right candidate. The circles represent the retained detectors while the triangles stand
for the sampling random points in Fig. 6.1. These triangles denoted by the number
“1”, “2”, and “3” are the examples of the “outside” points. The distance between the
center of the detector and the random point will be computed during the estimate
to check if the random point falls within any existing hyperspheres. If the random
points are outside a hypersphere, the difference between the calculated distance and
the radius of the hypersphere can be easily derived during this process. We call it
foreign distance to distinguish with the matching distances we generally discussed.
The foreign distance to the nearest detector for each “outside” random point is kept in
record. When all observations (total random points to be used for volume estimate)
are checked with the detector set, the candidate (one of “outside” point) with the
largest foreign distance is considered very foreign to the existing detectors and is
finally selected for the next detector. The idea for determining very foreign candidate
is in fact partially borrowed from Brute Force Algorithm. As illustrated in Fig. 6.1,
random point a has the nearest foreign distance to detector A. Similarly, point b is
the nearest to the detector B and point c is nearest to the detector C. The random
point b has the longest foreign distance and thus is picked up for the location of next
detector placement, that is, the placement of the detectors in our approach relies on
the feedback from the estimate with Monte Carlo Integration method. To accurately
understand our approach, we would like to emphasize the difference between foreign
distance and matching distance. As seen in Fig. 6.1, the random point a has the
shortest matching distance to the detector B instead of detector A. However, our
algorithm record the foreign distance between the random point a and detector A
because it is the shortest foreign distance for random point a.
The pseudo-code listed in Fig. 6.2 gives more details about the coverage estimate
and the strategy of detector candidate selection we described above. Line 3 shows that
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Figure 6.1 Interpretation of Monte Carlo Integration estimate and detector
candidate feedback
the sample size of the estimate is controlled by estimate error () and the confidence
level (δ). For all experiments conducted in this work, both parameters ( and δ) are
fixed to 0.05 and 0.95, respectively. The larger samples are required to minimize the
estimate error and increase the confidence of the estimate. In this work, the random
points (line 6) are generated by using more uniformly distributed deterministic quasirandom sequences because our previous experiments showed that quasi-random has
the potential to improve the performance of a negative selection algorithm [263]. The
loop between line 9 and line 17 shows how to calculate the nearest foreign distance
for a random sample while evaluating this sample with the existing detectors. Line
18 through line 21 updates the location that will be used to place the next detector
by referring to the best foreign distance. Finally, line 23 returns the total estimated
volume of the existing detector and the location feedback for next detector placement.
One of the major contributions in this chapter is the development of a new detector generation scheme, which is outlined in Fig. 6.3. The most important control
parameter is the target coverage (c), which is used to control the detector number for
this algorithm. Although two parameters (maximum/minimum number of detectors)
are proposed to prevent premature termination or infinite loop of the algorithm, they
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Figure 6.2 Algorithm: Monte Carlo Integration (MCI) based coverage estimate with feedback for next detector center
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are actually ignored in most applications by setting tmax to a larger number and tmin
to zero. The most important differences lie in line 14 through line 19. Rather than
being randomly assigned in most existing techniques, the location of the detector
placement is adopted from the feedback of Monte Carlo Integration method (line 19)
unless the estimate is failed by returning the coverage of 100% before the minimum
number of detectors is generated (line 12 and 13). When applying this algorithm, line
12 and 13 should be seldom executed in most applications. Because the candidate
based on the feedback from the coverage estimate is very foreign to the existing detectors, this placement strategy has the potential to alleviate the overlapping between
the detectors in the detector set. Another feature of the algorithm is that it does
not explicitly use the principle of negative selection. Once the center of the detector
is determined, the detector is assigned a variable radius equivalent to the distance
between the detector and its closest self sample (line 3 through line 8, line 14). The
direct benefit of this feature is the enhancement of the operability and reliability of
the algorithm by removing the control parameter r self (self radius) that is generally
defined but very difficult to be adjusted in basic NSA and its variations. Next section
we will report our experiments to further explain why this parameter could be removed and show that the removal of this parameter does not change the performance
of the algorithm. The algorithm normally converges under two conditions. First, the
convergence of the algorithm is occurred when the minimum number of detectors is
generated and the target coverage (c) is reached (line 17). Second, the algorithm is
converged when the limit of the detector number is reached in line 20. Informally, to
generate the detector set (D) for the collected subset (S) of the self set, the major
steps of the proposed detector generation scheme can be simplified as follows:
1. Pick a random point as the center of the first detector.
2. Assign a variable radius to the first detector. The radius is the distance from
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the center of the detector to the closest self sample.
3. Estimate the volume of the detector with Monte Carlo Integration method and
pick a sample point that does not fall within the detector and is very foreign to
the detector.
4. Generate the next detector by using the point returned from step 3 as the center
of the detector and assign it a radius like step 2.
5. Continue generate the remaining detectors by repeating step 3 and step 4.
6. The detector generation is terminated when the target coverage is reached. The
termination is also controlled by the preset limit (minimum and maximum) of
the detector number.

6.3.2

Comparison With Random-based Method

V-detector is one of the latest variations in the NSA family and has been proven that it
outperforms the original NSA [131,132]. The authors of V-detector pointed out that a
later “boundary-aware” version of V-detector with the estimate of hypothesis testing
solved the weakness of the termination condition in the earlier version of V-detector
to a large extent and would detect an anomaly more aggressively [134]. Our proposal
is developed on the basis of sufficient investigation of boundary-aware V-detector
and the estimate of hypothesis testing. It inherits the useful features of V-detector
but possesses its unique ideas. Table 6.1 summarized the most important differences
between NSA, V-detector and our proposed method. This section presents some
experimental results to illustrate these differences and demonstrate the properties
and advantages of the proposed method. The reported results are the average of
100 repeated runs for each parameter setting. The experiments with V-detector were
conducted by using the better version of V-detector: boundary-aware and hypothesis
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Figure 6.3 Near-deterministic detector generation algorithm
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testing cobundle [130]. As instructed by [131], the control parameter of self radius
(r self ) in V-detector is set to the typical value of 0.1.
Influence of Different Estimate Methods on the Detector Number
The experiments were carried out with the famous benchmark Fisher’s Iris data [72]
and a biomedical dataset [2] to investigate the properties and differences of two estimate methods: Monte Carlo Integration and hypothesis testing. The same methods
as in [261, 262] were used for data preprocessing and performance measuring. It is
worth noting that the number of detectors required in the proposed method to provide
near full coverage of the nonself is much smaller than the one that would be needed by
V-detector with the estimate of hypothesis testing. Table 6.2 shows that hypothesis
testing makes an unusual leap in the number of detectors from 51 to 50001 when
the parameter of target coverage is increased from 90% to near 100%. The results
in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5 show that the number of the detectors that is estimated by
Monte Carlo Integration increases as the control parameter of target coverage is set
to a larger value. These results coincide with the intuition that more detectors could
cover the larger proportion of the nonself space. The upside-down bell-like curve in
Fig. 6.6 reflects the fact that the estimate of hypothesis testing borrows the idea of
central limit theorem. Central limit theorem justifies that the distribution of can be
approximate to normal distribution when n is sufficiently large. The intrinsic limit of
hypothesis testing is inherited from two apparent sources of error in approximating
the binomial distribution to the normal distribution. As discussed in [133], the binomial distribution is discrete and asymmetric (it is symmetric only if the probability
of one outcome is 0.5) while the normal distribution is continuous and always symmetric. Fig. 6.6 indicates that it is impossible for hypothesis testing to estimate fewer
detectors by reducing the value of target coverage below 50%. [133] claimed that it is
very likely that a large value of target coverage, for example, 90% or 99%, is needed.
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Table 6.1 Major differences between NSA, V-detector and Near-deterministic-detector

However, our experiments with V-detector found that the best results for both Iris
data and Biomedical data were obtained with the least number of the detectors when
the value for self radius is fixed to 0.1 and the target coverage is changed to 50%.
With these parameter settings, the detection rate and false alarm rate for Iris data
are 99.93% and 15.24%, respectively. For Biomedical data, the corresponding results
are 62.89% and 12.25%. When we increase the value for the control parameter of
target coverage, the more detectors are generated, as shown in Fig. 6.6 and Table 6.2.
Accordingly, the false alarm rate apparently raises but the detection rate changes
very slightly. Based on such observations, we are wondering whether the detecting
performance could be improved if fewer detectors are used. Unfortunately, there is no
way to do such a testing with hypothesis testing since the minimum number of detectors has been reached when target coverage is set to 50%. Last but not the least, it
is also worth mentioning that the estimate of hypothesis testing is not so sensitive to
different applications, which are not meant to all applications but at least for Iris data
and Biomedical data we tested. The results in Fig. 6.6 and Table 6.2 indicate that if
the same value for the target coverage is set, the exactly same number of detectors
is estimated by hypothesis testing for Iris data and Biomedical data, although they
are totally two different data sets. This result may be caused by somewhat similarity
between Iris data and Biomedical data but the real reason remains unknown. On the
other hand, the estimate of Monte Carlo Integration produces the different detector
number for Iris data and Biomedical data. Fig. 6.5 demonstrates that such difference
is enlarged when the value for target coverage is beyond 95%.

Discussions on Control Parameters
The scheme of near-deterministic detector generation proposed in this chapter does
not follow the routine procedures that are used for the development of the algorithms
based on negative selection. It first decides the center of the detector and then
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Figure 6.4 The influence of different target detector coverage on the estimate of the number of detectors using Monte Carlo integration based neardeterministic detector generation
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Figure 6.5 The enlargement of the part of figure 1 showing the difference
of the number of detectors generated for biomedical data and iris data
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Figure 6.6 The influence of different target detector coverage on the estimate
of the number of detectors using hypothesis testing based boundary-aware
V-detector
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Table 6.2 Summary of the number of detectors from 100 repeated runs
Average number of
Estimate method

Nonself coverage
detectors
Iris data

Biomedical
data

80.00%

3.17

3.25

85.00%

3.23

3.56

90.00%

3.71

4.28

95.00%

4.75

5.42

99.00%

8.35

10.65

99.50%

11.83

17.06

99.99%

39.20

56.46

80.00%

26

26

85.00%

34

34

90.00%

51

51

95.00%

100

100

99.00%

500

500

99.50%

1000

1000

99.99%

50001

50001

MCI feedback

Hypothesis testing
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assigns the radius of the detector the distance between the detector and its closest
self sample. In fact, the rule for the assignment of the radius of the detector in our
method implicitly complies with the principle of negative selection and automatically
excludes all possible self matchings for the retained detectors. The detection phase
of the proposed algorithm is similar to basic NSA but each detector has its own
matching threshold (the detector’s radius). Self radius (rself ) is a control parameter
usually defined in the NSA to prevent the generation of self-matching detectors. If the
distance between a detector candidate and any self sample is less than the self radius
(r self ), then such candidate will be eliminated. The training data is considered as a
collection instead of individual points and only a group of points instead of individual
self points can claim a region to be the self region in boundary-aware V-detector [129].
To implement this idea, the distance from the center of the detector candidate to the
nearest self point is directly assigned with the detector’s radius. These ideas are
adopted in the scheme of near-deterministic detector generation. Although the self
radius (r self ) is still kept in boundary-aware V-detector, our experiments observed
that this parameter is almost useless to control the algorithm’s performance. Fig. 6.7
depicts the comparison of the ROC curves plotted from the experiments with Iris
data and Biomedical data. These experiments were done with various values of self
radius but Fig. 6.7 only display the results obtained with two typical values of self
radius (r self ): 0.0 and 0.1. If r self = 0, the detection rate is always zero in basic
NSA. The values of 0.1 for self radius (r self ) was recommended and very often used
to obtain better results in V-detector [129, 131, 132]. The results in Fig. 6.7 and
unreported experiments with other values of self radius showed that the algorithm’s
performance is extremely similar while the self radius is changed over a wide range
of values between 0 and 1. Let us think about the reasons behind these results. The
concrete role of the self radius (r self ) in boundary-aware V-detector is to prevent the
generation of the detectors having the radius of less than r self . The same effectiveness
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could be automatically obtained because the center of the detector in V-detector is
always randomly sampled. That is, even if the r self is not defined, the algorithm may
generate many random detector candidates so that the distance (d ) between these
random candidates and their own nearest self points is longer enough to satisfy the
condition of negation selection (d > rself ). Besides, the exclusion of the detectors with
smaller radii (rself ) has the potential side-effect because smaller detectors are capable
of covering the “holes” in the non-self space. Through experimental observations and
analysis of the results, the control parameter self radius (r self ) has been removed in
the scheme of near-deterministic detector generation. This decision brings out at least
three apparent advantages:
1. It makes the algorithm more operable and reliable because providing an optimal
value for the self radius (r self ) may not be very intuitive.
2. It makes the generation of detectors more efficient. Once the detector’s center
has been determined based on the feedback of the estimate with Monte Carlo
Integration, the proposed scheme certainly includes this detector to the detector
set. However, in the NSA and other variations such as V-detector, if a valid
detector is not generated within a loop, an additional loop must be added to
repeat the previous steps.
3. It makes the algorithm more effective by retaining smaller detectors to better
cover the nonself space.

Comparison of the Performance of the Algorithms
In the experiments with Iris data and Biomedical data, we have observed that the
proposed algorithm with near-deterministic detector generation can produce better
performance with fewer detectors. For example, the best results generated by Vdetector when testing with Iris data are for the detection rate of 99.93% and the false
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Figure 6.7 ROC curves plotted by changing the value of the target coverage
show that the performance of the V-detector is very similar with r self = 0.0
and r self = 0.1 (The top curves are plotted from Iris data while the curves
below are for Biomedical data).
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alarm rate of 15.24%. Compare to 10 detectors used in V-detector, our proposed
algorithm can produce the same performance with average of 5.66 detectors in 100
repeated runs. The time series of Ball Bearing [130] were used to demonstrate the
performance of boundary-aware V-detector when the algorithm was first published
[129]. In line with the previous work, the Ball Bearing Data are selected to do
comparative study between boundary-aware V-detector and the algorithm proposed
in this chapter. Since the value for the control parameter of target coverage used
in [129] remains unknown, we are unable to use V-detector to replicate the reported
results. However, our experimental results that are listed in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4
are apparently better than the reported results. The interesting reader can reproduce
our results when the threshold value of target coverage is set as 0.99. The other
parameters are set by default ( = 0.05, δ = 0.95, tmax = 1000, tmin = 0). T
window size is same as the length of each antigen. That is, the partial matching
is not used for the purpose of comparison. Furthermore, these promising results of
the proposed method, as shown in Table 3 and Table 4, are generated with 2.53
detectors and 4.77 detectors (average number of the 100 repeated runs), respectively.
All new bearings were used as normal cases in the training phase in [129]. Therefore,
the reported detection rate for new bearings (0.06% for Discrete Fourier Transform
and 0.15% for Statistical Moments) indicates that boundary-aware V-detector could
sometimes detect the self samples by mistake even if these self samples are known in
the training phase. Such detecting faults are not occurred in our proposed method.

6.4

Detecting Network Intrusion with Conserved
Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA)

This section will integrate the proposed scheme of near-deterministic detector generation to our earlier work - Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA)
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Table 6.3 Comparison of detected percentage using ball bearing data preprocessed by Discrete Fourier Transform
Near-deterministic detector generation
Ball bearings

Samples V-detector [129]
Max

Min

Mean

SD

New

2739

0.06%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00

Broken race

2241

98.37%

100%

96.79% 99.42%

0.50

Broken cage

2988

53.03%

88.92% 37.48% 63.92%

11.69

Damaged cage

2988

26.7%

57.46% 16.67% 33.96%

8.67

Badly worn

2988

22.42%

52.81% 12.15% 27.62%

8.46

Table 6.4 Comparison of detected percentage using ball bearing data preprocessed by statistical moments
Near-deterministic detector generation
Ball bearings

Samples V-detector [129]
Max

Min

Mean

SD

0.00%

New

2651

0.15%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00

Broken race

2169

93.4%

94.70% 90.78% 93.68%

0.78

Broken cage

2892

6.37%

14.25%

1.38%

7.79%

3.71

Damaged cage

2892

2.12%

5.84%

0.21%

2.59%

1.48

Badly worn

2892

1.49%

4.81%

0.00%

1.97%

1.37
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[261] and show that our algorithm has succeeded on the application of network intrusion detection.

6.4.1

Properties and Preprocessing of DARPA Network Intrusion Data

The 1998 DARPA (U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) network intrusion detection data [114], which was prepared and managed by MIT Lincoln Labs
for 1999 KDD intrusion detection contest, are used in our experiments. There are
about five million connection records from seven weeks of network traffic, where each
connection represents exactly one specific attack type and is labeled as either normal,
or as an attack. The description, attack type and distribution of each normal or
attack category in this data set are summarized in Table 6.5.
There are in total 41 features, suggested by domain experts, in the data set, 9
of which are, in fact, discrete. Prior to data preprocessing, the data range or the
number of symbols for each feature was computed, as shown in Table 6.6. Feature
20 (num outbound cmds) was removed because this feature presents zero for all connection records. The preprocessing linearly scaled all 31 continuous features to the
range [0.0, 1.0]. Features 5 (src bytes) and 6 (dst bytes) spanned over a very large
integer value. Thus, the logarithmic scaling (with base 10) was first applied before
these two features were linearly scaled. The early works like [14], the 9 discrete fields
in the data set were converted to a natural number arbitrarily and then normalized it
to the range [0.0, 1.0]. Such conversion, in fact, added some “geometrical properties”
that may not be in the original data. [134] also discussed the essential flaws of such
conversion but on solution was proposed when they carried out the experiments with
KDD Cup 1999 data. As I will explain in next section, these problems were avoided
in our experiments because our proposed model is flexible enough to directly use the
interesting discrete field(s) without any conversion.
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Table 6.5 Summary of DARPA network intrusion data
Category

Description

Specific attack types

Records

Normal

Good normal connections

normal

972,781
(19.86%)

DoS

Probing

R2L

Denial-of-Service

Surveillance

and

other

back, land, neptune, pod,

3,883,370

smurf, teardrop

(79.28%)

ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, 41,102

probing

satan,

(0.84%)

Unauthorized access from a

ftp write,

remote machine

imap, multihop, phf, spy,

guess passwd, 1,126
(0.023%)

warezlient, warezmaster
U2R

Unauthorized access to lo-

buffer-overflow,

cal superuser (root) privi- ule, perl, rootkit,
leges
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loadmod-

52
(0.0011%)

Table 6.6 Properties of 41 features in DARPA network intrusion data
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Feature Name
duration
protocol type
service
flag
src bytes
dst bytes
land
wrong fragment
urgent
hot
num failed logins
logged in
num compromised
root shell
su attempted
num root
num file creations
num shells
num access files
num outbound cmds
is host login
is guest login
count
srv count
serror rate
srv serror rate
rerror rate
srv rerror rate
same srv rate
diff srv rate
srv diff host rate
dst host count
dst host srv count
dst host same srv rate
dst host diff srv rate
dst host same src port rate
dst host srv diff host rate
dst host serror rate
dst host srv serror rate
dst host rerror rate
dst host srv rerror rate

Data Type
continuous
symbolic
symbolic
symbolic
continuous
continuous
symbolic
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
symbolic
continuous
symbolic
symbolic
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
symbolic
symbolic
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
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Data Range
0 - 58,329
3 symbols
70 symbols
11 symbols
0 - 1,379,963,888
0 - 1,309,937,401
0 or 1
0-3
0 - 14
0 - 77
0-5
0 or 1
0 - 7,479
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 - 7,468
0 - 43
0-2
0-9
0-0
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 - 511
0 - 511
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0 - 255
0 - 255
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1

Conserved Feature
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-

6.4.2

Proposed Detection Method

To make our conclusions more definitive, our experiments used a large amount of highdimensional data (around 5 million records) to evaluate the performance of the novel
approach of intrusion detection we proposed in this chapter. A fast intrusion detection
system cannot only satisfy our experimental needs but also ingratiate the challenging goal of promptly and accurately responding to the network intrusions or attacks.
This section will describe an effective and efficient detection method, which employs
Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm (CSPRA) with near-deterministic detector generation to successfully detector attacks in the DARPA intrusion data. Since
the CSPRA has been modified to be compatible with network intrusion detection in
this chapter, we call the modified CSPRA as CSPRA-ID (Conserved Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm for Intrusion Detection).

Detection with T detectors
In early versions of the CSPRA [261, 262], the generation and detection of T detectors inherited the main characteristics of basic NSA. In this work, the detecting
performance of T detectors is improved by replacing the traditional random-based
constant-sized detector with the novel scheme of near-deterministic variable-sized detector generation that has been integrated with the more reliable coverage estimate
of Carlo Monte Integration. We have described and discussed the near-deterministic
detector generation and the corresponding techniques of anomaly detection in section 6.3. All continuous features except feature 20, in total 31 features, of each
connection record in the DARPA network intrusion data are used for the training
and detecting of the T detectors in the CSPRA. To detect the anomaly within a
shorter computational time, no partial matching is applied by setting the length of
the T detector to 31.
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Detection with Conserved Self Pattern
By applying the CSPRA-ID, the definition of the conserved self pattern plays a vital role on the algorithm’s performance. In this work, the conserve self pattern in
the DARPA network intrusion detection data set is decided based on the earlier researches on the dimensionality reduction of this data set. Ng et al. introduced a
feature importance ranking methodology using a stochastic radial basis function neural network sensitivity measure [188]. Their work showed that 33 out of 41 features in
the DARPA intrusion data can be removed without significantly boosting false positives. Corresponding to Table 6.6, the 8 most significant sensitive features concluded
in [188] are features 2, 23, 24, 29, 32, 33, 34, and 36. Mukkamala et al. also performed
feature ranking of the DARPA intrusion data by using a brute force method. Their
selected features are features 1, 5, 23, 24, 25, 26, 32, 36 38, and 39 [182]. Based on
these results reported in the literature and our preliminary experiments, features 3,
23, 24, 25, 26, 32, and 36 are selected to form the conserved self pattern, as denoted
in Table 6.6. In the CSPRA, the conserved self pattern is used to generate the APC
detector, which is represented as follows:
{str list, hl23 , min, max, meani , hl24 , min, max, meani , · · · }
where str list is a list of non-duplicated services collected from feature 3 in the training
data set. l 23 , l 24 , , are the indices of the columns that constitute the conserved self
pattern. During the training phase, the maximum, minimum and mean of all of the
normalized values in the corresponding features indicated by l 23 , l 24 , are calculated
and recorded in the APC detector. As noted, the representation of APC detector
specific for DARPA intrusion data is slightly deviated from our previous description
[261] by adding an additional str list. This modification takes the advantages of the
flexible APC detector to effectively classify the attacks by making use of the symbolic
features in the DARPA intrusion data, which will be further explored in next section.
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Intrusion Detection Algorithm
A new detection strategy associated with Conserved Self Pattern Recognition Algorithm is proposed to make the intrusion detection more efficient. To highlight the
efficiency of the proposed detection strategy, let us first discuss the complexity of
the detecting process by using APC detector and T detector, respectively. When the
new sample is checked with APC detector, the distance function (equation 3.1) is
used to report the attacks. It is very straightforward that the computation of the
detection by APC detector has linear complexity to the number of the testing set size.
Mathematically, the total complexity of the detection by APC detector is denoted as
O(N X ), where N X is the size of a set of the testing samples X. The new sample is
classified by T detector as an intrusion or attack if it matches any of the detectors
in the T detector repertoire. If the possibility that a testing sample and detector
match according to the specified matching rule is P m (0 < P m < 1) and the detector
repertoire size is N R , the total complexity of detecting a set of testing samples X
with T detector is O((1-P m )·NR · NX ). The complexity of the detection by T detector
can be as high as O(NR · NX ) in the worst case, when the matching possibility P m is
close to zero. Obviously, the complexity analysis reveals that the detection of APC
detector is more efficient. By taking into account the advantages of APC detector,
the key difference between the detection strategy we used in this work and the earlier
version of the CSPRA is that the new sample is checked against the APC detector
instead of the T detector in the first place. To clarify this difference, a flow diagram of the proposed detection strategy is presented in Fig. 6.8. The distance (dist)
between the new sample and APC detector is calculated by only considering the continuous features 23, 24, 25, 26, 32, and 36 in the conserved self pattern. The Pattern
Recognition Receptors (PRRs) model suggested that the immune system evolved to
discriminate infectious nonself from noninfectious self [126]. By taking this principle
as inspiration, our system responds to the detecting results of APC detector in three
229

ways that are controlled by feature 3 in the conserved self pattern and two inputted
parameters: noninfectious self threshold (Ts ) and infectious nonself threshold (Tns ).
Noninfectious self threshold (T s ) is often set to more stringent value, that is, if the
new sample is very close to the APC detector, it will be directly classified as self
(normal network). Let us follow the flowchart in Fig. 6.8, if dist > T s , the algorithm
will check if the “Service” feature (feature 3) of the new sample matches any item
in the list of “Service” that is stored in the APC detector in the training phase. If
no such matching is found, then the new sample is classified as an attack. On the
contrary to noninfectious self threshold, the infectious nonself threshold (T ns ) is set
to a bigger value, if dist > T ns , that is, the new sample is very distant to the conserved self pattern, it will be detected as nonself (an intrusion or attack). If the new
sample remains undecided in the above steps, it is finally checked against the set of T
detectors using the proposed method we described in section 6.3. It is not difficult to
see that the efficiency of this detection algorithm mainly depends on the percentage
of the samples that are detected by APC detector and the accuracy of such detection,
which could be improved by wisely determining the conserved self pattern and tuning
the control parameters (noninfectious self threshold and infectious nonself threshold).

6.4.3

Experimental Results and Comparative Study

The strength of the CSPRA-ID is demonstrated by its application to DARPA network
intrusion data [114]. In our experiments, we take 50% of the normal connection
records (486,390 samples) to train the system. The remaining 50% normal data
and all abnormal data (the connection records labeled as attacks) contribute to the
testing data. Despite the large testing data (4,412,041 samples) that are used in
our experiments, the fundamental difference between our experiment design and that
earlier works is that there is no intersection of the normal data that are used in the
training data set and the testing data set for our experiment, while for the experiments
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Figure 6.8 Flowchart of the intrusion detection algorithm
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Table 6.7 Experimental settings for DARPA network intrusion data
Parameter

Value

Total number of training samples

486,390

Total number of testing samples

4,412,041

Target coverage (c)

0.99

Estimate error ()

0.05

Confidence level (δ)

0.95

maximum number of T detectors (tmax )

300

minimum number of T detectors (tmin )

100

APC detector self threshold (Ts )

0.7

APC detector non-self threshold (Tns )

1.5

reported in [134, 222], all normal data in the testing data set are those already used
to train the system. Such experimental practices as those in [134, 222] could overfit
the system and produce deceptive results, i.e., the false alarm rate is misleadingly 0.
To facilitate the other researchers to reproduce our experimental results reported in
this chapter, the parameter settings we used for DARPA intrusion data are listed in
Table 6.7.
Stibor et al. claimed that statistical technique such as one-class SVM (Support Vector Machine) has very competitive performance on network intrusion detection problems in comparison to real-valued NSA with variable-sized detectors (Vdetector) [222]. Several applicability issues in [134] were discussed by the authors
of V-detector while they agreed that SVM did very well on DARPA intrusion data
by their own experiments [134]. [134] also showed that an improved version of Vdetector - hypothesis testing integrated boundary-aware V-detector can obtain satisfactory detection on DARPA data in comparison to the unacceptably poor results
generated by point-wise V-detector. However, the results reported in [134] are not
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good enough to change the conclusion that the SVM outperforms V-detector. In
addition to the common characteristics of one-class classification algorithms between
SVM and CSPRA-ID, these early works convince us that it is more persuasive to
evaluate the performance of the CSPRA-ID by comparison of one-class SVM. Since
the promising results were produced by one-class SVM in [222], the same data preprocessing methods and experimental parameters were adopted in our experiments
with one-class SVM. As outlined in [222], our experiments with one-class SVM were
performed with ν = 0.005, ν = 0.01 and ν = 0.05.
Because the first detector is still randomly initialized in the near-deterministic
detector generation scheme that is imported to the CSPRA-ID, we repeated the
experiments 100 times for each parameter setting. The results reported in Table 6.8
are the summary of the 100 repeated runs. Table 6.8 showed that CSPRA-ID yields far
lower false alarm rate with the comparable detection rate compared to the detecting
results obtained from one-class SVM. Table 6.9 listed some examples of the best
results among 100 repeated runs with CSPRA-ID, one can see that with the minimum
false alarm rate of 0.47%, CSPRA-ID can still yield high detection rate of 99.47%,
as we know that the detection rate is apparently lowered if we need to control the
false alarm rate to the lower extent. Furthermore, although CSPRA-ID has a random
behavior as mentioned above, these best results can be retained and repeated if we
save the set of the T detectors during the training phase. We also kept the detecting
time in record during the detection phase for both CSPRA-ID and one-class SVM, as
shown in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9, the CSPRA-ID can detect the intrusions or attacks
very efficiently.
When considering the efficiency of the CSPRA-ID, one may raise this question:
can we completely abandon the detection of T detectors in the CSPRA-ID since such
detection is computationally relatively expensive? This question was investigated by
the experiment with modified CSPRA-ID, where only APC detector is used and the
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boundary dilemma between self and nonself is controlled by the parameter noninfectious self threshold (Tns ). When Tns is set to 0.7, the testing sample is classified as
normal network if the distance between APC detector and the sample is greater than
0.7 and vice versa. By applying to the same training and testing data as described
above, this experiment yielded the detection rate of 99.87% and the false alarm rate
of 22.62%. Obviously, the false alarm rate is dramatically increased if T detectors are
ignored in the CSPRA-ID. With the parameter settings listed in Table 6.7, there is in
fact only 7.38% of the testing samples are detected by T detectors while most testing
samples (92.62%) are already detected by APC detectors with no need of further
detection of the T detectors. Moreover, although not mandatory, the knowledge of
well-known attacks can help to construct the appropriate conserved self pattern in
the CSPRA-ID to obtain the best performance in identifying known intrusions. But,
the CSPRA-ID retains the ability to detect novel intrusions because of the presence
of the T detectors. Thus, the robust and reliability of the CSPRA-ID are maintained
by both APC detector and T detectors, neither of which are dispensable.

6.5

Summary

This chapter proposed a variation of the real-valued negative selection algorithm
with a near-deterministic detector generation scheme. It inherits the advantages of
variable-sized detectors but the placement of the detectors is no longer random-based.
The detector coverage is estimated with Monte Carlo Integration method each time
a detector is generated. During the estimate of the coverage, the center of the next
detector to be retained is determined simultaneously using Brute Force method. The
major advantages of the proposed near-deterministic detector generation scheme, as
evidenced by a series of experiments carried out in this work, can be highlighted as
follows:
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Min

99.86
99.91

SVMν=0.01

SVMν=0.05

95.84

Mean

99.83

99.58 94.32

Max

Detection rate

SVMν=0.005

CSPRA-ID

Algorithm
Max

Min
0.82

Mean

20.29

13.29

10.33

2.12 10.20 0.47

SD

SD

Max

Min

Mean

Detecting time
SD

24506

4995

2325

1.10 3079 1865 2859.28 297.61

False alarm rate

Table 6.8 Comparative detection performance of CSPRA-ID and One-class SVM

Table 6.9 Examples of best results among 100 repeated runs for network
intrusion detection with CSPRA-ID
Run #

Detection rate False alarm rate

Detecting time (sec.)

20

99.56%

0.48%

2020

57

99.47%

0.47%

2860

68

99.58%

1.05%

2262

• The detector is placed in a highly correlated manner to generate the detector
set with an optimal distribution. Consequently, fewer detectors are required to
cover near full nonself space, which leads to less time and space complexities
for the detector generation and anomaly detection.
• The center of the next detector is online determined by reusing the samples
generated for the coverage estimate during the detector generation. Unlike the
early work [95], no additional optimization step is needed but the placement rule
that the next detector is very foreign to the existing detectors shall alleviate
the overlapping of the detectors to a certain degree.
• Removing the constraint self radius (r self ) in fact allows the algorithm to keep
smaller detectors to better cover the holes in the nonself space. Another benefit
of this decision is to make the algorithm more operable and reliable because an
optimal value for this parameter is usually difficult to be found.
• In comparison to the hypothesis testing [133], the proposed coverage estimate
based on Monte Carlo Integration provides a more reasonable and tunable direction to the number of the detectors that is adequate to produce better performance. It is also more sensitive to the different applications.
Although the proposed NSA variation can be applied as a standalone unit to the
intrusion detection problem, it is relatively computationally expensive in proportion
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to the number of detectors used in the detection phase. In this chapter, the proposed
near-deterministic detector generation scheme is integrated to Conserved Self Pattern
Recognition Algorithm and an intrusion detection algorithm called CSPRA-ID is
developed. The CSPRA-ID can detect the attacks within anomaly detection context.
The robust and reliability of the CSPRA-ID are maintained by both APC detector
and T detector, where if available, the knowledge of well-known attacks can help
to define a more accurate conserved self pattern to obtain the best performance in
identifying known intrusions while the CSPRA-ID retains the ability to detect novel
intrusions because of the presence of the T detectors. Experimental results show that
the CSPRA-ID is promising on DARPA network intrusion data in terms of detection
accuracy and computation efficiency, as shown in Table 6.9, CSPRA-ID can detect
4,412,041 samples within 34 minutes and yield high detection rate of 99.56% when
the false alarm rate is as low as 0.48%. Currently, the CSPRA-ID is only tested
with the DARPA network intrusion data from MIT Lincoln Labs. Since the CSPRAID could potentially be used as an effective and efficient tool for general network
intrusion detection problem, our future work includes assessing the performance of
the CSPRA-ID with more intrusion data dumped from different network sites and
translating this model into real-time intrusion detection systems.
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Chapter 7
Multilevel Immune Learning
Algorithm: A Humoral Immunity
Inspired Approach for Detecting
Anomalies in Time Series
T-cell-dependent humoral immune response is one of the more complex immunological events in the biological immune system, involving interaction of B cells with
antigen (Ag) and their proliferation, differentiation and subsequent secretion of antibody (Ab). Inspired by these immunological principles, a Multilevel Immune Learning
Algorithm (MILA) is proposed for anomaly detection. This chapter describes the detailed background of MILA, and outlines its main features in different phases: Initialization phase, Recognition phase, Evolutionary phase and Response phase. Different
test problems are studied and experimented with MILA for performance evaluation.
The results show MILA is flexible and efficient in detecting anomalies in time series.
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7.1

Introduction

The biological immune system is an intricate network of specialized tissues, organs,
cells, and chemicals with the capability of distinguishing entities within the body as
“self” or “nonself” and eliminating those that are nonself. It employs a multilevel defense against invaders through nonspecific (innate) and specific (adaptive) immunity.
Similar to the biological immune system, it is impractical to find and patch every
security hole in a large computer system. Thus, a multi-faceted and more comprehensive approach is most appropriate to computer security [61]. Negative Selection
Algorithm (NSA) [76–78] is an example of importing ideas from immunology to computer science and engineering. This algorithm is based on the principles of self-nonself
discrimination, which is analogous to the censoring process of T cell maturation in the
immune system. The original NSA generates detectors randomly and eliminates the
ones that detect self so that the remaining detectors can detect any non-self. If any
detector is ever matched, a change (non-self) is known to have occurred. Obviously,
NSA is a single level approach and its monitoring phase is logically (not biologically)
derivable.
The objective of our work is to combine several immunological metaphors in order
to develop an intelligent computational technique. In this chapter, we briefly reviewed
the biological immune system defense mechanisms, proposed the new algorithm MILA
and demonstrated its performance. This chapter also shows advantages of using new
features of MILA in the application of anomaly detection.
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 briefly reviews the immune system defense mechanism from the immunological point of view. Section 7.3 describes
the proposed algorithm and provides the analogy between the algorithm and biological humoral immunity. Section 7.4 demonstrates the application of MILA to anomaly
detection and presents some results. Section 7.5 discusses new features of MILA in
the application of anomaly detection. Section 7.6 provides concluding remarks.
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7.2

The Immune System Defense Mechanisms

The biological immune system is a complex adaptive defense system that has evolved
in vertebrates to protect them from invading pathogens. To accomplish its tasks,
the immune system has evolved two mechanisms: innate (nonspecific) immunity and
adaptive (specific) immunity, which are linked to and influence each other.

7.2.1

Innate Immunity

Innate immunity is inherent without requiring a previous encounter with the offending substance and does not develop memory. Innate immunity can be envisioned
as comprising four types of defensive barriers: anatomic, physiologic, endocytic and
phagocytic, and inflammatory [89]. The skin or mucous membrane is an organism’s
first barrier of defense against pathogens and can prevent the penetration of most
pathogens and inhibit the growth of most bacteria by producing an oily secretion
with a lower pH value. Physiological conditions such as pH, temperature and chemical mediators provide inappropriate living conditions for foreign organisms. Another
important innate defense mechanism is the ingestion of extracellular particular materials through the process of phagocytosis. When infectious microorganisms invade the
system, T helper cells can recognize the infection and secrete lymphokines to stimulate the macrophage to “eat” the invaders. Bacterial infection causes tissue damage
with the release of various vasoactive and chemotactic factors. These factors induce
an influx of phagocytes and lymphocytes from the blood into the tissues. Finally,
these cells engulf the bacteria and some serum proteins with antibacterial properties
to kill the bacteria. This process is called inflammatory response.
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7.2.2

Adaptive Immunity

Adaptive immunity is characterized by learning, adaptability, and memory and is
broadly divided into two branches: humoral and cellular immunity.
Humoral Immunity
Humoral immunity involves interaction of B cells with antigen (Ag) and their subsequent proliferation, differentiation and the secretion of the antibodies (Ab). T-celldependent humoral immune response widely exists in our system. B cells recognize
T-dependent antigens (foreign protein) via immunoglobulin receptors on their surface but are unable to proliferate and differentiate unless prompted by the action of
lymphokines secreted by T helper cells. In order for the T helper cells to become stimulated to release lymphokines, they must also recognize specific antigens. However,
T helper cells only recognize antigenic peptides in the context of the MHC molecules
via their receptors. A process called Ag presentation is needed. The antigen becomes
internalized, processed and expressed within the class II MHC molecule through Ag
presentation. Under some specific conditions, the process of B cell activation is suppressed by T suppressor cells, but specific mechanisms of such suppression is yet
unknown. The activated B cells and T cells migrate to the primary follicle of the
cortex in lymph nodes. Within a primary follicle, germinal center (GC) reactions
take place. Germinal center reaction (GCR) represents a complex interaction of the
basic cell kinetic process of activation, proliferation, differentiation, and death of Blymphocytes [115]. Interested readers may refer to literature [115, 158, 232, 233]for
details of GCR and its models. As a summary of the literature, this chapter explores
two main immunological events in GCR.
1. B cell Proliferation. There is a proliferative expansion of B cells in the dark
zone of GC. The activated B cells migrate to primary follicles, appearing as
Ag-specific B blasts within the network of follicular dendritic cells (FDC). The
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B blasts begin dividing and give rise to the so-called centroblasts. Centroblasts
continue to proliferate rapidly in dark zones and migrate into the light zone to
become centrocytes, producing a continuous output of centrocytes.
2. B cell selection. The centrocytes express mutated immunoglobulin by somatic
hypermutation and undergo a positive selection process based on their affinity
for Ag/Ab complexes held on FDCs and interaction with Ag-specific T cells in
the light zone. Negative selection also occurs in the GC, eliminating centrocytes
expressing autoreactive mutated immunoglobulin. The selected, high affinity
centrocytes may mature to form Ab-producing plasma cells, or memory B cells.
The unselected, low affinity B cells rapidly die by apoptosis.
The antibodies are generated in the humoral immune response, which has recognition
function and thus binds to foreign antigens. But, they have no meaning if they only
bind to antigens because antibodies do not kill anything. By binding to antigens,
however, antibody molecules are activated so that the serum complement C1q can
bind to the appropriate region of antibody molecules and initiate the classic pathway of complement activation. Finally, a pore-forming molecule-membrane attacking
complex (MAC) is formed through complement activation, which punches holes in
the cell surface of the foreign antigen and destroys the foreign antigen.
Cellular Immunity
Effector T cells generated in response to antigens are responsible for cell-mediated
immunity. T killer cells participate in cell-mediated immune reactions and play an
important role in the killing of virus-infected cells and tumor cells. Cytokines secreted
by T helper cells can mediate the cellular immunity and activate various phagocytic
cells, enabling them to phagocytose and killing microorganisms more effectively. This
type of cell-mediated immune response is especially important in host defense against
intracellular bacteria and protozoa [89].
242

Immune Memory
Both B cells and T cells have the processes of proliferation and selection and exhibit
immunologic memory once they have recognized and responded to an Ag. The initial
exposure to Ag that stimulates an adaptive immune response is handled by a small
number of low-affinity lymphocytes. This process is called primary response. Memory
cells with high affinity for the encounter, however, are produced pursuant to response
in the process of proliferation, somatic hypermutation, and selection. So, a second
encounter with the same antigen induces a heightened state of the immune response
due to the presence of memory cells associated with the first infection. This process is
called secondary response. By comparison with the primary response, the secondary
response is characterized by a shorter lag phase and a lower dose of antigen required
for causing the response [30].

7.3

MILA - Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm

The motivation of developing MILA comes from the fact that current immunity-based
methods of the immune system, implemented the immune metaphors in a piecemeal
manner. This chapter proposes a new immunity-based approach, which incorporates
multiple detection schema, clonal expansion, and dynamic detector generation mechanisms in a single framework.

7.3.1

Notations

The following notations are defined, which are only applied to this chapter:
• L1 , L2 : length of attributes for self-pattern, Ag-pattern, respectively.
• N 1 , N 2 : set of Ag’s to be detected, Ag’s to be recognized by T helper cells,
Ag’s to be recognized by B cells, respectively.
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• P : set of the generated surface positions.
• R 1 , R 2 , R 3 : set of Th (helper) detectors, Ts (suppressor) detectors, B detectors,
respectively.
• R 1a , R 2a : set of activated T helper cells, B cells, respectively.
• S 0 , S 1 , S 2 : set of Self-pattern, Self-peptides, Self-features.
• T 1 , T 2 , T 3 : threshold used in initialization (training) phase for T helper cells,
T suppressor cells, B cells, respectively.
• T 1a , T 2a , T 3a : threshold used in recognition phase for T helper cells, T suppressor cells, B cells, respectively.
• v 1 , v 2 : affinity value of T helper cells, B cells for Ag encountered, respectively.
• w 1 , w 2 : window size used to produce self/Ag-peptides, self/Ag-features, respectively.

7.3.2

Algorithm Overview

The algorithm employs shape-space model [198] to describe the Ag-Ab interactions,
and a distance measure is used to calculate the degree of Ag-Ab interactions. Mathematically, the generated shape of a molecular (Ag or Ab) can be represented by
a set of L attributes directly associated with coordinate axes. For example, Ag or
Ab is defined as m = hm1 , m2 , . . . , mL i, which can be considered as a point in an
L-dimensional real-valued shape space. We assume that T cell and B cell recognize
antigens at different levels. In the immune system, T cells can only recognize internal
features (peptides) processed from foreign protein. We define T cells recognition as
bit-level recognition. This is a low-level recognition scheme using consecutive pattern
windows. In the immune system, however, B cells can only recognize surface features
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of antigens. Because of the large size and complexity of most antigens, only parts of
the antigen, discrete sites called epitopes, get bound to B cells. We propose that Bcell recognition is a higher-level recognition at different non-contiguous (occasionally
contiguous) positions of antigen strings. The MILA algorithm consists of four phases:
initialization phase, recognition phase, evolutionary phase, and response phase. The
block diagram shown in Fig. 7.1 sheds light on the four phases of MILA.

Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase, we “train” the system by injecting the knowledge of “self”.
The outcome of initialization is to generate sets of detectors, analogous to the populations of T helper cells (Th ), T suppressor cells (Ts ) and B cells, which participated
in T-cell-dependent humoral immune response. The basic stages involved in initialization phase are as follows:
1. Build up a “Self” database from the normal behavior of each process of interest
or protected data, and then logically split the pattern sequence to represent
as a multiset S 0 of equal-attribute strings of length L1 over a finite alphabet.
Depending on application, “Self” may extend to include “normal” or “abnormal” data. Thus, it is more appropriate to replace the term “Self” with “Initial
sample”. The meaning of the extension is that we can produce two types of
detectors. One is to be used to detect “general” anomaly using the knowledge
of “normal data” in “Initial Sample”; another can be used to detect “known”
anomaly using the knowledge of “abnormal data” in “Initial Sample”.
2. Generate the set R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 of detectors corresponding to Th , Ts , and B
detectors. Negative selection strategy [77] is employed in the generation of Th
detectors. But, the implementation we proposed is different.
(a) Generation of Th detectors: The data pattern in S0 can be considered
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Figure 7.1 Representation of MILA - Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm
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as the self-protein. Self-proteins need to be broken down into peptides for
training the Th Cells. The peptide set S1 is generated from the self-pattern
in S0 using a sliding (overlapping) window of size w1 as described in [51].
Each of the Th detectors must not match any peptide strings in S1. A
distance measure is used to decide the “matching”. Th detector can be
represented as ht1 , t2 , tw1 i.
(b) Generation of B detector: In the immune system, B-cell receptor only binds
to particular sites called epitope on the surface of antigen. Antigen is a special folding of peptides in 3-dimension space. When we unravel the folding,
the matching sites are not necessarily contiguous. In computational terms,
this means that the B cells recognize a subset of features of the antigen
data, not necessarily in a restricted contiguous way. In our algorithm, for
one self-pattern in S 0 , the window size of so-called “self-features” analogous to “self-peptides” is w 2 (input parameters), a surface position set P is
generated, among which each element is composed of w2 different numbers
between 0 and L1 . Combining the position value of each element in P and
value of the attribute indexed by each position in self-pattern in S 0 , a set
of self-features S 2 can be obtained. For example, as shown in Fig. 7.2,
suppose that a self-pattern is h s1 , s2 , , sL1 i and w 2 = 3, we can generate
position set like {h1, 3, L1 i , h2, 4, 9i , . . .}. So, the generated self-features
set S 2 should be {h(1, s1 ) , (3, s3 ) , (L1 , sL1 )i , h(2, s2 ) , (4, s4 ) , (9, s9 )i , . . .}.
To simplify the problem for the generation of B detectors, we assume that:
(1) the position set P generated from each self-pattern in S 0 is the same;
(2) the length of B detectors is the same as that of self-features. Therefore, in the previous example, if the candidate B detector represented as
hm1 , m2 , m3 i fails to match Any self-feature indexed as h1, 3, L1 i in S 2 , the
candidate B detector belongs to a set of B detectors R 3 , represented as
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h(1, m1 ) , (3, m2 ) , (L1 , m3 )i.
(c) Ts detectors: It acts as suppressors. In the immune system, the existence
of T suppressor cells (Ts ) is a relatively recent discovery, and hence, their
functioning is still somewhat debated. As will be seen in section 7.4, in
the application to anomaly detection, Ts cells are initialized during the
Th cell initialization period. Those randomly generated initial detectors
capable of killing self-peptides will be checked using the more stringent
threshold, called suppression threshold. If the distance between the initial
Ts detector and a self-peptide is less than or at least equal to the suppression threshold, then the detector belongs to R 2 set. The significance of
using a higher matching threshold on Ts detector is to guarantee that the
generated Ts cell can act as a robust self-detector for some specific selfpatterns. In the recognition phase, a Ts detector may detect the antigen
prior to Th detection. The antigen recognition will be interrupted if the
Ts can recognize the antigen. Clearly, we think of Ts detectors as a guard
to prevent the system from raising a false alarm signal.
Recognition Phase
In the recognition phase, B cells, together with T cells (Th , Ts ) and antigen presenting
cells (APCs), form a multilevel recognition. In a distributed environment, this makes
the recognition system more robust and ensures the efficient detection. Overall, the
phase includes the following stages:
1. Ag presentation: APCs are the first to pick up signals from the system (e.g.,
screen is turning black; too many printing jobs line up, etc), which start an
immune recognition process. If APCs receive a signal, then they begin to process the suspicious pattern (the antigenic protein) into its constituent peptides
as described in the initialization phase. In the immune system, when an anti248
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Figure 7.2 Generation of a matured B detector at w 2 = 3

gen invades the body, it releases some chemical signals such as vasoactive and
chemotactic factors. From a computational perspective, this process may be
regarded as the highest level of the recognition done by observing the effects of
damaging activity that is used to trigger the monitoring system. In computer
systems, these signals caused by damaging activity are sometimes invisible or
indistinguishable. We cannot determine the security of computer systems only
depending on the damaging signals. We may assume that signals are always
captured to continue the next detection.
2. T helper cell binding. We use a distance measure (affinity function) to calculate
an affinity value between the bindings of a Th detector and an Ag-peptide. The
affinity calculation is similar to the affinity between Ag peptide and T helper
cell receptor.
3. T helper cell activation and/or suppression. In the stage of Ag presentation,
an antigen with L2 attributes can generate (L2 -w 2 +1) peptides using a sliding
window of size w 2 . If the distance value between any peptide from the Ag and
Th detector is less than Th activation threshold T1a (an input parameter), it is
assumed that the Th detector has activated T helper cells with the capability of
recognition. It will then be added to the set of activated Th detectors R 1a , and
relevant Ag peptide is recorded in a set of Th antigenic sample N 1 . As already
stated in initialization phase, the recognition and activation of T helper cells is
subject to surveillance of T suppressor cell.
4. B cell binding. This is a parallel processing with T cell binding. They are
dealt with simultaneously along with other immune network channels. In our
algorithm, B detectors generated in the initialization phase is actually an information vector with the information of binding sites and values of attributes
in these sites. Similar to T helper cell binding, we calculate an affinity value
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based on the B detector value and the epitope of antigen, which is extracted
from those positions recorded in B detector. For example, suppose a B detector is h(1, m1 ) , (3, m2 ) , (L, m3 )i and an Ag is represented as hn1 , n2 , n3 , , nL i,
then the affinity value is calculated by computing the distance between points
hm1 , m2 , m3 i and hn1 , n3 , nL i.
5. B cell activation. For safety and reliability, decisions of immune response are
made by committees, not by single cells. B-cell receptors may recognize an
antigen molecule based on the molecule’s conformation. But, the B cell will
not be activated unless a T cell confirms its recognition of a peptide sequence
of the processed molecule, which is presented by the B cell. In the algorithm,
activation of a B detector (B i by an Ag (Ag i ) is subject to three conditions:
(1) the affinity value between the B i and the epitope of Ag i is greater than B
activation threshold T 3a (an input parameter); (2) the affinity value between
any peptide of Ag i and any Th detector in a set of Th detectors R 1 R1 is
greater than Th activation threshold T 1a (an input parameter); and (3) Ts does
not suppress the response. B detectors satisfying these three conditions and
relevant Ag epitopes are kept in a set of activated B detectors R 3a and a set of
B antigenic sample N 2 , respectively.
Evolutionary Phase
The activated B Cell does two things. Firstly, it differentiates into the plasma cell
which is capable of secreting antibodies, the antibodies then bind to antigens and inactivate them, or identify them as phagocytes and complements, which allow the innate
or complement system to eliminate them. This is implemented in response phase in
our algorithm. Secondly, the B-cell undergoes Evolutionary phase with proliferative
expansion, clonal selection, and affinity maturation to produce memory cells. Cloning
is subject to very high mutation rates called somatic hypermutation with a selective
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pressure. From computational standpoints, the outcome of the Evolutionary phase is
to generate high-quality solutions to complex problems. The copies produced by this
cloning are not perfect; so they have to undergo two phases of selection. In addition
to passing negative selection, the affinity value between each progeny of the activated
B cell (parent B cell) and the Ag that stimulates the parent B cell are calculated.
Only the clone whose affinity value is greater than the B activation threshold or a
higher threshold set by the user is selected. This process is defined as positive selection. Similar to B cell, activated T cells (only Th or both Th and Ts ) too undergo
the process of cloning, mutation, and selection.

Response Phase
This phase involves the primary response to the initial exposure and secondary response to second encounter.

7.4

Application of MILA to Anomaly Detection

In order to evaluate the performance and to compare its efficiency the existing techniques, MILA is applied to the anomaly detection problem. To simplify the implementation, some assumptions are made:
• Self-pattern and Ag-pattern are of same length, L;
• Self-peptides, self-features, Ag-peptides, Ag-features have the same length, w;
• As described in section 7.3.2, Ts detector is regarded as a special self-detecting
agent with more stringent threshold than Th detectors and B detectors. It
undergoes cloning and positive selection after being activated by a special Ag.
• The lower the antigenic affinity, the higher the mutation rate. From a computational perspective, the purpose of this assumption is to increase the probability
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of producing effective detectors.
• During cloning of each parent, only ONE clone whose affinity is highest among
all is kept. The selected clone will be discarded if it is similar to the existing
detectors. This assumption solves the problem using minimal resources without
compromising the detection rate.
• The response phase is dummy as we are only dealing with anomaly detection
tasks.

7.4.1

Experiment Design

Self-pattern and Ag-pattern
Using a sliding overlapping window of size L (in our case, L =13), if the normal series
have the values: x1 , x2 , . . . , xm ; self-patterns are generated as follows:
hx1 , x2 , . . . , xL i
hx2 , x3 , . . . , xL+1 i
... ... ... ...
... ... ... ...
... ... ... ...
hxm−L+1 , xm−L+2 , . . . , xm i
Similarly, Ag-patterns are generated from the samples shown in Fig.4b. We used realvalued strings to represent Ag and Ab molecules, which are different from Negative
Selection Algorithm [51, 61, 77] and the application of Clone Selection Principle [30].
Euclidean distance measure is employed to compute the affinity between Ag and Ab
and a partial matching rule is used.
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Figure 7.3 Mackey-Glass normal series
Test Cases
The following test cases are studied and some results are reported in this chapter.
1. For different threshold changing strategies, the influence on ROC curves is studied.
2. Comparison of performances illustrated in ROC curves between single level
detection and multilevel detection (MILA) is studied.
3. The efficiency of the detector for detecting an anomaly is studied.

7.4.2

Application in Mackey-Glass Time Series

The normal and abnormal time series are generated by Mackey-Glass equation [51].
The resulting time series is shown in Fig. 7.3 and Fig.7.4. We train the system using
time series shown in Fig. 7.3 and test the system using time series given in Fig. 7.4.
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Figure 7.4 Mackey-Glass series with an anomaly from 300 to 400
We first tested the Mackey-Glass time series from three different cases: (1) changing B threshold at fixed Th threshold (0.1) and Ts threshold (0.02); (2) changing
Th threshold at fixed B threshold (0.1) and Ts threshold (0.02); (3) changing Th
threshold at fixed B threshold (0.148) and Ts threshold (0.02). The results shown in
Fig. 7.5 indicate that the first case can obtain a better ROC curve. Therefore, the
ROC curves shown in this section are plotted by using the first case.
We experimented and compared the efficiency of anomaly detection in three cases:
(1) only using Th detectors; (2) only using B detectors; (3) combining Th , Ts , B
detectors as indicated in MILA. ROC curves in these cases are shown in Fig. 7.6.
Moreover, Fig. 7.7 and Fig. 7.8 show how detection and false alarm rates change
when the threshold is modified under these three cases. Since detectors are randomly
generated, different values for detection and false alarm rates are observed. Considering this issue, we run the system ten iterations to obtain the average of the values
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Figure 7.5 Mackey-Glass time series: ROC curves obtained by employing
different thresholds changing strategy, as described in the text
for detection and false alarm rate.
Once detectors, e.g., Th detectors, Ts detectors, and B detectors, are generated
in the Initialization phase, we repeatedly detected the same Ag samples 6 iterations
under the same parameter conditions. Since the detector in MILA undergoes cloning,
mutation and selection after the Recognition phase, the elements in the detector set
changes after each iteration. So, for each iteration, different values for detection and
false alarm rate are observed, as shown in Fig. 7.9 - Fig. 7.11.

7.4.3

Application in Speech Recording Time Series

MILA is also applied to detect anomalous patterns in time series from speech recording. We normalized the raw data at the range 0 1 and trained the system. The
training data is shown in Fig. 7.12. The testing data is shown in Fig. 7.13 with
generated anomalies from 500 to 700 and some noise after 700.
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Figure 7.6 Mackey-Glass time series: comparison of ROC curves between
single level detection (e.g., Th detection or B detection) and multilevel detection (MILA)

Figure 7.7 Mackey-Glass time series: evolution of detection rate based on
single level detection and multilevel detection (MILA) when the threshold is
modified. The curves are completely overlapped for anomaly detection based
on MILA and B detector alone in the figure
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Figure 7.8 Mackey-Glass time series: evolution of false alarm rate based on
single level detection and multilevel detection (MILA) when the threshold is
modified
As shown in Fig 7.14 and Fig. 7.15, the results from speech recording time series consistently demonstrate the advantages of the proposed MILA. We will further
discuss these results in section 7.5.

7.5

New Features of MILA

The algorithm presented here takes its inspiration from T-cell-dependent humoral
immune response. Considering the application to anomaly detection, one of the key
features of MILA is its multilevel detection; that is, multiple strategies are used to
generate detectors, which are combined to detect a new sample, as nature does in the
humoral immune response. Experiments show that MILA detection is more flexible
than single level detection. The generation and recognition of various detectors in this
algorithm can be implemented in different ways depending on the application. For
example, our current proposal defines that the recognition of antigen is decided by the
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Figure 7.9 Mackey-Glass time series: performance of MILA based anomaly detection is shown for each detecting
iteration. 0, 1, 2, in the ROC curves denote the iterations of detecting same Ag samples. For each iteration, the
detector sets are those that are generated in the detecting phase of previous iteration

Figure 7.10 Mackey-Glass time series: evolution of detection rate for MILA
based anomaly detection in each detecting iteration when threshold is modified. Here the numbers (0,1,2,3,4,5) represented in the curves denote the
number of iterations for detecting same Ag samples. For each iteration, the
detector sets are those that are generated in the detecting phase of previous
iteration

Figure 7.11 Mackey-Glass time series: evolution of false alarm rate for
MILA based anomaly detection in each detecting iteration when threshold is
modified
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Figure 7.12 Speech recording normal series

Figure 7.13 Speech recording series with an anomaly from 500 to 700 and
some noise after 700
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Figure 7.14 Speech recording time series: comparison of ROC curves between single level detection (e.g., Th detection or B detection) and multilevel
detection (MILA)
common recognition of Th , B and APC, analogous to “AND” logical operator. So,
the system is fault tolerant. Certainly, we can easily change to “OR” logical operator
to make the system more sensitive. Moreover, the efficiency of MILA based anomaly
detection can be improved by tuning threshold values for various detectors. Fig. 7.5
shows this advantage of MILA and indicates that better performances can be obtained
(shown in the ROC curves) by employing a different threshold changing strategy.
Compared to the NSA, which is single level detection, Fig. 7.6 and Fig. 7.14 show
that the performance of multilevel detection of MILA is better. Further results shown
in Fig. 7.7 and Fig. 7.8 also support the better performance of MILA. Comparing
multilevel detection with single level detection, the varying trend for detection rate,
when the threshold is modified, is similar as illustrated in Fig. 7.7, however, the false
alarm rate for multilevel detection, when the threshold is modified, is much lower
(Fig. 7.8). For anomaly detection using NSA, the detector set remains constant once
generated in the training phase. However, the detector set is dynamic for MILA based
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Figure 7.15 Speech recording time series: ROC curves for MILA based anomaly detection in each detecting iteration.
1, 2, 3, in the ROC curves denote the iterations of detecting same Ag samples. For each iteration, the detector sets are
those that are generated in the detect phase of previous iteration

anomaly detection. MILA involves a process of cloning, mutation, and selection after
successful detection, and some detectors with high affinity for a given antigen will be
selected. This constitutes an on-line learning and detector optimization process. The
outcome is to raise the relative population size and affinity of those detectors that
have proven themselves to be valuable by having recognized a given antigen. Fig. 7.9
and Fig. 7.15 show improved performance by using the optimized detector set being
generated after the detecting phase. This can be explained with the fact that some
of the anomalous time series employed in our experiment is the similar, but generally
anomaly is much different from normal series. Thus, when we reduce the distance
between a detector and a given antigen, that is, raise the detector affinity to a given
antigen, the distances between this detector and other antigens similar to the given
antigens are also reduced. Thus those antigens, which formerly failed to be detected
by this detector, become detectable. However, the distances between the detector and
most of the “self” except for some “self” extremely similar to “nonself”(anomaly) are
still out of allowable variation. Therefore, the number of detectors having high affinity
increases with the increase in time of detecting the antigens that are encountered
before (at least in a certain range), and thus, the detection rate at certain thresholds
becomes higher and higher. The experimental results confirm our explanation. Under
same threshold values, Fig. 7.10 shows that the detector set produced later has higher
detection rate than previous detector sets, whereas the false alarm rate has no obvious
changes as shown in Fig. 7.11. In the application to anomaly detection, because
of the random generation of the pre-detector, the generated detector set is always
different even if the same conditions are applied. We cannot guarantee the efficiency
of the initial detector set. However, MILA based anomaly detection can optimize
the detector during on-line detection, and thus, we can finally obtain more efficient
detectors for given samples for monitoring.
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7.6

Summary

In this chapter, we briefly reviewed biological immune system defense mechanisms
and proposed an anomaly detection algorithm inspired by the T-cell-dependent humoral immune response. This algorithm is called Multilevel Level Immune Algorithm
(MILA), which involves four phases: Initialization phase, Recognition phase, Evolutionary phase and Response phase. Initialization phase is where the ”self” knowledge
is injected into the system. A multilevel recognition is performed by three groups
of detectors, which contributes to the Recognition phase. Evolutionary phase is an
evolutionary process introduced to fine-tune the detector set. Antigen should be finally killed (or deleted) in the Response phase, not implemented currently. We used
the shape-space model to represent the Ag and Ab molecules and Euclidean distance
measure to describe the degree of Ag-Ab interaction (as matching rule). The proposed methods are tested with an anomaly detection problem. MILA based anomaly
detection is characterized by multilevel recognition and on-line learning. Experimental results show that MILA based anomaly detection is flexible, and the detection
rate can be improved at the range of allowable false alarm rate by applying the different threshold changing strategy. In comparison with the single level based anomaly
detection, performance of MILA is clearly better. Experimental results show that
detectors have been optimized during the on-line testing phase as well.
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Chapter 8
Viewing Multilevel Immune
Learning Algorithm from Different
Angles: A Framework for Adaptive
Eye Localization via Face
Detection
The precise localization of face and eyes is crucial in many automatic face recognition systems. This chapter presents an immunity-based framework for adaptive
eye localization via face detection using the Haar Cascade Classifiers. The proposed
framework remains several features from our early proposal called Multilevel Immune
Learning Algorithm (MILA), including multiple layers (Initialization, Recognition
and Evolution, Response), various levels of the detectors and evolutionary process.
However, this work views the MILA as a generic framework. The generation and evolution of various detectors are not confined to the principle of negative selection. The
proposed framework has been experimented with the PUT face database. Based on
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the generally acceptable methods from previous work, a stricter performance measure
is established in this chapter to evaluate the system performance. The results show
that the system can automatically identify the high-quality solutions and successfully
localize the eyes based on the detected face in previous steps with very high accuracy.

8.1

Introduction

Due to its high accuracy and non-invasiveness, face detection has become a valuable
biometric identification method with a variety of potential applications such as monitoring and surveillance, human-computer interface, and human face/body tracking
systems. As both the position of the eyes and the inter-ocular distance remain relatively constant on the face for most people, eye detection is usually the first crucial
step towards automatic face recognition for normalizing the face size, measuring the
relative locations and adjusting image-plane rotation of the human face. On the other
hand, the human face is a highly non-rigid, complex three-dimensional body. It is
still a challenge task to detect the face and facial features. Firstly, the face images
themselves are highly variable. Secondly, many factors make individual appearance
susceptible, including pose variations, facial expression, illumination changes, occlusions or structural disturbances (e.g., make-up, glasses, facial hair, etc.). Numerical
approaches have been proposed for face detection and recognition and facial feature
extraction [3,23], among which face detection algorithms based on the Viola-Jones object detection approach [243], also known as Haar Cascade Classifier (HCC), is widely
adopted in object tracking and classification [86], face and eye detection [39,142], hand
gesture recognition [37], and Palmprint recognition [109].
Artificial Immune System (AIS) is emerging as an active and attractive field
that covers all the efforts to develop computational tools inspired by biological immune systems for solving the science and engineering problems. The representative
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AIS applications include data mining, networking and computer security, anomaly
detection, optimization, pattern recognition and so on. Based on recent AIS reviews [50, 113, 144, 235, 236] and our own extensive search, the application of AIS to
the field of face detection has not been reported in the literature. This chapter attempts to initiate a new application area of AIS by revisiting our early proposal called
Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm (MILA) and applying it to the field of face
detection. This motivation leads to the development of a MILA-based framework for
automated and adaptive eye localization via face detection. The proposed framework
includes three layers: Initialization, Recognition and Evolution, and Response. The
Viola-Jones object detection approach is used in all the three layers. The multilevel
candidate solutions to the problem of face and eye localization, analogous to APC
detector, Th detector, and B detector that are proposed in the MILA, are first initialized. Then, the Recognition and Evolution layer is responsible for identifying the
high-quality solutions. To establish a robust and efficient face detection system, the
Response layer applies a multilevel detection strategy resembling the top-down search
to locate the eyes in face areas by gradually narrowing the search region. The experiments were carried out in this work with a new database of high resolution face images
taken by CIE Biometric Group at Poznan University of Technology (PUT) [141] and
the performance was evaluated with a stricter measurement defined in this chapter
to demonstrate the promising results of our proposed system.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 and section 8.3 provides the background of the work presented in this chapter by briefly reviewing the
immunological basics and the main features of the MILA and introducing the principle
of the HCC. Section 8.4 explains the proposed immunity-based framework for adaptive face and eye detection. Section 8.5 describes the environment, procedures, and
measurement of our experiments and presents experimental results on the proposed
framework. Finally, section 8.6 concludes the chapter.
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8.2

The Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm
(MILA)

Inspired by the more complex immunological events involved in the T-cell-dependent
humoral immunity, we developed a Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm (MILA)
and showed its success in the field of anomaly detection [58]. In this work, the
MILA is reconsidered in a different angle by giving prominence to its nature of the
framework and thus an automated and adaptive face detection system is proposed.
Before delivering the new idea of our work presented in this chapter, a short overview
of the background and main features of the MILA is given in this section.

8.2.1

Humoral Immunity

What inspired us to develop the MILA is humoral immunity, which involves three
distinct phases: Induction phase, Evolution phase and Effector phase. Induction of
the humoral immune response begins with the recognition of antigen by specific T and
B cells. Through a process of clonal selection with somatic hypermutation, specific B
cells are stimulated to proliferate, mutate and differentiate. However, this evolutionary process of B cells requires the intervention of specific T-cells called T helper cells
(Th cells) that are themselves stimulated to release lymphokines that help the proliferation and differentiation of the antigen-induced B cells. The Th cells are unable
to help the activation of the B cells that are explored to the antigens, unless they
are activated by recognizing antigenic peptides in the context of the MHC molecules
that are formed in a process called antigen presentation. The antigen presenting cells
(APCs) are responsible for the process of antigen presentation. The B cell itself can
act as the APC. When B cells bind antigen, the antigen becomes internalized, processed and expressed within the class II MHC molecule on the surface of the B cell and
thus can be recognized by the Th cells. Under some specific conditions, the process
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Figure 8.1 The major immunological events in humoral immunity
of B cell activation is suppressed by T suppressor cells (Ts cells). The antibodies are
generated in the humoral immune response. They are activated by binding to foreign
antigens so that the serum complement C1q can bind to the appropriate region of
antibody molecules and initiate the activation of the complement system. Finally, a
pore-forming molecule-membrane attacking complex (MAC) is formed through complement activation, which punches holes in the cell surface of the foreign antigen.
The major immunological events occurred in the humoral immunity are illustrated in
Fig. 8.1.

8.2.2

Algorithm Overview

The Multilevel Level Immune Algorithm (MILA) involves four phases: Initialization
phase, Recognition phase, Evolution phase, and Response phase. By extracting the
“self” knowledge in the training data set, Initialization phase generates a set of detectors, analogous to the populations of T helper cells (Th ), T suppressor cells (Ts ) and
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B cells, which participated in T-cell-dependent humoral immune response. A multilevel recognition is performed by four groups of detectors in the Recognition phase,
including APC-driven Ag presentation, Th cell binding, Th cell activation and/or Ts
suppression, B cell binding, and B cell activation. In a distributed environment, this
makes the recognition system more robust and ensures the efficient detection. The
Evolution phase in the MILA aims at generating high-quality solutions to complex
problems. Cloning is subject to very high mutation rates called somatic hypermutation with a selective pressure. Each clone must pass both negative selection and
positive selection. Those clones that match any of the self samples are eliminated
in the phase of negative selection. In the phase of positive selection, the algorithm
calculates the affinity value between each progeny of the activated B cell (parent B
cell) and the Ag that stimulates the parent B cell. Only the clone whose affinity
value is greater than the predefined B activation threshold is selected. The Response
phase proposed in the MILA involves a primary response to the initial exposure and
secondary response to second encounter. The Th detector and B detector detect the
incoming sample at different levels in the MILA. The detection by the Th detector is
in the bit level. This is a low-level recognition scheme using consecutive pattern windows. In the immune system, however, B cell can recognize only parts of the antigen,
discrete sites called epitopes. By mimicking this property of B cell, the B cell recognition in the MILA is defined a higher-level recognition at different non-contiguous
(occasionally contiguous) positions of antigen strings.

8.3

The Haar Cascade Classifiers

In the adaptive face detection system proposed in this chapter, a cascade of boosted
classifiers working with haar-like features [156,243] is used to detect the object such as
face and eye under the control of various types of the detectors similar to those in the
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MILA. To make this chapter self contained, this section provides a brief introduction
to this technique.
The HCC works on an extensive set of digital image features, which can be computed in a short and constant time. These features are called haar-like feature due to
their intuitive similarity with Haar wavelets. The definition and evaluation of these
haar-like features were summarized in [156]. The HCC is trained with a few hundreds
of positive samples and arbitrary negative samples. The resultant classifier consists
of several simpler classifiers (stages). Such cascade structure enables the classifier to
quickly discard the non-object regions and focus only on those which are relevant.
The classifiers at every stage of the cascade are complex themselves and they are
built out of basic classifiers using one of four different boosting techniques (weighted
voting), including Discrete Adaboost, Real Adaboost, Gentle Adaboost, and Logitboost. Boosting selects the sufficient subset of the salient features and aggregates
many simple weak classifiers into an ensemble outperforming its components. The
HCC uses decision tree classifiers, i.e., Classification And Regression Tree (CART), as
weak classifiers. When the simplest single-split CARTs called “stumps” are used, the
weak classifiers rely on a single feature only. Although it requests more training time,
the more complex 4-splits CARTs allow to preserve some relations between features
encoded in a structure of a weak classifier.
To search for the object in the whole image, one can move the search window
across the image and check every location using a cascade of gradually more complex
classifiers. The performance of the searching process can be tuned by adjusting several
parameters:
• Minimum neighbors number: The object of interest usually generates many
rectangles from the HCC. The isolated rectangles are discarded and the rectangles that contain a large amount of overlap are grouped and averaged to
constitute a single detection result. The number of the rectangles merged is
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called the neighbors number. The minimum neighbors number sets the cutoff
level for discarding or keeping rectangle groups. If a lot of the searched objects
are missing, then lowering the minimum neighbors number is recommended.
• Mode of operation: If the Canny Pruning flag is selected, the function uses a
Canny edge detector to reject some image regions that contain too few or too
much edges and thus cannot contain the searched object. Whether or not to
set this flag is a tradeoff between the detecting speed and the searched object
missing. If it is difficult to find the searched objects, clearing this flag enables
the detection more reliable.
• Detection window: To use the HCC to find an object of an unknown size in the
image, the scan procedure should be done several times at different scales. The
HCC is designed to enable the detection (search) window to be easily “resized”
in order to be able to find the objects of interest at different sizes, which is
more efficient than resizing the image itself. The minimum detection window
size can be adjusted. Depending on the image resolution, it is best to set the
minimum detection window size only as small as the application truly needs.
If the minimum window size is set to too small, it is not only meaningless but
also wastes the CPU resources. The scale factor by which the detection window
is scaled between the subsequent scans is also an adjustable parameter, which
specifies how quickly the detection window is increased with each pass it makes
over an image. A higher value for the scale factor can speed up the processing by
running few passes but it also increases the possibility of missing the searched
objects.
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Table 8.1 The specific roles of various types of detectors
Detector type

Roles Assigned

APC detector

Control high level face detection that checks
whether the image contains any face

Th detector

Control the process of face localization that further
detects where the face locates

Ts detector

Suppress the detecting process if any unexpected
result or behavior emerges in previous detection

B detector

Control the process of eye localization that detects
where the eyes locate on the basis of the detected
face region in previous steps

8.4

MILA-Based Framework for Adaptive Face and
Eye Detection

By revisiting multilevel immune learning algorithm (MILA), a framework for adaptive
face and eye detection is developed in this work. The flow diagram of our proposed
system is depicted in Fig. 8.3. The framework remains four types of detectors such as
APC detector, Th detector, Ts detector, and B detector that are involved in the MILA.
However, these detectors do not directly detect the objects (i.e., face/eye) but carry
the vital parameter information by which they control different detecting processes
and the corresponding performance. Table 8.1 summarizes the specific roles that are
assigned to various types of detectors. Inheriting from the MILA, the architecture of
the proposed detection framework is composed of three main layers: Initialization,
Recognition and Evolution, and Response.
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8.4.1

Initialization

The Initialization layer collects face and eye positive and negative samples to train
the corresponding HCC and constructs the repository of various types of detectors,
including APC detector, Th detector, Ts detector, and B detector. These detectors
are categorized as the MILA-based detectors in this chapter to distinguish from the
HCC detectors such as face detectors and eye detectors. The Ts detector is used to
suppress the unexpected detecting result or behavior. Because there is one or null face
in each of the testing images used in our experiments, the detection of the incoming
pattern is terminated by the Ts detector when multiple faces are detected by the
HCC. The other types of detectors (APC detector, Th detector and B detector) are
represented as the feature vectors consisting of the various training parameters that
are used during the HCC training.
• APC detector: It is used to control the face detection in a fast and high-level
manner. It only distinguishes between the face images and the other arbitrary
non-faces images and does not report the details of the face, i.e., the total
number of the face objects and the region of each face. The APC detector does
not undergo the evolutionary process and only one APC detector is initialized
in this layer. To get a performance boost, two strategies are adapted for APC
detector: 1) Down-scale the input image by performing downsampling step of
Gaussian pyramid decomposition; and 2) The Canny Pruning flag is selected
in the stage of eye localization to reduce computational overhead and speed
processing because setting this flag first runs Canny edge detector to identify
the image regions that are unlikely to contain the object and then skips these
region during the HCC detection. The minimum neighbors threshold is set to
zero during the detection controlled by APC detector. This helps to prevent
the face detector from missing the faces to the maximum extent possible.
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• Th detector: Th detector is modeled as an information vector consisting of the
features such as the option of the haar cascades (hcc), the scale of detecting window increasing or sliding (scale factor ), minimum neighbors threshold
(min neighbors), mode of operation flag (flags), the width of the smallest face
to search for (min face width). Thus, the Th detector can be represented as
the vector hhcc, scale factor, min neighbors, flags, min face widthi. Th detectors
are randomly populated until the limit of the preset detector number (nTh ) is
reached. The values for various types of features (or attributes) in the Th detectors are randomly picked up but subject to the predefined ranges and the
available resources. For example, if only two face HCCs are trained, then the
feature of the haar cascade in the Th detector can only have two options. The
Th detector is responsible for controlling the process of face localization, which
requires a very high accuracy because in the next step eyes localization is proceeded based on the face region that is detected in this step and the detecting
errors that is generated in this step bring to the step of eyes localization. The
detection of the Th detector in the MILA is a low level recognition scheme.
This concept is also applied in the proposed face detection system. The system
allows the feature values of the Th detector to be vibrated in a wider range to
obtain a large pool of the Th detector candidates. This helps the system to take
more chances to find a robust T detector and further enhances the robust and
reliability of the overall system.
• B detector: B detectors are populated in a manner similar to the initialization
of the Th detectors. By taking into account the system efficiency, however, the
process of eye localization that is controlled by the B detector employs a high
level detection scheme. This scheme requires the smaller size of the B detector
population (nB ). The features of both the haar cascade and the mode of operation flag are removed from the B detector since only one eye HCC was trained
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Figure 8.2 Interpretion of the four attributes in the B detector: search width left scale, search width right scale, search height up scale,
search height bottom scale
and the Canny Pruning flag is used in the process of eyes localization. In eyes
localization, the size of the smallest eye to search for is set to the default (same
as training size). Only the partial region of the detected face in previous steps is
scanned for efficient eye localization. Correspondingly, the features of the scanning scales to the face region, which restricts the region for eye localization, is
defined in the B detector. As illustrated in Fig. 8.2, for example, the left eye
detector only scans a rectangular region with width of search width left scale ×
face width and height of (search height bottom scale - search height up scale)
× face height. Clearly, the B detector is represented as (search width left scale,
search width right scale, search height up scale, search height bottom scale,
scale factor, left eye min neighbors, right eye min neighbors).

8.4.2

Recognition and Evolution

Both Recognition phase and Evolution phase in the MILA are merged into the second
layer to exactly reflect that Evolution phase is accompanied with Recognition phase.
This layer generates the high-quality solution to the face and eye localizations that
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are controlled by Th detector and B detector, respectively. Both the Th detector
and B detector undergo a similar process of recognition and evolution. The Th or B
detector must be activated by recognizing the face or eye objects prior to entering the
Evolution phase. The system picks up each Th or B detector candidate in the initial
repository and extracts the values of the control parameters from those detectors.
These control parameters are then imported to the HCC that is used to detect the
face or eye objects. The performance for Th detector or B detector driven detection
is validated by face validation data and eye validation data, respectively. If the
detecting accuracy (measured by True Positive Ratio as described in section 8.5.3) is
greater than predefined activation threshold, then the corresponding matured Th or B
detector is kept in the separated activation list. If the predefined activation threshold
is too strict to enable any detector candidate to get matured, then the candidate with
the highest true positive ratio is considered as the selected detector. The value for the
activation threshold that is used during the activation of Th detector (tTh ) is usually
different from that used in the activation of B detector (tB ). Because it is pointless
to retain the exactly same detectors in the face detection system, the cloning does
not include the exact copies but is subject to very high mutation rate. The mutation
takes full account of the detecting efficiency. Three mutation operators are proposed
for Th detectors:
• randomly raising the scale factor of the detecting window if the maximum value
for scale factor is not reached;
• randomly increasing the size of the minimum detecting window if the maximum
size is not reached;
• randomly increasing both the scale factor and the size of the minimum detecting
window subject to the maximum limit.
Instead, the B detectors use the following mutation operators:
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• only randomly decrease search height up scale or search height bottom scale if
it is no less than allowable minimum value;
• only randomly decrease search width left scale or search width right scale if it
is no less than allowable minimum value.
In our experiments, the Th detectors and B detectors in the activation list are retained
with a very stringent threshold. All detectors in the activation list are mutated to
push the limit of their efficiency. The mutation is proceeded by randomly using one
of the operators and finally a mutation list is populated. Each individual in the
mutation list is validated with the known face or eye data to find if the mutated
detector can produce similar or even better performance compared to the results
that are generated by the detectors in the activation list. By comparing the overall
detectors in the activation list and mutation list, the Th detector or B detector with
the best performance is selected to participate in the face and eye detection in the
Response layer. The selected Th detector or B detector is called Memory Th detector
or Memory B detector, respectively.

8.4.3

Response

The new image samples are loaded to the system in the Response layer. The face
and eye are detected and localized for the incoming new image. A group of detectors (APC, Th , Ts , B) control the multilevel detection that is proceeded by HCCs.
As shown in Fig. 8.3, the multilevel detection consists of three main modules: 1)
High-level face detection; 2) Face localization; and 3) Eye localization. The incoming
pattern passes the three modules sequentially. It is allowed access to the next module
only when it successfully passes the preceding module. Additionally, the face localization module is monitored by Ts detector. This helps to prevent the system from
distorting the detection in the early stage if some known or predictable errors are
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caught by the Ts detector. This distributed detection system is, in fact, following a
top-down strategy of information processing. The overview of the incoming image is
first formulated in the face detection module and the detecting process immediately
jumps to the next testing image when the non-face image is encountered. The search
region is then refined to find the location of the face in the face localization module.
The system finally localizes the eyes in greater details in a smaller search region, i.e.,
face region. These features make our face detection system more robust and efficiency.

8.4.4

A Simple Case

A simple experiment with only 8 testing images (4 face images and 4 arbitrary images) was set up to demonstrate how the proposed framework detects the face and
locates the eyes. As shown in Fig. 8.4, the arbitrary images that do not contain any
faces are quickly opted out during the detection controlled by APC detector. In this
experiment, the attribute of min neighbors in the Th detector has a small value as of
1, so we can see in Fig. 8.4 that double faces are detected in one of the images. The
detecting process for such an image is then suspended by the Ts detector. The other
images will go to next step for eye detection and localization that is controlled by B
detector. As noted in Fig. 8.4, more than one right eyes are detected in the leftmost
image of the last row. This is called false positive for eye localization.

8.4.5

Comparison with Previous Detection Systems

Several detecting systems for eye localization, including some features similar to our
proposed framework, were proposed in earlier works. Ma et al. [166] presented a three
stage method for eye localization. The first two stages follow a top-down scheme:
first the cascaded AdaBoost classifier is used to locate the face region, then the
detected face is vertically divided in two by looking at the vertical projection; each
half is separately scanned with an eye detector. In the last stage, a specifically
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Figure 8.3 Flow diagram of framework for adaptive face and eye localization
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Figure 8.4 A simple case showing the workflow of the proposed framework
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trained eye-pair classifier is used to identify the three most probable eye pairs from
the previous detections and the eye localization is derived from the average positions
of the three pairs. Tang et al. [228] proposed a similar three level system including
an AdaBoost face detector, an AdaBoost eye detector and a SVM post classifier.
Only the upper part of the previously identified face region is scanned with another
AdaBoost classifier trained on eyes to reduce the computational complexity. The
SVM trained on geometrical features regarding the eye positions within the face
region is employed to evaluate all pairs of detections and those classified as admissible
configurations are averaged together. Campadelli et al. [22] built a top-down system
consisting of two modules: the eye detector and the eye localizer. Each module is
built around a SVM trained on optimally selected Haar wavelet coefficients. The eye
detector not only produces a rough localization of the general eye features but also
validates the output of the face detector. The very recent work done by Kasinski
and Schmidt [142] presented a three-stage hierarchical face and eyes detection system
augmented with some simple knowledge based rules. The eye localization works on
the previously found face regions in their system. The simple knowledge-based rule
is used in the final stage, where an in-plane rotation φ is calculated for each left and
right eye combination in a given face rectangle and the eye pairs with |φ| > 20◦ are
discarded. Compared to these earlier works, the top-down scheme involved in our
proposal was widely used in the previous detection systems. However, our proposed
framework is the first attempt to apply the immunity-based approach to the area of
face detection and has several important features that make it unique and useful:
1. A fast and high-level detection method is proceeded as the first step to exclude
the non-face images from the incoming patterns. The previous works handled
all images using the same procedure by simply assuming all images contain
faces.
2. An evolutionary process automatically generates the optimal parameter settings
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and selects the appropriate face detector. Moreover, the performance of the face
or eye detectors could be maximized in terms of efficiency and accuracy through
the mutation and selection process.
3. The eye localization is scanned in a more restricted region to reduce the computational complexity and expedite the processing. The scanning region is finely
and automatically tuned through the evolutionary process and thus the additional detection, feature extraction or computation is avoided.
4. The process of recognition and evolution is an offline process for finding highquality solutions to face and eye detection. The complexity of this process is
not propagated to the detecting process in the Response layer, which usually
requires the fast or real-time response.
5. The suppression mechanism proposed in our framework terminates detecting
process at the early stage when the known errors or unexpected behaviors are
found. It is a useful feature for cost reduction that is usually considered for an
industry-level application.

8.5
8.5.1

Experiments and Results
PUT Face Database

Our experiments were performed on a new database of color, high resolution (2048x1536)
face images taken by CIE Biometric Group at Poznan University of Technology
(PUT) [141]. The PUT face database consists of almost 10,000 images of 100 people.
The images were taken in partially controlled illumination conditions over the uniform
background. Therefore, the main factor altering the face appearance in this database
is the pose variation. Fig. 8.5 presents some exemplary pose variations from the
PUT face database. Additional data such as rectangular regions of interest (ROIs),
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landmark points and contours are also provided in this database to provide a ground
truth for the face and eyes detection tasks. All the face and eye ROI rectangles were
adjusted to have the aspect ratio of 0.8 and 1.8, respectively.

8.5.2

Experimental Procedures

First, positive images and negative (background) images were collected for the HCC
training. The 4879 face images are selected as positive samples from the first 50
persons in the PUT face database and not changed during the experiment. The nonfaces negative samples consist of the 3452 diverse pictures not containing any faces
and 1496 images from the PUT face database with occluded faces. The non-eyes
negative samples were created from the face images with the left or right eye occluded.
The influence of the various training parameters and the training set diversity on the
HCC performance was investigated in [142], which instructed us to set up the training
experiments to obtain an efficient and precise detection system. All the HCCs were
trained using the Gentle AdaBoost and 4-split CART as a weak classifiers. Both
parameters of minhitrate and maxfalsealarm are set to 0.9999 and 0.3, respectively.
The input pattern size was set to 20x25 pixels for face haar training and 18x10 pixels
for the eyes haar training.
Both Th detectors and B detectors are initialized by assigning each attribute a
random value within a certain range as listed in Table 8.2. In Table 8.2, the face
detector options were trained as follows:
• Option 1: occluded face and arbitrary negative set, minhitrate = 0.9999, maxfalsealarm = 0.3, 4-split CART as a weak classifier, Gentle AdaBoost
• Option 2: occluded face and arbitrary negative set, minhitrate = 0.999, maxfalsealarm = 0.5, 4-split CART as a weak classifier, Gentle AdaBoost
Although it is known that Option 1 actually produces a higher detection ratio than
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Figure 8.5 Examples of pose variations from the test set in our experiments
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Table 8.2 The range of attribute value in Th and B detector
Attribute name

Th detector

B detector

hcc

Option 1 or 2

eye detector

scale factor

1.01 - 1.20

1.001 - 1.01

min neighbors

0-5

0-5

flags

default or Canny pruning Canny pruning

min face width

300 - 500

N/A

search width left scale

N/A

0.40 - 0.70

search width right scale

N/A

0.40 - 0.70

search height up scale

N/A

0.00 - 0.20

search height bottom scale

N/A

0.40 - 0.60

option 2, we still trained option 2 to test whether the system has the ability to automatically pick up the optimal face detector. To define the smallest face to search
for in the Th detector, the region width is randomly assigned between 300 and 500
pixels and the corresponding region height is calculated based on the region width
and the aspect ratio of 0.8. The face images from other 50 persons (different from
the training set) in the PUT face database are used for validation data set and
test data set. Among about 100 face images taken for each person, 10 images are
randomly picked up to contribute to the validation data set and the remaining images are used for testing. The testing data set in our experiments consists of 4515
face images from the PUT face database and 3019 non-face images downloaded at
http://tutorial-haartraining.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/data/negatives/. The initial
population of the MILA-based detectors is checked with the validation date set in
the Recognition and Evolution layer to find high-quality solutions to the problem of
face and eye detection and localization. Only the single best solution to the face and
eye detection, which is coded as Th detector or B detector, is exploited to detect the
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unknown images in the testing data set.

8.5.3

Evaluation Protocol

Face Detection and Localization
APC detector is used to control a high-level face detection. In this stage, if one or
more faces are detected in the face image, then it is detected as True Positive (TP);
if one or more faces are detected in the non-face image, then it is reported as False
Positive (FP); if no face is detected in the non-face image, then it is classified as True
Negative (TN); if no face is detected in the face image, then a False Negative (FN)
is counted. The evaluation methods in the field of anomaly detection are adopted to
measure the performance of APC detector controlled face detection, as introduced in
Chapter 3.
Th detector controls the face localization and more complicated cases are observed.
Both the size difference and the displacement between the detected face region and
the ground truth ROI are considered to measure the face detection efficiency. As
shown in Fig. 8.6, the bounding rectangle is found for the detected face rectangular
region and the ground truth ROI. If both the area of the detected face rectangular
region and the area of the ground truth ROI are greater than 70% of the bounding
rectangle, then a TP is claimed, otherwise the case is classified as FP. The following
cases are considered as FP for face detection:
1. The detected face region is different from the ground truth as described above.
2. One or more face is found in the non-face image by APC detector or T detector.
3. Multiple faces are detected in the face image because each image in the PUT
face database only contains one face.
Fig. 8.7 shows some examples of false positives for face localization, one can see that
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Figure 8.6 Correctness measure for face detection
these detections seem acceptable but are classified as false positives when the 70%
is used as the threshold for the boundary between TP and FP. If no face was found
in the face image or the face cannot be detected by APC detector, then the result is
considered as FN. If no face was found in the arbitrary non-face image, then TN can
be declared. As noted, the definitions of TP, FP, TN, or FN in this stage are widely
varied compared to those defined in anomaly detection. Hence, the measurement
methods used in the field of anomaly detection are not appropriate here. Instead,
TPR (TP Ratio), FPR (FP Ratio) and FNR (FN Ratio), which are computed as
dividing TP, FP, FN by the total face images, respectively, are employed to evaluate
the performance of face localization controlled by Th detector.
Eye Localization
One of the popular error measures for eye detection introduced by Jesorsky et al. [128]
was used in our experiments. Let and stand for the center of the detected rectangle
of the left eye and the right eye, respectively; and stand for the center of the ground
truth rectangle of the left eye and the right eye, respectively. The relative error of
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Figure 8.7 Some examples of false positives for face localization: red rectangle stands for a detected face region whereas green rectangle is the manually
annotated ground truth
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the eye detection is calculated by equation 8.1.


el , Cr − C
fr
max Cl − C
error =
kCl − Cr k

(8.1)

The relative error lower than 0.25 is a reasonable criterion to flag the eye presence
[23] (to be claimed as TP). The following cases are reported as FP for eye localization
in our experiments:
1. Multiple faces are detected in the face image because it is very possible that
multiple eyes are detected as well in this case, although the eye localization is
not proceeded (terminated by Ts detection) based on our proposal.
2. One or more eyes are detected in the non-face image.
3. Multiple left eyes are detected in the face image.
4. Multiple right eyes are detected in the face image.
5. No eye is detected in one side but one or more eyes are detected in the other
side.
6. Although only one left eye and one right eye are detected in the face image, the
detected eye location is different from the ground truth as described above.
If no eye is detected in the face image, then it is FN. If no face is detected by
APC detector or Th detector controlled localization, then the eye localization is not
proceeded but TN or FN is still counted for eye localization. The TN is defined when
both eyes are not detected in the non-face image. Obviously, the stricter definitions
of FPs are employed in our experiments and the errors occurred in the preceded steps
are passed to the stage of the eye localization that is controlled by B detector. TPR,
FPR, and FNR are also used to evaluate the performance of the eye localization. It
is easily derived that the performance of the eye localization in the Response layer
roughly reflects the performance of the overall detecting system.
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Validation Process
In our experiments, all images in the validation data set contain only one face, so the
true negative result was impossible in the Recognition and Evolution layer. In the
same layer, the performance of the B detector controlled eye localization was tested
on the manually marked face region. Therefore, the system performance in this layer
is evaluated by TPR.

8.5.4

Results

In the first high-level detection (APC detector driven detection), our detection system
can distinguish between the face images and the nonface images with a very high
detection rate of 96.54% and far lower false alarm rate of 1.16% while the minimum
search window is set to 1/5 of image width and 1/3 of image height and the scale
increasing rate is set to 1.01. Fig. 8.8 shows some examples of face and eye localization
from the testing set, which are obtained with the following MILA-based memory
detectors (referring to the representation of the detectors described in section 8.4.1):
Memory Th detector: hOption1, 1.05, 2, Canny pruning, 400i
Memory B detector: h0.6, 0.6, 0.1, 0.5, 1.005, 5, 3i
We also recorded the overall performance for the above memory Th detector and B
detector: TPR, FPR and FNR for face localization are 83.88%, 7.69%, and 8.44%,
respectively; TPR, FPR and FNR for eye localization are 83.46%, 7.13%, and 9.41%,
respectively. Additional experimental results are reported in Table 8.3 1 . The corresponding parameter settings that are automatically selected by our detection system
are recorded in Table 8.4. With the information in Table 8.4, one can exactly repeat
1

The definition of the parameters in the table 8.3: nTh : total number of initial Th detectors; nB :

total number of initial B detectors; tTh : Th detector activation threshold; tB : B detector activation
threshold
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our experimental results reported in Table 8.3. As evidenced by the experimental results in Table 8.3, our detection system worked successfully for locating the face and
eyes. The best solution (No.3) that has been automatically found during the proposed
evolutionary process is able to accurately locate 90.59% of the faces with very low
FPR of 2.26%, while testing with 4515 face images and 3019 arbitrary images. This
solution can fully automatically locate the eyes based on the detected face region in
the previous step with the TPR of 85.36% and the FPR of 7.29%. Due to the uniqueness of the proposed detection system, experiment design and measurement method,
we could not directly compare our techniques with the previous works. However, the
results we obtained are really promising in comparison to the very recent work [142],
where they used the same face image database and could detect 90% of the faces
and 94% of the eyes with the FPR of 11% and 13%, respectively. Table 8.4 shows
that the Option 2 face detector is abandoned by the memory Th detector in all five
experiments, which indicates that our system has the ability to correctly pick up the
optimal face detector (option 1), as it is clear that increasing the complexity of the
weak classifiers significantly. improves the performance of the face detector. The
experimental results also suggest that the population of Th detector candidates and
B detector candidates in the initial repository must reach a certain size to secure the
high-quality detectors to be found. The larger the population, the more the chance
to find the best solution. However, it does not mean that the memory detectors that
are obtained based on the largest candidate repository are guaranteed to be better
than those selected from the relatively smaller repository. The outcome of the evolutionary process is also influenced by the randomness and mutation of the initial
detector candidates. Our experiments also find that both minimum neighbors number and the resizing factor of the detection window (scale factor) are very sensitive to
the performance of Haar cascade object detection. The smaller scale factor improves
the accuracy of the face and eye localization. When the minimum neighbors number
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Table 8.3 Experimental results for the test set containing 4515 face images
and 3019 arbitrary images

No.

Face Localization

Eye Localization

TPR

FPR

FNR

TPR

FPR

FNR

Experimental Parameters

1

nTh =20;nB =10;tTh =0.80;tB =0.75

82.66

2.52

14.82 78.05

6.89

15.06

2

nTh =40;nB =20;tTh =0.80;tB =0.75

85.67

2.75

11.58 81.04

6.95

12.00

3

nTh =60;nB =30;tTh =0.80;tB =0.75

90.59

2.26

7.15

85.36

7.29

7.35

4

nTh =80;nB =40;tTh =0.80;tB =0.75

89.99

3.63

6.38

81.95 11.10

6.95

5

nTh =100;nB =50;tTh =0.80;tB =0.75 88.90

4.78

6.31

83.65

6.64

9.70

Table 8.4 The selected detectors through the evolutionary process in the
proposed framework
No.
1
2
3
4
5

Th detector

B detector

hOption1, 1.04, 5, Canny pruning, 476i h0.68, 0.69, 0.11, 0.49, 1.003, 5, 5i
hOption1, 1.04, 3, def ault, 480i

h0.63, 0.64, 0.05, 0.53, 1.007, 4, 2i

hOption1, 1.01, 3, Canny pruning, 500i h0.68, 0.70, 0.05, 0.59, 1.003, 5, 3i
hOption1, 1.03, 1, def ault, 496i

h0.55, 0.55, 0.20, 0.54, 1.004, 2, 1i

hOption1, 1.04, 1, Canny pruning, 470i h0.65, 0.67, 0.14, 0.53, 1.004, 3, 2i

is set to a smaller value, the higher TPR can be obtained but the FPR is possibly
increased as well.

8.6

Summary

This chapter has demonstrated an immunity-based framework for automatic and
adaptive eye localization in the previously found face bounding box. This framework
introduces an evolutionary process to make the detection system more efficient and
robust by automatically generating the optimal parameter settings, selecting the ap-
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Figure 8.8 Some results of face and eye localization from test sets
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propriate face detector, and restricting the scanning region for eye localization. It only
searches the partial face region that is tuned through the evolutionary process to reduce the computational complexity and expedite the processing. The implementation
of the proposed framework involves three basic layers: Initialization, Recognition and
Evolution, and Response. The Initialization layer generates the repository of MILAbased detectors, several haar cascade face detectors, a haar cascade left eye detector
and a haar cascade right eye detector. Recognition and Evolution layer identifies
the high-quality solutions to face and eye detection by combining the efficient face
or eye detector and the optimal control parameters for the face detection and eye
localization. The results from the experiments with 7534 face and arbitrary images
clearly demonstrate that our detection system was able to properly distinguish between the face images and the nonface images with a very high detection rate of
96.54% and far lower false alarm rate of 1.16%. The experiments have proven that
the proposed framework can correctly select the optimal parameter settings and the
best HCC detectors. The best solution that has been automatically identified by our
proposed framework can fully automatically locate 90.59% of the faces and 85.36%
of the eyes. The extraction of other facial features such as mouth and nose can be
easily incorporated in our proposed framework. Future work will further extend this
framework, investigate a more effective evolutionary strategies and finally establish a
complete face recognition system.
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Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks and Future
Directions
While the researchers tend to turn to nature for inspiration to establish novel approaches for computational problems that become more complex, the biological immune system has been paid a great deal of attention as it has various computational
mechanism and process to offer by way of inspiration to computer scientists and
engineers alike. The mechanism of self versus nonself recognition in the immune system is a challenging mystery in modern science. Among various immune theories
of self-nonself discrimination, self-nonself model is the earliest one, which has dominated the field for almost 60 years. Some new immune theories are also proposed to
accommodate new findings incompatible with self-nonself model, including Pattern
Recognition Receptors (PRRs) Model and Danger Theory. The field of Artificial Immune System (AIS) emerged in 1990s. Only about four years later, self-nonself model
had been gained attention by computer scientists to be explored for AIS model called
Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA), which now becomes well-established and by far
the most popular algorithm in the field of AIS. Based on our survey in Chapter 2,
danger theory has been also drawn more attention evidenced by many publications
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on the applications of Danger theory and the development of the Dendritic Cell Algorithm. Although it offered an ingenious solution to some new findings against the
self-nonself model, the PRRs Model has not yet been aroused enough attention in the
community of AIS researchers. Considering the issues encountered, there is an analog
between self-nonself model and NSA. Self-nonself model cannot explain some new experimental findings while NSA suffers its intrinsic limit of a high false positive error
rate. Since PRRs model can solve some problems existed in the self-nonself model,
it is our belief that the ideas behind the PRRs model can be borrowed to solve (at
least alleviate) some issues in NSA. The success of Conserved Self Pattern Algorithm
(CSPRA) developed in this dissertation confirms our initial thoughts and intuition.
This work inspires the researchers in the AIS field to seek out solutions for the problems in the existing AIS models from the advanced immune theories. The CSPRA
attempted to solve the issues in NSA by revising the NSA’s initial and fundamental
assumption. In the CSPRA, all foreign patterns are not simply viewed as anomalies.
The “unseen self” and “altered self”, which are different from the original known self
samples (training data) or the generalized self with the control parameter self radius,
are classified as “self” by the specific conserved self pattern detector (APC detector),
at least conceptually. However, these cases are generally considered as “nonself” in
NSA. Despite this fundamental and vital change, the CSPRA has several important
advantages over the previous works: revised concept of “self”, definition of conserved
self pattern, concept of ambiguous boundary, randomized method, near-deterministic
detector generation, and effective estimate of detector coverage. The proposed techniques and strategies involved in the CSPRA can be either converted to a standalone
algorithm or combined with the other AIS algorithms.
The biological immune system is an intricate network of specialized tissues, organs, cells, and chemicals with the capability of distinguishing between “self” and
“nonself”, maintaining a memory of past encounters and continually learning about
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new encounters. It employs a multilevel defense to protect the body from invading
pathogens through nonspecific (innate) and specific (adaptive) immunity. Humoral
immunity is one type of the adaptive immunity and widely exists in our body. Multilevel Immune Learning Algorithm was developed by taking the abstraction of the
immunological events involved in the humoral immunity. MILA has many features
to distinguish with other AIS models. For example, in addition to its own features,
it imports the merits of negative selection algorithm and clone selection theory; the
multilevel detection makes the system very sensitive to any changes or robust to
noise; the cloning in MILA is a targeted (not blind) cloning companying with a process of the detector on-line learning and optimization. Our early work employed the
shape-space model to represent the detectors at various levels. The detector sets
at different levels are generated in a negative selection manner with different implementation mechanisms. Therefore, the early version of the MILA could be viewed
as a multilevel negative selection algorithm with the ability of evolutionary. Now,
we extend the MILA as a generic framework to develop an adaptive system for eye
localization via face detection. The proposed framework remains the basic features
of the MILA, for example, the different layers (Initialization, Recognition and Evolution, Response), various types of detectors (APC detector, Th detector, Ts detector,
B detector) and evolutionary process (clone, mutation, and selection). However, the
concept of negative selection has been abandoned in the proposed framework and
thus the complexity of the system has been significantly reduced by removing the
process of the multiple complicated detector generations.
Undeniably, the success of AIS applications is still limited by the lack of killer
AIS applications being accepted in industry. This dissertation investigated the applications of the CSPRA and MILA in several important and interesting areas: 1)
anomaly detection; 2) clinical diagnosis; 3) network-based intrusion detection; and
4) face detection. Again, we have to admit that the applications presented in this
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dissertation might not be accepted in industry without further efforts. However, this
dissertation demonstrated that the performance of our techniques is very promising
in the explored application areas in comparison to that of the previous works. Therefore, the techniques presented in this dissertation have the great potential to lead to
practical use in industry.
The works that have been done in this dissertation are important contributions to
the field of AIS and have opened many interesting areas to pursue further. From long
term perspective, the following interesting and practically useful topics are worthy of
being further pondered:
1. Conserved self pattern is an important concept in the CSPRA. The advantages
of the CSPRA rely on an appropriate conserved self pattern that can be found
in the application data. If the conserved self pattern cannot be found, then the
CSPRA performs exactly like NSA or its variants, depending on the implementation of the T detector. Objectively, there is a conserved self pattern in most
application. However, find the conserved self pattern is sometimes a challenging
task. Some mathematical and statistical methods and data mining techniques
can be further examined for this task.
2. Different distance measure, data representation, and matching rule for both T
detector and APC detector in the CSPRA need to be further examined. In particular, the distance measure for APC detector is very tight with the definition
of the conserved self pattern. These issues are suggested to be addressed in
the context of a specific application. Customization of these settings based on
specific applications or the existing domain knowledge will potentially improve
the performance of the algorithm for the specific application.
3. In addition to the further exploration of the real-world applications of the
CSPRA and MILA we investigated in this dissertation when more resources
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become available and new techniques and knowledge emerges, searching for
more real-world problems is very practical research topic by considering the
nature and features of CSPRA and MILA. For example, any one-class classification problems are not only suitable to any negative selection algorithm
but also potential applications for the CSPRA. The successful applications of
evolutionary algorithms can inspire us to search useful and practical problem
domains for MILA. MILA can be also viewed as a generic framework to direct
the development of a complicated system.
4. Of all NSA variants, the proposals of the different detector generation scheme
rank at the top, based on our survey on recent advances in the field of AIS. Neardeterministic detector generation proposed in this dissertation is a by-product
of the CSPRA aiming at lessening the randomness of detector generation and
alleviating the overlapping of detector placement. The overlapping of detectors
requires more detectors to cover nearly full nonself space and thus severely
reduce the efficiency of the detecting process in NSA. However, the issue of the
detector overlapping has not yet been solved or even significantly alleviated in
the existing techniques of detector generation. Solving this problem is a tough
but vital future direction in the NSA research area. It may need the researchers
from AIS, mathematics and geometry to learn from each other through working
in an interdisciplinary manner.
5. MILA is inspired from a complex humoral immune response, which involves
many tissues, organs, cells, and chemicals to communicate and interact with
each other to kill the body enemies. Understanding the MILA and the immunological mechanisms and theories behind the algorithm that have already been
deeply explored in this dissertation will be very helpful to develop a mathematical model for these very interesting immunological events. The development of
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the mathematical model of humoral immunity in turn helps to apply new ideas
to improve or analyze the MILA.
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